March 2007 News Stories

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Anchorage Daily News
March 31, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/story/8753739p-8655200c.html

Oil spill barges lacking storage
PRINCE WILLIAM SOUND: Capacity is found to be lower than regulators thought.
By WESLEY LOY
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 31, 2007
Last Modified: March 31, 2007 at 01:16 AM

Tanker companies have admitted to the state that their Prince William Sound oil-spill response barges -- vital tools for a cleanup operation -- can't hold as much oil as originally specified.

Now state pollution regulators are mulling whether to hit the ship operators with a violation or fine.

"It's an urgent issue and we are taking action," said Betty Schorr, industry preparedness program manager for the state Department of Environmental Conservation.

The barges would play a critical role in the event of a large spill, serving as holding tanks for oil and oily water skimmed from the Sound.

Tanker operators for oil companies BP, Conoco Phillips, Exxon Mobil and others disclosed in a "notice of nonreadiness" to the state Thursday that barges arrayed around the Sound can hold about 68,700 barrels or nearly 2.9 million gallons less than previously thought.

That trims the holding capacity of the five barges by 10 to 15 percent, Schorr said. The barges, along with powerful tugs and other gear, were deployed around the Sound in the wake of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, which released about 11 million gallons of crude oil into the water.

The DEC and state lawyers are reviewing the barge capacity shortfall, and might cite the tanker operators Monday with a notice of violation, Schorr said. A civil fine could follow.

"That is a possibility if they're found out of compliance," she said.

Tanker operators said a consultant discovered the capacity shortfall while reviewing the performance of oil-skimming and other equipment on the barges.

At least part of capacity error came from not accounting for the weight of spill cleanup equipment on the decks of the barges, Schorr said.

The tanker companies did the right thing and notified DEC officials, said Anil Mathur, president of Alaska Tanker Co., a Beaverton, Ore., company that hauls North Slope crude oil for BP.

Despite the lower barge capacity, Mathur said tanker operators don't believe they've violated state law on oil spill response preparedness.

"No change in equipment has occurred," Alaska Tanker Co. manager Capt. Tom Colby wrote in the Thursday letter to DEC. "Rather, in the course of efforts to improve our barge system, we unexpectedly discovered that an assumption with respect to barge storage capacity was inaccurate. Out of an abundance of caution we disclosed this information to the department."

Discovery of the capacity error has not halted or slowed down oil shipments out of the Sound, DEC and oil company spokesmen said Friday.

A big reason for that is a raft of extra precautions the tanker companies have voluntarily put into place until the barge matter is settled, Schorr said.

Barges have been repositioned or put on standby in the Sound and in Cook Inlet; tug escorts for loaded tankers have been increased; and a one-way traffic zone for tankers moving through Valdez Narrows has been extended.

The tanker operators, which include Conoco's Polar Tankers Inc. subsidiary, Exxon's SeaRiver Maritime Inc. and others, also originally committed to running oil-laden tankers through the Sound only during daylight, but quickly dropped that measure.

It was a "stupid idea" that could increase traffic congestion and risk as tankers move in and out of Valdez, Mathur said.

One potential solution to the barge problem might be to bring in another barge to boost capacity, he said.

But Mathur said his preference would be to concentrate on preventing spills in the first place, not laying out more money for after-the-fact equipment.

The Prince William Sound Regional Citizens' Advisory Council, which keeps watch over tanker operations, questioned why the shipping companies would not "immediately obtain additional storage capacity to resolve any shortfall."

But council spokesman Stan Jones gave the tanker operators credit for self-reporting the barge shortfall.

"They dug it up themselves, they disclosed it and now they're working supposedly to remedy it," he said.



Daily News reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.

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http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/story/8752136p-8653676c.html

Regulators slam oil pipeline fees
By WESLEY LOY
Published: March 30, 2007
Last Modified: March 30, 2007 at 02:51 PM

Lawyers for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission have again blasted owners of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline for overcharging to move oil through the line.

In a brief filed last week, the FERC lawyers say “the record is woefully inadequate” to support the high rates sought by the pipeline owners, which are BP, Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, Koch Industries and Chevron.

The lawyers urged the five-member commission to reject rates that averaged $4.02 per barrel last year and instead go with a fairer rate set by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska: $1.96 per barrel.

It’s the second time in recent weeks that lawyers for the FERC have weighed in on the legal fight that’s been raging for years in both the courts and before the federal regulatory commission.

The fight involves the pipeline owners, the state, and two nonpipeline owners that rely on the 800-mile line to move oil: refiner Tesoro and North Slope oil producer Anadarko.

At stake is hundreds of millions of dollars for the state, whose oil tax collections go down as pipeline transportation costs go up.

Reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.

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Financial Times
March 27, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/fd80adde-dbff-11db-9233-000b5df10621.html

BP blast probe finds tensions at top
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 27 2007 03:00 |
Last updated: March 27 2007 03:00

An internal BP investigation into the Texas City refinery explosion found John Manzoni, the chief executive of refining, should have done a "much deeper dive" into the true state of the facility after "clear warning signals" from previous accidents.

The confidential report concludes that Mr Manzoni - who until late last year was regarded as being near the top of the list to succeed Lord Browne as BP's chief executive - lacked refining experience and failed to obtain information needed to understand better his complex and important refining asset and the risk of a big accident. The report also reveals tensions between him and Mike Hoffman, then group vice-president for refining and marketing, upon whom he chose to rely for information.

These tensions temper the criticism of Mr Manzoni. The report states that the "standoff" between the two contributed to Mr Manzoni's lack of understanding of the risks at Texas City.

The report, dated February 2007, summed up the findings of the team led by BP's Wilhelm Bonse-Geuking. It was appointed to investigate whom to hold accountable for the Texas City blast, which killed 15 people and injured a further 500.

Although the report clears Mr Manzoni of "serious neglect or intentional misconduct,'' it says he should have taken more steps to consider and mitigate the risks long before the disaster occurred.

The report divided individuals into four tiers in descending order of accountability. Mr Hoffman, along with three other senior US executives, were placed in Tier 1 and recommended for dismissal. Tier 1 includes "direct accountability for substantial management activities; aggravating factors generally outweigh mitigating factors". Mr Hoffman retired earlier this year.

The report places Mr Manzoni as the sole executive in a "Tier 2" of responsibility for the accident which means "direct accountability for substantial management activities; balance of aggravating and mitigating factors".

The report notes that Mr Manzoni visited Texas City several times. These visits "ought to have given him some of the missing information (or at least critical clues) that Texas City refinery was in worryingly poor condition, and that there were serious questions concerning its overall operating condition.''

The appropriate response should have been "a much deeper dive into the process safety environment of refining, especially at Texas City, compared with what he did do in response to this incident (increasing inspection and expenditures, as well as emphasising Just Culture)".

The US Chemical Safety Board, the federal agency charged with investigating the blast, last week issued its final report. It found audits and safety reports revealing the deterioration at the site were shared with BP executives in London and with at least one member of the executive board - Mr Manzoni.

Mr Manzoni's secretary said: "We have no comment." BP said: "The team found no evidence that anyone acted in bad faith or violated BP's Code of Conduct. As a matter of policy, BP does not comment on personnel matters.'' Attempts to contact Mr Hoffman proved unsuccessful.

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/68c2896e-dc00-11db-9233-000b5df10621.html

Trained for the top slot at BP but passed over
after safety breaches on his watch
By Carola Hoyos
Published: March 27 2007 03:00 |
Last updated: March 27 2007 03:00

John Manzoni was until last year the second-most likely man to take over as chief executive of BP, the UK energy group.

That the head of refining and marketing had to bear some responsibility for the refinery explosions that killed 15 people at BP Texas City plant in March 2005 did not stop company insiders from touting his abilities as well as his chances.

Like Tony Hayward, head of exploration and refining, the front-runner who eventually beat Mr Manzoni and three others to be chosen as chief executive-designate, Mr Manzoni was one of Lord Browne's "turtles", a nickname derived from the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles.

Turtles were picked out of the pack early to spend time shadowing the chief executive as he worked, from striking deals with rich but unpredictable Russian oligarchs to deciding whether to sell the company's legacy North Sea oil field.

Mr Manzoni holds an honours degree in civil engineering and a masters degree in petroleum engineering from Imperial College, London.

He joined BP in 1983 and spent time working in the North Sea.

Mr Manzoni has been head of investor relations, head of strategy and vice-president of Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, which would be the sceneof leaking pipelines and become the company's second big recent blunder.

He also holds a degree in business management from Stanford University in California and ran BP's integration with Amoco.

Mr Manzoni later oversaw European refining and marketing and gas and power, before being appointed chief executive of refining and marketing in 2002 and a board member in 2003.

He works harder than most of his peers but the performance of BP's refining operations still lags behind that of many of its rivals.

Dynamic, pragmatic, numerate and focused on detail, he is perhaps the quintessential engineer.

Yet, his family line has a literary bent.

In the 19th century, his great, great, great grandfather Alessandro Manzoni wrote The Betrothed, a romantic novel set in 17th century strife and plague-ridden Lombardy.

Giuseppe Verdi's requiem was dedicated to him and first performed in 1874 on the anniversary of his death. The novel is considered one of the greatest works of modern Italian fiction.

Mr Manzoni was unaware of his distinguished ancestry until it was recently pointed out to him by a colleague.

Some outsiders regard Mr Manzoni as slightly more able though less jovial than Mr Hayward.

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/98a2a46c-dbff-11db-9233-000b5df10621.html

BP and the crude task of balancing cost and danger
By John Kay
Published: March 27 2007 03:00 |
Last updated: March 27 2007 03:00

Last week the US Chemical Safety Board published its review of the fatal explosion at BP's Texas City oil refinery. The board criticised senior executives of the company for demanding cost reductions at the expense of safety. Chemical plants are, by their nature, full of flammable liquids. Airlines carry their customers in fragile metal boxes at speed and altitude. Pharmaceutical products are effective only because they interfere with our bodies.

Refineries, aircraft and drugs are inherently dangerous. There is no limit to what can be spent to make them safer. But if there were no limit to spending, oil, flying and pharmacology would be prohibitively expensive. To say that safety must always come first, as we are all inclined to do when we hear of a tragic accident, is to indulge in empty rhetoric. It is to ignore the real social, ethical and commercial dilemmas that conscientious commentators, regulators and business people face.

Business activities such as chemicals, flying and pharmaceuticals are heavily regulated. Agencies such as CSB must balance the conflicting public interests in greater safety and cheaper products. Some do so explicitly: their economists try to calculate the monetary value of life, serious accidents and environmental damage. Perhaps companies should make the same assessment?

The Ford Motor Company once did. The company's calculation was the "smoking gun" in what may be the most famous trial in the history of product liability. Richard Grimshaw, a 13-year-old passenger, suffered horrible disfigurement when a Ford Pinto caught fire after a rear-end collision. A Californian jury awarded $125m in punitive damages, but this was reduced on appeal.

Legend has Ford executives marketing a dangerous car after estimating that it would be cheaper to settle with grieving widows than to spend $10 per car protecting the fuel tank. The facts are somewhat different. The offending memo was prepared as part of a submission to the company's safety regulator, the National Highway Transportation Safety Agency. The memo did not estimate the costs to Ford of protecting the fuel tank from the accident that injured Mr Grimshaw, but the cost to the US car industry of reducing the risk of fuel leakage if a car rolled over. The value of life in the calculation, at $200,000, is offensively low: much less than a US jury typically awards, and much less than the jury did in fact award to the family of the driver of the Pinto, who was killed in the accident. But the figure is based on a common methodology used by public agencies in such assessments and its source was the NHTSA itself. Ford's calculation was precisely the one it believed the agency would make.

The Pinto was not a safe car. Small cars on US roads are vulnerable. The Pinto's safety record was neither better nor worse than that of other small cars on American roads at the time.

Making decisions that balance human life against costs is unavoidable. Doctors and politicians, generals and road engineers must do so all the time. Everyone who buys a compact car makes such a trade-off. We wish it were not so. We prefer that the calculations are implicit rather than explicit. We prefer them to be made by public agencies than by private companies. And we deny that we make these judgments ourselves, although we do so every day.

Ford's error in that memorandum was a more subtle one than the story of profit before human life - which may, nevertheless, have been the reality - allows. A private business had asserted the authority which only a political process can make legitimate. The safest course for a company making judgments about public safety - and it is not a very safe course either for the company or the public - is to rise slightly above the standards of its peers.

The unattractive consequence is that safety standards and costs are the outcome not of calculation, but of competition and comparison. BP's mistake was to let standards slip in an environment where financial market pressure to enhance earnings per share meant that competition served to lower standards, not to raise them.

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Financial Times
March 26, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/01342ed8-db2e-11db-ba4d-000b5df10621.html

BP in Alaska is a safety model
By Richard Berkowitz

Published: March 26 2007 03:00 |
Last updated: March 26 2007 03:00

From Mr Richard Berkowitz.

Sir,
In recent months the Financial Times has provided extensive coverage of the failure of BP to address safety issues adequately in its US operations, most notably BP's Texas City refinery and Prudhoe Bay pipelines. The lack of safety measures taken, as reported in the FT, is truly appalling. However, it is contrary to my personal experience with other parts of BP, such as the Alaska Tanker Company, a vessel operator BP helped create, whose ownership is 25 per cent BP, and whose exclusive client in the Alaska oil tanker trade is BP.

The Alaska Tanker Company has won top national honours from the US Coast Guard along with regional and state regulatory agency awards for adhering to the highest safety standards and having a spill prevention record that is unmatched in the world. Despite transporting more than 1bn barrels of oil in a harsh marine environment, ATC has not spilled more than a barrel of oil in each of the last six years and has the enviable record of no spills in the last two years. This achievement is surpassed only by ATC's operations having well over 10m man-hours without a single time-loss incident.

Clearly, this element of BP's business is a model for all of us as they have put an extreme emphasis on personnel safety and operational integrity while maintaining competitive costs with others in the Alaska trade.

Richard Berkowitz,
Director, Pacific Coast Operations,
Transportation Institute,
Seattle, WA 98121, US


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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/8e0efe56-db2d-11db-ba4d-000b5df10621.html

BP investors poised to oppose pay proposal
By Kate Burgess
Published: March 26 2007 03:00 |
Last updated: March 26 2007 03:00

Some shareholders in BP are threatening to vote against the oil company's executive pay proposals in protest at the size of Lord Browne's remuneration package when he leaves in July.

The Local Authority Pension Fund Forum (LAPFF), whose members own about 1.2 per cent of BP and have £70bn in total under management, has said its members would oppose BP's remuneration report at the forthcoming annual meeting because of an "insufficient linkage between executive pay and health-and-safety performance".

Pirc, which advises investors on governance issues, is urging other BP shareholders to follow suit although the Association of British Insurers and Rrev, which advises National Association of Pension Fund members, have passed the oil company's report without critical comment.

The LAPFF's decisionfollows a series of safetyfailures at BP, notably the Texas City refinery blast, which killed 15 people in 2005, and the Prudhoe Bay spill in 2006. The company has been the subject of a series of highly critical reports, most recently this week from the Chemical Safety Board in the US. Last month, a panel led by James Baker, former US secretary of state, concluded that the BP management was to blame for the Texas City refinery explosion.

Pirc has raised questions over the BP board plans, outlined this month, to award Lord Browne shares of up to 7.5 times salary, based on long-term leadership measures and the group's share-price performance between 2007 and 2009, even though he will have left BP by July. The eventual award will be decided in 2009.

Pirc is also concerned about an additional payment of 12 months' pay, a £1.98m bonus and £90,000 of fringe benefits to which Lord Browne is entitled when he leaves in July.

One top-10 shareholder said: "It won't matter what the company has to say about contractual entitlements this is going to go down like a lead balloon in some quarters, notably the US."

The payment is on top of Lord Browne's total £4.5m pay packet in 2006, which was sharply down from the £6.3m he received in 2005. He was also awarded a potential 1.76m in shares in a long-term incentive plan maturing in 2008 and his pension pot is worth £21m.

In answer to previously expressed shareholder concerns, BP has promised that it will make the link between safety and bonuses clearer. Some shareholders have also pointed out that during Lord Browne's long tenure of more than 30 years at BP the share price has risen markedly. Rrev said it welcomed moves to postpone long-term incentive awards until the impact of an executive's actions become apparent even if that is long after the executive leaves.
 

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Wall Street Journal
March 26, 2007

UK's Local Authority Pension Fund To Oppose BP Pay Report
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 25, 2007 7:01 p.m.

 LONDON (Dow Jones)--Local Authority Pension Fund Forum said Monday that local authority pension funds will oppose the remuneration report of BP PLC (BP) at the company's upcoming annual shareholder meeting, due to concerns about insufficient linkage between executive pay and health and safety performance.

The LAPFF has recommended that its members, who own an estimated 1.2% of BP shares, vote against the company's remuneration report as a result of the company's failure to clearly tie executive rewards to safety performance.

LAPFF said it is also in contact with other institutional investors in the U.K. and overseas, who share its concerns.

The LAPFF, which was set up in 1991, is a voluntary association of 39 public sector pension funds based in the U.K. Its members currently have combined assets of more than GBP70 billion.

The LAPFF considers that BP's long-term incentive scheme should contain safety-related and other extra-financial performance elements.

"Given the company has stated that the change in its safety culture is a "5 to 10 year journey," LAPFF considers a link between long-term incentives and safety must form part of BP's remuneration policy," LAPFF said in a statement.

The LAPFF also believes extra-financial performance metrics should apply to all executive directors, not only the outgoing chief executive. In particular they should apply to the CEO designate, Tony Hayward, who is set to take over from Lord Browne in July 2007.

"Although the Forum acknowledges that the company has reduced directors' bonuses, it has raised concerns with BP about the reactive nature of the cuts.

"The company has responded by confirming that process safety components will be part of the 2007 annual bonus calculation.

"The Forum believes that this will be in line with BP's commitment to improve process safety. The Forum will assess the stringency of these targets in its analysis of the 2007 annual report," LAPFF said.

LAPFF chairman Darrell Pulk said: "Whilst we welcome the company's openness to investor engagement, and decision to include process safety as a factor in determining future bonuses, we have no choice but to oppose the remuneration report in this instance.

"It is important the investors give the company a clear message - if safety culture is to be at the heart of the business going forward, then it must also be inherent in the board's remuneration policy," Pulk said.

The LAPFF said it has been talking to BP for six months over the company's response to recent safety failures, including the Texas City Refinery blast in March 2005 and the Prudhoe Bay spill in July 2006.

The company has been criticized for its management of safety issues in reports by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker and, more recently, the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board.

BP's annual shareholder meeting is scheduled for April 12.

 -By Lilly Vitorovich, Dow Jones Newswires; 44-0-207 842 9290;
lilly.vitorovich@dowjones.com  
 

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Anchorage Daily News
March 24, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/pipeline/story/8734851p-8636461c.html

Exxon, BP proposals frustrate legislators
NO SPECIFICS: Changes sought in pipeline bill but no details are given.
By SABRA AYRES
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 24, 2007
Last Modified: March 24, 2007 at 01:38 AM

JUNEAU -- In testimony before state lawmakers Friday, both Exxon Mobil and BP called for changes to proposed legislation aimed at setting criteria for building a natural gas pipeline from the North Slope.

Representatives from the two companies made their pitch before the Senate Resources Committee, but the day ended with some lawmakers frustrated at what they said was the lack of specifics in their appeal.

Exxon Mobil and BP representatives agreed a producer-owned pipeline would be the best value for both the state and North Slope gas producers. But applicants who bid to build and operate the pipeline project should be allowed to set their own terms of inducements and financial certainties instead of being restricted by the criteria laid out in Gov. Sarah Palin's Alaska Gasline Inducement Act, the companies told the committee.

"The best way to allow competition is to allow applicants to come up with whatever inducements they feel are necessary," David Van Tuyl, the commercial manager for BP's Alaska Gas division, said during his testimony on the governor's gas line bill.

Palin's AGIA bill sets out requirements and incentives for applicants wishing to bid on a state license to build a gas line. But both BP and Exxon Mobil said the proposed legislation also needed more clarification on how the state would ensure financial stability for the project.

Uncertainties about the bill's financial terms pose serious risks for potential pipeline builders, said Martin Massey of Exxon Mobil.

The bill has a provision for a 10-year freeze on gas production for producers willing to commit their gas to the project. But producers indicated Friday they would prefer a longer, locked-in rate from the state.

The companies also said the bill's provision requiring the pipeline owner to share the cost of any capacity expansion via transportation fees could increase the financial risks.

"We are willing to take on the geologic, cost and future commodity rate risks, but we can't take on the risk of any unknown changes to the fiscal terms," Massey said.

A plan proposed last year by former Gov. Frank Murkowski teamed the state's three largest producers -- Exxon Mobil, BP and Conoco Phillips -- together to build the pipeline. The contract would have allowed a 30-year tax freeze on oil and a 45-year tax freeze on gas. The contract was criticized by lawmakers for giving away the state's ability to tax its largest revenue sources.

Lawmakers Friday pushed the producers to be more specific in what sort of financial stabilizing terms they would prefer. Both Van Tuyl and Massey, however, hedged on giving specifics, saying there were several possibilities that could make the project's risks manageable.

"I don't think we need new legislation," Van Tuyl said. "But I believe AGIA can be amended to allow the project applicants to specify what that risk-reward ratio should be."

The vagueness of both Exxon Mobil's and BP's request provoked frustration among several of the committee's members. Some members tried various ways of questioning to get the producers to clearly spell out what financial terms they would prefer to be included in AGIA.

Their attempts failed.

"I would genuinely like to see what kind of inducements they want or need," said Sen. Bill Wielechowski, D-Anchorage. "We have a process here where people can come forward with suggestions on legislation. We can do this without the producers, but I think it's preferable to do it with them."

At least one natural gas exploration company expressed concern Friday about a producer-owned pipeline.

Anadarko Petroleum Corp., which is currently exploring in the North Slope, said an independently operated pipeline would provide more access to the pipeline's capacity for explorers coming on line after the pipeline's construction.

"An independent pipeline owner is motivated to solicit more capacity," Mark Hanley, the public affairs manager for Anadarko, told lawmakers.

Legislators will conduct a second public hearing on AGIA today, followed by more committee hearings on the bill next week.

Sen. Charlie Huggins, R-Wasilla, has said that as chairman of the Resources Committee, he would like to see AGIA get to the Senate floor before the end of April.

Daily News reporter Sabra Ayres can be reached at
sayres@adn.com   or 1-907-586-1531.
 

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Chemical Safety Board

03_23_2007 Chemical Safety Board Final Report on the BP Texas City Refinery Explosion
can be found at:

http://www.csb.gov/completed_investigations/docs/BP%20Final%20Report%203.23.07.pdf

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Alaska Report
March 23, 2007

http://www.alaskareport.com/do77779.htm

Exxon Valdez oil remains. Why?
March 23, 2007
Courtesy of  Far North Science
By Doug O'Harra

More than 18 years after the tanker Exxon Valdez ran aground on Bly Reef and spilled at least 11 million gallons of crude oil into Prince William Sound, buried remnants of largely unweathered oil continue to foul certain beaches and harm marine life.
 
The persistence of 85 tons of oil from the spill has surprised many scientists and confounded expectations that most of the crude would have long since disappeared and left the Sound's marine species completely recovered.

Scientists at Auke Bay Laboratory in Juneau have tracked the fate of the crude oil for a decade. A study released in February, led by chemist Jeff Short, found alarming amounts of oil at 10 beaches studied in 2001 and 2005.

This remaining oil  about 26,600 gallons from the original 11 million  appears to be declining at only about 4 percent per year. It has seeped four to 10 inches beneath the surface, where it continues to leach into ocean and get ingested by sea life.

"Such persistence can pose a contact hazard to inter-tidally foraging sea otters, sea ducks, and shorebirds, create a chronic source of low-level contamination, discourage subsistence in a region where use is heavy and degrade the wilderness character of protected lands," wrote Short and eight co-authors in the study, published Feb. 15.

Now, to help sort out why the oil still lingers, the Exxon Valdez Oil Spill Trustee Council has awarded a three-year $1.2 million grant to researchers at Temple University.

"Every indication tells us that the oil should have biodegraded," says principle investigator Michel Boufadel, chair of Civil and Environmental Engineering in Temple's College of Engineering, in a release. "But what we've seen is there are still plenty of places where the oil still exists."

A release from Temple University science writer Preston Moretz explains what's up:

During the next two summers, Boufadel and graduate students will travel to Prince William Sound for 20 days and 50 days, respectively, to conduct field studies, take samples and try to get an understanding of the motion of the water and effects of the waves along the beaches.

"Our goal is to understand what is happening at the oil-water interface, since that is where the biodegradation of oil typically occurs," said Boufadel, an expert in oil spill remediation. "We will be examining the biodegradation from both sides of that interface  from inside and outside the oil patches."

Boufadel said the researchers currently believe that micro-organisms, which would typically consume the oil, may play a key role in the oil's lack of biodegradation along the beaches.

"You would expect that over 17 to 18 years, the micro-organisms that live in water along the beach would eat the oil; that they would consume it completely," Boufadel said. "That did happen at many locations, but at these particular locations that we will be examining, there have been some limitations on that occurring."

Boufadel hypothesizes that the micro-organisms, which live in the water and need other nutrients to be able to consume the oil, may not be getting enough nitrogen, phosphorus or oxygen in order to do that. Or, he adds, a layer or sort of "skin" may have developed around the oil patches, making them impenetrable by the micro-organisms.

Boufadel also believes that environmental factors such as temperature could be inhibiting the micro-orgamisms. "There may be enough nutrients, but the temperature may be so low that these micro-organisms cannot grow fast enough to consume the oil that lingers on these particular beaches," he said.

-----------------------------------------------------------
Most of  Far North Science is written and edited by Doug O'Harra, a writer and journalist based in Anchorage, Alaska.

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Anchorage Daily News
March 23, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/prudhoe/story/8729830p-8630578c.html

FBI digs deeper in probe of North Slope
DEC: Political appointees accused of punishing state regulators who got tough.
Daily News staff and wire reports
Published: March 22, 2007
Last Modified: March 22, 2007 at 02:03 PM

NEW YORK -- The FBI is investigating whether Alaska political appointees improperly punished state regulators who tried to enforce environmental rules against oil companies operating in Alaska.

The inquiry, which is being conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation and the U.S. attorney's office in Anchorage, is connected to an ongoing criminal investigation of BP for allowing pipelines it operates to corrode enough to cause a large oil spill on Alaska's North Slope in 2006. Similar pipeline corrosion discovered later that year forced the partial shutdown of Prudhoe Bay, the most productive U.S. oil field.

Now, the actions of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, which is responsible for overseeing oil operations in the state, have come under scrutiny from federal investigators, according to a story from Dow Jones Newswires.

Critics of the department say senior political appointees are partly to blame for the state's environmental woes such as last year's oil spills. They say these appointees repeatedly shielded oil companies from enforcement actions that would have required better maintenance and oversight of the industry's facilities and pipelines.

"We're aware of the allegations, and we are looking into it," said FBI spokesman Eric Gonzalez. He declined to comment further.

One DEC critic is Susan Harvey of Eagle River, who quit the department in 2002 after she said her responsibility for North Slope oil spill prevention and response was taken away. Harvey has said she believes it was because of her firm stance as a regulator. She also has said she received a federal subpoena and has talked with investigators.

The FBI has interviewed Steve Taylor, the director of environmental policy at BP Alaska in 2001, about a meeting he had in September 2001 with Michele Brown, then DEC commissioner, in her office. Taylor said that, during the meeting, a lobbyist with the Alaska Oil and Gas Association telephoned Brown complaining about Harvey's enforcement of environmental rules. Judy Brady, the lobbyist, asked Brown to remove Harvey from her job overseeing the oil companies on the North Slope, Taylor said.

Harvey often didn't see eye-to-eye with oil company officials. In October 2000, for example, Harvey's office prohibited BP's offshore Northstar field from producing oil when the Arctic ice was partially thawed because the company had failed several drills testing its ability clean up a spill in those conditions. Harvey says her staff also resisted efforts by Phillips Inc., now part of Conoco Phillips, to extend the winter drilling season, due to concerns that companies wouldn't be able to clean a spill in warmer weather when the tundra was thawing.

"Brady was complaining about Susan Harvey and demanding they get rid of Susan," Taylor said. This type of pressure from Brady, he added, "was not an uncommon thing."

Taylor has since retired from BP, though he still consults for the company, he said.

Brady, a former state natural resources commissioner, adamantly denied the allegation that she tried to get rid of anyone, and said the telephone call described by Taylor never happened. She said her group didn't attempt to remove Harvey from her job.

"You'd be a fool to do such inappropriate things," she said.

At the time, Brady said, her organization was trying to iron out with state officials a clearer understanding for oil companies of how DEC would apply requirements for spill response plans. Several companies were concerned that the rules seemed inconsistent, she said.

The goal was to get a better process, not get rid of regulators, Brady said.

Brown, the former DEC commissioner, said she recently was interviewed by FBI agents, but mostly they wanted to review how the state and oil industry developed a 1999 "charter agreement" that, among other things, required regular reports from BP and what is now Conoco on how they were dealing with corrosion in pipelines.

The agents said the state is not the target of the investigation, Brown said.

As for Harvey, she tended to overreach in her regulatory demands and seemed to have an inflated sense of her own importance within the DEC organization, Brown said. Under Harvey, reviews of industry "contingency" or spill-response plans lagged by two years or more, Brown added.

"Her tendency was, there is my way and there is only my way and you will do it my way," Brown said.

DEC spokeswoman Lynda Giguere issued a statement Wednesday:

"To our knowledge, the FBI is not investigating senior DEC political appointees concerning allegations they punished regulators for being tough on the oil industry. Rather, the FBI as part of the federal grand jury investigation of BP's actions on the North Slope has interviewed past and current DEC employees concerning BP's North Slope oil spills."

Giguere said state law forbids the department from discussing Harvey or other personnel matters.

BP spokesman Daren Beaudo said the company wasn't aware of any federal investigation into state environmental regulators and declined to comment further.

Conoco Phillips and Exxon Mobil Corp. hold stakes in the Prudhoe Bay field, which is operated by BP.

An Exxon Mobil spokeswoman said the company didn't seek to have Harvey removed from her position at the department overseeing the North Slope, nor has it been contacted by the FBI.

A Conoco spokesman didn't a return a call seeking comment.

According to performance assessments reviewed by Dow Jones Newswires, Harvey's supervisors at the department gave her an "outstanding" rating in all four performance categories for the year preceding Aug. 15, 2001. But a later review for the period between August and December 2001 said her performance was "average" and rated her "unacceptable" in "interpersonal relationships" and "supervisory."

Harvey's disintegrating relationship with her supervisors came at a time when tensions between her office and the oil industry were mounting.

"There was a decade of neglect of environmental enforcement," Harvey said in an interview. "We were making headway too fast. Some huge shift happened in the fall of 2001. All of a sudden, I'm a rogue employee."

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy contributed to this story. He can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.
 

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Houston Chronicle
March 23, 2007

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/4654446.html

Lawmakers pummel OSHA
House members say inspections were too infrequent at BP plant
By KRISTEN HAYS and DAVID IVANOVICH
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

WASHINGTON  House members skewered the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration on Thursday, lambasting the agency's infrequent inspections at BP's aging Texas City refinery before the explosion that killed 15 workers two years ago today.

OSHA appeared to be more of a target than even London-based BP in the first of several House Education and Labor Committee hearings on the blast.

Rep. Phil Hare, D-Ill., said Congress needs to "take a long look at OSHA and its effectiveness," and "start kicking some OSHA people in the kneecaps."

Retired U.S. Navy Adm. Frank "Skip" Bowman, who served on an independent review panel chaired by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III that criticized the company for safety lapses at its U.S. refineries, told the committee that OSHA's reactionary approach to oversight was "incredible" to him.

"We are constantly shooting behind the duck," he said.

No representatives of OSHA or BP testified, but committee spokesman Aaron Albright said they will likely get their chance.

"We are looking into future hearings with OSHA, BP and other refinery executives," he said.

OSHA released a statement after the hearing that said the agency makes refinery worker safety a priority, and the hearing reinforces that effort.

Edwin Foulke Jr., assistant secretary of Labor for OSHA, said in the statement that the agency has increased inspections, conducting 100 last year and 50 so far this year. OSHA also has trained more than 160 staff in principles of comprehensive inspections focused on overall safety management  or operation of equipment and handling of hazardous materials  rather than slips and falls. By August, OSHA will have 280 such trained inspectors, he said.

"These staff will ensure that under a new national emphasis program, every refinery under OSHA's jurisdiction is inspected," the statement said.

BP spokeswoman Sarah Howell said company officials have taken responsibility for the accident and are "working with regulators and other authorities to understand all the facts and address all the concerns."

"We're in action," Howell added. "We are addressing them. We're moving forward with what we said we would do."

The hearing came a day before the two-year anniversary of the blast and two days after the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board unveiled its final report. That report said cost-cutting, poor investment in training and mechanical integrity and a lack of safety vigilance caused the blast.

Only nine inspections

CSB Chairwoman Carolyn Merritt testified before the panel that the investigation found that from 1995 to 2005, OSHA conducted only nine planned, comprehensive inspections anywhere in the country, and none in the refining sector.

And while OSHA conducted unplanned inspections at the Texas City refinery in response to accidents, complaints or referrals, Merritt said such examinations are typically narrower in scope and shorter than planned inspections.

About a year after the blast, OSHA issued citations alleging more than 300 violations of the agency's standards, imposed a $21.3 million fine  the largest in its history  and ordered safety improvements.

But such penalties have little impact on massive corporations, she said.

In 1992, OSHA issued what's known as the Process Safety Management standard, which requires refineries to implement 14 management strategies to try to prevent catastrophic accidents like the blast two years ago.

But OSHA has not focused on enforcing that rule. Without adequate enforcement, Merritt said, it devolves into essentially a voluntary program.

"The problem with voluntary programs," Merritt noted, "is that not everybody volunteers."

Red Cavaney, president of the American Petroleum Institute, the oil industry's trade organization, faced some heated questions of his own after touting the group's 500 safety standards for its members to follow.

"Somehow, they can also be ignored without any repercussions to the company," said Rep. George Miller, D-Calif., chairman of the committee.

But API is not a regulatory body. The industry is regulated by OSHA and other federal bodies as well as state agencies.

"With all due respect, Mr. Cavaney, that didn't happen. That didn't happen until this place blew up," Miller said.

"I understand," Cavaney said.

Guidelines on trailers

One issue the trade group plans to re-examine and issue new guidelines on this spring is the use of trailers in refineries and chemical plants.

All of the workers killed and many of those injured in the Texas City blast were in or near trailers, Merritt said.

Because a trailer can shatter during an explosion, a worker inside is more likely to be killed or injured than a person standing in the open, Merritt said.

Eva Rowe, whose parents died in the blast, recounted the disaster in a halting, emotional voice. She asked that OSHA increase safety and inspections at all refineries as the CSB report recommended.

"It is of little comfort to us, but we hope that, through legislation, to ensure more stringent worker health and safety standards, that their deaths won't be in vain," she said.

On Friday, Rowe and her attorney, Brent Coon, will appear at the Texas Capitol to promote a "Remember the 15" bill in the Legislature. Coon told the committee the bill addresses issues of safety during unit startups, proper training, tracking of near misses and replacement of antiquated equipment.

kristen.hays@chron.com 

david.ivanovich@chron.com 

Kristen Hays reported from Houston and David Ivanovich reported from Washington.

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Wall Street Journal
March 22, 2007


UPDATE:
FBI Interviews Former Official About Oil Spills
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 22, 2007 4:31 p.m.

 (Updates with comments from Susan Harvey and statistics from the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation)

 NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--The former commissioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation has said she has been interviewed by FBI agents investigating the oil spills that occurred on the state's North Slope last year.

But the FBI agents said the state wasn't a target of the investigation, Michele Brown, the former commissioner, told the Anchorage Daily News in an article published Thursday.

Dow Jones Newswires reported Wednesday that the FBI is investigating political pressure placed on regulators at the department before last year's spills, which were caused by severe corrosion on North Slope pipelines operated by BP PLC (BP).

Critics say this pressure from top officials at the department discouraged enforcement actions that might have prevented the spills. FBI spokesman Eric Gonzalez said the agents are examining these allegations about the department and wouldn't comment further.

One allegation being examined is an episode that occurred in December 2001, when Brown removed Susan Harvey, a civil servant, from her job overseeing oil spill prevention and response for companies on the North Slope. The FBI has interviewed several people familiar with that incident, including Steve Taylor, the former director of environmental policy at BP.

Taylor told Dow Jones Newswires that he was interviewed by the FBI about a meeting he attended at Brown's office in September 2001, when a lobbyist for the Alaska Oil and Gas Association called asking to have Harvey removed from her job. Judy Brady, the lobbyist, disputes Taylor's account, saying she never called the department to pressure Brown.

Brown told the Anchorage Daily News that Harvey was removed because her stance on the department's regulatory authority was too aggressive. Brown also said Harvey's reviews of oil-spill response plans took too long.

Harvey disputed that her department took too long to evaluate spill response plans. She pointed to department statistics showing that spill plan review times actually declined in 2000 and most of 2001, under her supervision, from nearly 300 days for plans submitted in 1999 to less than 200 days for plans submitted in 2000.

 -By Matthew Dalton, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-4604;
matthew.dalton@dowjones.com  


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UPDATE:
US House Panel Mulls Action In BP Refinery Fire  Wake
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 22, 2007 2:31 p.m.
 (Updates with comments from lawmakers and API President Red Cavaney)
By Maya Jackson Randall
Of  DOW JONES NEWSWIRES

 WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Two years after a fatal explosion at BP PLC's (BP) Texas City refinery, U.S. lawmakers are mulling what kind of legislation is needed to improve workplace safety and prevent similar tragedies from occurring.

At a House Education and Labor Committee hearing on the accident Thursday, lawmakers criticized federal regulators at the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA, for failing to conduct thorough, pre-emptive safety inspections at refineries.

They also suggested that the oil industry has enabled bad industry behavior and argued that trade group American Petroleum Institute should do more to encourage member companies to meet safety standards.

"I think the situation screams out for legislation," said new Committee Chairman George Miller, D-Calif. "Clearly, the status quo is unacceptable."

Miller said he's not sure yet what kind of legislation is necessary but that the committee will hold additional hearings on the issue.

Oil-refining activities have always been considered dangerous due to the presence of high temperatures and noxious gases, but critics say refinery workers are facing increased risks against the backdrop of strong oil-product demand and finite processing capacity in an industry known for strict cost discipline.

But over the years, the oil industry has turned OSHA, the federal agency charged with protecting workers, "into a starved lapdog," said Rep. Rush Holt, D-N.J.

Holt asked American Petroleum Institute President Red Cavaney if he would support actions meant to ensure that OSHA strengthens its enforcement capabilities, increases staff training, and report safety warnings.

"I just don't know," Cavaney responded.

After the hearing, Cavaney told reporters that API wouldn't lobby Congress for budget measures that would provide OSHA greater funding, but the group wouldn't protest such moves either.

"We would not complain if they got more and more funding and had more resources," he said.

The hearing focused on a report the U.S. Chemical Safety Board released Tuesdaythat blamed BP budget cuts, investment failures, understaffing and safety deficiencies for the accident, which has been described as the worst U.S. workplace accident since 1990. The March 23, 2005 BP explosion killed 15 people and injured 180 others.

Eva Rowe, whose parents died as a result of the accident, urged lawmakers to craft new federal policies that would force corporations to better protect their workers from deadly accidents.

"It is of little comfort to us, but we hope that, through legislation to ensure more stringent worker health and safety standards, that their deaths won't be in vain," Rowe said in prepared testimony. "Today, I come to Congress asking that you mandate by law a change in corporate culture, by requiring that all corporations place worker safety before profits."
 
Federal Regulators In Focus

 Chemical Safety Board Chairman and Chief Executive Carolyn Merritt, another witness at the hearing, told lawmakers that OSHA needs desperately to beef up oversight.

"Federal regulators didn't conduct any comprehensive, planned process safety inspections at the Texas City Refinery," said Merritt in her written testimony. "The Chemical Safety Board believes that OSHA should also pay increased attention to preventing less frequent, but catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City."

Merritt urged Congress to give the federal worker safety agency "appropriate support, resources and encouragement." She said the agency should hire or develop specialized inspectors.

"It sounds like we have a cultural problem within OSHA," said Rep. Howard McKeon of California, the senior Republican on the committee.

He argued that third-party consultants should be inspecting refineries around the country.

"Had such a third party audit been undertaken, it is not out of the realm of possibility that BP would have done more to rectify ongoing problems of which it had been made aware," he said.

Meanwhile, Cavaney of the API said energy companies are making changes in light of the 2005 tragedy. They've been examining their safety procedures, and the industry as a whole will be reviewing the Chemical Safety Board's safety recommendations, he said.

 -By Maya Jackson Randall, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9263;
Maya.Jackson-Randall@dowjones.com  

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Juneau Empire
March 22, 2007

http://www.juneauempire.com/stories/032207/sta_20070322022.shtml

FBI probes pressure on oil regulators
Agency asks if political appointees acted
improperly before Prudhoe spill

By MATTHEW DALTON
Dow Jones Newswires

NEW YORK - The FBI is investigating whether Alaska political appointees improperly punished state regulators who tried to enforce environmental rules against oil companies operating in Alaska, according to people contacted by investigators.

 The inquiry, which is being conducted by the FBI and the U.S. Attorney's office in Anchorage, is connected to an ongoing criminal investigation of BP for allowing pipelines it operates to corrode enough to cause a large oil spill on Alaska's North Slope in 2006. Similar pipeline corrosion discovered later that year forced the shutdown of Prudhoe Bay, the most productive oil field in the United States.

Now, the actions of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation, which is responsible for overseeing oil operations in the state, have come under scrutiny from federal investigators, though it's unclear whether current or former state officials would face criminal charges.

Critics of the department say senior political appointees are partly to blame. They say the appointees repeatedly shielded oil companies from enforcement actions that would have required better maintenance and oversight of facilities and pipelines.

"We're aware of the allegations, and we are looking into it," said FBI spokesman Eric Gonzalez. He declined to comment further.

One incident that has caught investigators' attention occurred in December 2001, when the department shifted responsibility for oil spill prevention and response on the North Slope.

Michele Brown, who was then the department's commissioner, took away that job from Susan Harvey, a civil servant, and gave it to a person appointed by Brown. Environmentalists have long claimed that Harvey's oversight of the North Slope was stripped because Alaska oil producers complained that her interpretation of the state's environmental rules was too harsh.

ConocoPhillips and Exxon Mobil Corp. hold stakes in the Prudhoe Bay field, which is operated by BP.

Harvey resigned from the department in March 2002, convinced, she said, that its leadership wouldn't allow her to enforce environmental laws against the oil industry.

The FBI has interviewed Steve Taylor, the director of environmental policy at BP Alaska in 2001, about a meeting he had in September 2001 with Brown in her office. Taylor said that, during the meeting, a lobbyist with the Alaska Oil and Gas Association telephoned Brown complaining about Harvey's enforcement of environmental rules. Judy Brady, the lobbyist, asked Brown to remove Harvey from her job overseeing the oil companies on the North Slope, Taylor said.

Harvey often didn't see eye-to-eye with oil company officials. In October 2000, for example, Harvey's office prohibited BP's offshore Northstar field from producing oil when the Arctic ice was partially thawed, because the company had failed several drills testing its ability clean up a spill in those conditions.

Harvey says her staff also resisted efforts by Phillips, now part of ConocoPhillips, to extend the winter drilling season, due to concerns that companies wouldn't be able to clean a spill in warmer weather when the tundra was thawing.

"Brady was complaining about Susan Harvey and demanding they get rid of Susan," Taylor said. This type of pressure from Brady, he added, "was not an uncommon thing."

Taylor has since retired from BP, though he still consults for them, he says.

Any convictions from this FBI investigation could influence what is seen as a favorable regulatory environment that the oil industry has enjoyed since the discovery of Prudhoe Bay itself in the 1960s.

Alaska officials have sought to protect the state's oil and mining industries from tough environmental regulation by the federal government. And the state's dependence on oil taxes means that policymakers are wary of imposing rules that they believe would hamper output.

A person familiar with the investigation said the U.S. attorney's office in Anchorage has issued a grand jury subpoena for documents related to the removal of Harvey and her staff.

Brady, in an interview, said the telephone call described by Taylor never happened. She said her group didn't attempt to remove Harvey from her job.

"No one would ever ask someone to be removed in a regulatory sense," Brady said.

Brown, who now heads the United Way chapter in Anchorage, didn't return several calls seeking comment.

A spokeswoman for the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation acknowledged that current and former department officials have been interviewed by the FBI, but said the interviews were related to BP's oil spills on the North Slope and not about pressure put on staff by political appointees. Lynda Giguere, the spokeswoman, said state law forbids the department from discussing Susan Harvey or other personnel matters.

BP spokesman Daren Beaudo said the company wasn't aware of the federal investigation and declined to comment further. An ExxonMobil spokeswoman said the company didn't seek to have Harvey removed, nor has it been contacted by the FBI. A ConocoPhillips spokesman didn't a return a call seeking comment.

According to performance assessments reviewed by Dow Jones Newswires, Harvey's supervisors at the department gave her an "outstanding" rating in all four performance categories for the year preceding Aug. 15, 2001. But a later review for the period between August and December 2001 said her performance was "average" and rated her "unacceptable" in "interpersonal relationships" and "supervisory."

Harvey's disintegrating relationship with her supervisors came at a time when tensions between her office and the oil industry were mounting.

"There was a decade of neglect of environmental enforcement," Harvey said in an interview. "We were making headway too fast. Some huge shift happened in the fall of 2001. All of a sudden, I'm a rogue employee."

BP was upset over a report prepared by Coffman Engineers, a consulting firm hired by the state, on the oil giant's program to monitor and prevent pipeline corrosion. A final draft of Coffman's report, submitted to the Alaska environmental department in November 2001, said that BP's corrosion-monitoring program "makes it difficult to develop a qualitative understanding of the basis for their corrosion strategy."

Harvey said that BP officials approached her saying that the corrosion report was too negative and should be toned down. Harvey refused to change the report because it was produced by an outside consultant, not the department.

After she was stripped of her duties overseeing the North Slope, the department released a revised report from Coffman in which many of the negative comments were deleted. Coffman officials have said that they changed the report after discussing complaints with BP.

The Coffman reports have been subpoenaed as part of the federal investigation into the corrosion that caused the spills.

xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

Wall Street Journal
March 22, 2007

FBI Interviews Former Official About Alaska Oil Spills -Paper
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 22, 2007 11:44 a.m.

 NEW YORK (Dow Jones)--The former commissioner of the Alaska Department of Environmental Conservation has said she has been interviewed by FBI agents investigating the oil spills that occurred on the state's North Slope last year.

But the FBI agents said the state wasn't a target of the investigation, Michele Brown, the former commissioner, told the Anchorage Daily News in an article published Thursday.

Dow Jones Newswires reported Wednesday that the FBI is investigating political pressure placed on regulators at the department before last year's spills, which were caused by severe corrosion on North Slope pipelines operated by BP PLC (BP).

Critics say this pressure from top officials at the department discouraged enforcement actions that might have prevented the spills. FBI spokesman Eric Gonzalez said the agents are examining these allegations about the department and wouldn't comment further.

One allegation being examined is an episode that occurred in December 2001, when Brown removed Susan Harvey, a civil servant, from her job overseeing oil spill prevention and response for companies on the North Slope. The FBI has interviewed several people familiar with that incident, including Steve Taylor, the former director of environmental policy at BP.

Taylor told Dow Jones Newswires that he was interviewed by the FBI about a meeting he attended at Brown's office in September 2001, when a lobbyist for the Alaska Oil and Gas Association called asking to have Harvey removed from her job. Judy Brady, the lobbyist, disputes Taylor's account, saying she never called the department to pressure Brown.

Brown told the Anchorage Daily News that Harvey was removed because her stance on the department's regulatory authority was too aggressive. Brown also said Harvey's reviews of oil-spill response plans took too long.

"Her tendency was, there is my way and there is only my way and you will do it my way," Brown told the newspaper. Brown also said that Harvey seemed to have an inflated sense of her own importance, the newspaper reported.

 -By Matthew Dalton, Dow Jones Newswires; 201-938-4604;
matthew.dalton@dowjones.com  



Xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx

US House Panel To Mull Action In Wake Of BP Refinery Fire

DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 22, 2007 11:11 a.m.
By Maya Jackson Randall
Of DOW JONES NEWSWIRES

 WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--Two years after a fatal explosion at BP PLC's (BP) Texas City refinery, U.S. lawmakers Thursday are poised to consider whether new laws are needed to prevent similar tragedies and improve workplace safety.

Oil-refining activities have always been considered dangerous due to the presence of high temperatures and noxious gases, but critics say refinery workers are facing increased risks against the backdrop of strong oil-product demand and finite processing capacity in an industry known for strict cost discipline.

Eva Rowe, whose parents were killed in the March 23, 2005, explosion, will be one of several witnesses testifying on Capitol Hill Thursday.

She'll be urging lawmakers to craft new federal policies that would force corporations to better protect their workers from deadly accidents.

"It is of little comfort to us, but we hope that, through legislation to ensure more stringent worker health and safety standards, that their deaths won't be in vain," Rowe said in prepared testimony submitted to the House Education and Labor Committee. "Today, I come to Congress asking that you mandate by law a change in corporate culture, by requiring that all corporations place worker safety before profits."

The committee Thursday morning is holding an oversight hearing of the accident that killed 15 people and injured 180 others.

In a report released Tuesday, the U.S. Chemical Safety Board blamed BP budget cuts, investment failures, understaffing and safety deficiencies for the accident, which has been described as the worst U.S. workplace accident since 1990.

 
        Federal Regulators In Focus
 In addition to sharply criticizing the London-based energy giant, the board also raised questions about federal regulators' role in ensuring that BP met safety rules. The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration, or OSHA, is charged with enforcing safety standards that aim to protect worker safety and health.

"The Chemical Safety Board report paints an extremely troubling picture of gross negligence on the part of BP and OSHA," said Committee Chairman George Miller, D-Calif., in a statement earlier this week. "We can't bring back the 15 men and women who died in the Texas City explosion, but in their honor, we can and must take steps to prevent future tragedies."

Chemical Safety Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Carolyn Merritt, another witness at the hearing, is prepared to tell lawmakers that OSHA needs to take serious steps to beef up oversight.

"Federal regulators did not conduct any comprehensive, planned process safety inspections at the Texas City Refinery," said Merritt in her written testimony. "The Chemical Safety Board believes that OSHA should also pay increased attention to preventing less frequent, but catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City."

Merritt said the federal worker safety agency should hire or develop specialized inspectors.

She also urged Congress to give the federal worker safety agency "appropriate support, resources and encouragement."

"Devastating accidents" in the petrochemical industry continue to take place despite a 1992 standard issued by OSHA that aims to ensure safe and healthful workplaces, said Kim Nibarger, a member of the United Steelworkers, in her written testimony. United Steelworkers represents workers in various industries, including the petrochemical, plastics tires and steel sectors.

"Unfortunately, it takes a major event like the one we saw in Texas City for these incidents to get any real notice," said Nibarger, adding that between January and mid-February, there were already 43 incidents of pipeline leaks, chemical releases, plant mishaps and fires.

Meanwhile, Red Cavaney, the head of Washington-based oil industry group American Petroleum Institute, says energy companies are making changes in light of the 2005 tragedy. They've been examining their safety procedures, and the industry as a whole will be reviewing the Chemical Safety Board's safety recommendations, he said in prepared testimony.

 -By Maya Jackson Randall, Dow Jones Newswires; 202-862-9263; Maya.Jackson-Randall@dowjones.com 

 Corrected March 22, 2007 11:16 ET (1516 GMT)

 Chemical Safety Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Carolyn Merritt, another witness at the hearing, is prepared to tell lawmakers that OSHA needs to take serious steps to beef up oversight.

(In "US House Panel To Mull Action In Wake of BP Refinery Fire," published at 10:08 a.m. EDT, Chemical Safety Board Chairman and Chief Executive Officer Carolyn Merritt's name was misspelled.)

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Reuters news
March 22, 2007

Alaska oil pipeline completes corrosion tests
Wed Mar 21, 2007 6:51 PM ET
By Yereth Rosen

ANCHORAGE, Alaska, March 21 (Reuters)  The
operator of the Trans Alaska Pipeline System (TAPS) has successfully completed "smart pig" runs that were conducted ahead of schedule because of growing concerns about pipeline corrosion, regulators said Wednesday.

But Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. has yet to complete its analysis of the data collected by the runs of the smart pigs, sophisticated plug-like devices that electronically sense and record anomalies inside the pipe, the regulators said.

Smart pigs were sent down the 800-mile (1,300 km) oil artery late last fall, after the discovery of widespread pipeline corrosion and a pipeline leak at Prudhoe Bay prompted a partial shutdown of the nation's biggest oil field, said Rhea DoBosh, spokeswoman for the state and federal agencies that oversee TAPS.

"The corrosion at Prudhoe Bay, that really unsettled everybody. We did not want to see any impact to TAPS because of that," said DoBosh, who works for the Joint Pipeline Office, the consortium of federal and state agencies that regulate the pipeline and its Valdez marine terminal.

While last fall's smart-pig run through the northern part of the pipeline was completed successfully, a separate smart-pig run through the southern part of the pipeline failed to collect usable data, DoBosh said.

Alyeska completed a separate smart-pig run of the southern section last Thursday, DoBosh said. "What the early indications are is that the run was good. They got good data," she said.

Alyeska normally has 180 days in which to analyze data collected by smart pig runs, she said.

The smart pigs are usually run through the oil line every three years, and its last smart-pig run was in 2004, DoBosh said. But the Joint Pipeline Office requested an accelerated analysis last year.

Alyeska is owned by oil companies with interests on the North Slope. Major owners are BP Plc , ConocoPhillips  and Exxon Mobil.

WAXY BUILDUP

Last fall's smart-pig run of the southern part of the pipeline ran into difficulty because waxy buildup coated part of the pig, making it impossible to properly collect data, DoBosh said.

Since then, Alyeska has increased the frequency of its cleaning-pig runs through the line, she said. "They're doing more cleaning pig runs than they used to. Every three to five days is the sequence," she said.

Previously, according to company officials, the cleaning pigs were run about every week.

Lower throughput in the pipeline, a consequence of maturing fields, has resulted in cooler oil and more buildup of wax, DoBosh said.

Meanwhile, Alyeska remains on the lookout for a piece of a cleaning pig that was lost somewhere in the line last December, she said.

The pig broke apart during its run, and a metal ring was not recovered. But the company believes the ring may be hidden in the large volume of wax that was pushed out of the line, DoBosh said.

"They sent all of that wax down to Seattle," she said. "They've going to filter through that and see if they can find it."

Although regulators are curious about the metal ring's fate, there are no worries that its loss will hurt the pipeline, DoBosh said.

"It's never been considered an integrity threat. Even though it's a piece of metal, it's still pliable," she said.
 

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U.S. Hs. of Rep., Education & Labor
Full Committee Hearing
Thursday, 3/22/07

Hearing on "The BP-Texas City Disaster and Worker Safety," scheduled at 10:00 a.m. in room 2175 Rayburn H.O.B.
Archived Webcast ››

http://boss.streamos.com/wmedia/edwork/fc/fc032207.wvx


CSB Congressional Testimony
http://www.chemsafety.gov/index.cfm?folder=news_releases&page=news&NEWS_ID=358

Testifying before House Committee on Education and Labor, Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt Calls for Increasing Oversight of Refining Industry by OSHA

For more information, go to: Chairman Merritt's Written Testimony
http://www.csb.gov/news_releases/docs/MerrittLaborCommitteeTestimony3.22.07.pdf

Washington, DC, March 22, 2007 - Carolyn W. Merritt, Chairman of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB), told a congressional committee today there should be increased oversight of the oil refining industry by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) in order to prevent accidents such as the one that occurred at the BP refinery in Texas City, Texas, in 2005. She spoke before the House Committee on Education and Labor, chaired by U.S. Rep. George Miller of California who convened the hearing "to examine what we can learn from the missteps that preceded this disaster in order to help prevent future ones."

Chairman Merritt said the CSB's exhaustive investigation into the BP accident, the results of which were released two days ago in Texas City, showed the company had not followed OSHA process safety regulations, and that OSHA had not adequately inspected the facility to see if BP was complying with those regulations. As a result, she said, cuts in training, staffing, maintenance, equipment modernization, and safety, which the investigation found were a result of significant budget cuts ordered by BP, left the Texas City facility vulnerable to catastrophe.

Ms. Merritt said, "The CSB found that regulatory oversight of this refinery was ineffective. In recent years, OSHA has focused its inspections on workplaces with high injury rates, but these rates do not predict the likelihood of a catastrophic process accident at a facility."

Ms. Merritt noted that the BP facility, like thousands of other petrochemical plants, is regulated under OSHA's Process Safety Management standard, issued in 1992. "Rigorous application and enforcement of this rule - including its preventative maintenance and incident investigation requirements - would almost certainly have prevented this tragedy," she said. She noted the BP refinery had a long history of deadly accidents and dangerous hydrocarbon releases from the same equipment that was involved in the Texas City accident.

The work of the CSB received bipartisan praise from committee members for the CSB's investigation of the BP tragedy and other accidents. Several expressed concern about the paucity of regulatory inspections in the petrochemical industry.

Chairman Miller said, "Protecting the safety of refinery and chemical workers is reason enough to get this right. But the safety of our refineries and chemical facilities also has broader implications for the communities surrounding these plants. The disaster at BP Texas testifies to the steep price we pay as Americans for not enforcing the nation's laws that are supposed to protect working men and women in this country." He said further hearings may be convened.

Following Chairman Merritt's testimony, other panelists addressed the committee, including Eva Rowe, who lost both parents in the explosion. They were among the 15 contract workers meeting in work trailers at the time of the blast. The CSB found the trailers were sited in a hazardous location at the plant, near a blowdown drum which spewed highly flammable hydrocarbons that were ignited by an idling pickup truck. The agency has recommended to the American Petroleum Institute (API) that trailer siting guidelines be revised.

Other panelists included Kim Nibarger, health and safety specialist for the United Steelworkers (USW), Frank L. "Skip" Bowman, retired admiral and member of the BP Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel, which was instituted on the recommendation of the CSB and headed by former U.S. Secretary of State James Baker III, and Red Cavaney, American Petroleum Institute president and CEO.

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Please visit our website, www.csb.gov.

For more information, contact Sandy Gilmour at (202) 261-7614 / (202) 251-5496 cell.
 

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Wall Street Journal
March 21, 2007

Worker Fatigue, Labor Shortage Blamed For Accidents At BP
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 21, 2007 7:24 p.m.

 ANCHORAGE, Alaska (AP)--Long hours are the norm at the Prudhoe Bay oil field, but veteran workers for field operator BP PLC (BP) said a labor shortage has made conditions ripe for fatigue-related accidents similar to one that killed 15 employees in the company's Texas plant in 2005.

The lack of highly skilled technicians at well pads and oil collection centers coincided with an uptick in construction and pipeline inspections following two spills at Prudhoe Bay last year.

The company has failed to fill about a dozen vacancies for highly skilled technicians, despite repeated requests from its union since September, said Kris Dye, president of United Steelworkers 4959.

A report released this week by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board said operators of the isomerization unit linked to the fatal blast in Texas City, Texas, were likely fatigued when they started the equipment, triggering the fatal explosion that also injured 170 people.

BP officials said at least nine new technicians, each with more than 10 years of experience, will be starting work in the Arctic oil field by April 10, along with about two dozen other workers.

"The process has taken longer than we would have expected or would have liked," said BP spokesman Daren Beaudo. "But we believe we've found a solution to bridge the gap."

Two inspectors from the state Division of Oil and Gas visited Prudhoe Bay last weekend, partially in response to information from industry watchdog Chuck Hamel detailing the safety concerns on the union's behalf, said Joe Balash, special assistant to to Gov. Sarah Palin.

The union, which represents 230 of the company's 1,300 Alaska employees, had been concerned about the labor shortage for about a year before an oil spill in August prompted BP to temporarily halve production at the U.S.'s largest oil field. An earlier spill of up to 267,000 gallons in March was the North Slope's largest. Both were traced to corrosion in pipelines that had been poorly maintained for years.

The technicians run facilities that process a billion cubic feet of natural gas and 50,000 to 100,000 barrels of crude oil a day.

"We're dealing with very explosive and dangerous processes and you wouldn't have to do too much to have something really bad happen," said Dye, who has worked for BP at Prudhoe Bay for 21 years.

Dye said he doesn't think the worker shortage had anything to do with the spills, but now there aren't enough workers to accommodate the recent increase in corrosion monitoring at Prudhoe.

The x-ray units used by corrosion detection crews trigger fire alarms inside Prudhoe's massive oil collection centers, so the alarms and sprinkler system must be turned off for hours while the pipes are being examined. But there are barely enough workers to patrol the networks of indoor pipes while the fire safeguards are down, said Dye, the chief operator at one of the collection centers.

"If we don't have enough operational folks there, we'd put ourselves at risk," Dye said.

About 120 technicians at oil collection centers and well pads are working back-to-back 18-hour days, with 12 hours off between sets. Normally, they work 12-hour shifts for two weeks straight and then get two weeks off.

"We are concerned because people have said flat out, 'I can't work any more overtime,'" Dye said. "We need people with 10-year plus experience who we can bring up to speed pretty quickly and take care of these people who are walking around with a glazed look in their eyes."

In its final report on the March 23, 2005, explosion at BP's refinery in Texas City, the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board said the operators had been working 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days when the explosion occurred.

"Fatigue causes cognitive fixation and impaired judgment and could lead operators to fixate on one operational parameter...to the exclusion of other indicators," said CSB investigator Cheryl MacKenzie.

The CSB noted that fatigue-prevention regulations have been developed for aviation and other transportation sectors but there are no such guidelines widely used and accepted in the oil and chemical sector.

The report criticized the Occupational Safety & Health Administration for failing to inspect plants with enough care and frequency to prevent major accidents. Alaska's Occupational Safety and Health office, which is certified and funded by the federal OSHA program, said it hadn't heard of the union's safety concerns.

"I've not received any complaints from the union about overtime potentially contributing to hazards," said Chief of Enforcement Steve Standley. "We've not been included in that loop at this point."

Last fall, representatives for the steelworkers union went on recruiting trips to BP facilities in Texas City, Texas; Whiting, Ind.; Toledo, Ohio, and Carson, Calif.; and convinced at least four people to apply for a transfer to Prudhoe Bay.

"We're not normally involved in the hiring process," Dye said. "But it was an important enough safety issue to us that we said we would go out and beat the bushes to find people to work in Alaska."

Hiring was slowed by fallout from the shutdown as well as the holiday season, according to an internal memo sent to workers.

Company ombudsman Stanley Sporkin, a retired federal judge, said the company has had a hard time finding qualified people who are willing to work in such a harsh and remote environment.

"It takes a long time because it's not easy to fill these positions," said Sporkin, who is based in Washington, D.C.

Since the Prudhoe Bay shutdown last fall, BP pledged to replace 16 miles of corroded pipeline by the end of 2008. The repairs and upgrades are expected to cost about $250 million. The London-based company manages Prudhoe Bay for co-owners ConocoPhillips (COP) and Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM), and several smaller companies.
 

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Guardian Unlimited
March 21, 2007

http://business.guardian.co.uk/story/0,,2038680,00.html

Blame for BP disaster laid at the feet of Lord Browne and his board
Report says 15 died in blast because cost cuts compromised safety and warnings were ignored
Andrew Clark
Wednesday March 21, 2007
The Guardian

The four BP oil workers who were filling a vertical tank with chemicals when it exploded in America's worst industrial accident for a generation had all been working 12-hour shifts for more than four weeks without a day off.

In a final report into the Texas City disaster, which killed 15 people through "blunt force trauma" as they were hit by flying metal two years ago, American regulators have called on the oil industry to impose airline-style limits to the days and hours worked by staff who are in critical safety roles.

BP comes in for scathing criticism in the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation board's study, published in Houston yesterday. The investigators concluded that cost cuts mandated by the company's London headquarters contributed to the tragedy - and that bosses ignored successive warnings that an accident was imminent. "The Texas City disaster was caused by organisational and safety deficiencies at all levels of BP Corporation," the board says. "Warning signs of a possible disaster were present for several years, but company officials did not intervene effectively to prevent it."

The board's verdict is the final flurry in a blizzard of regulatory action since the explosion. BP has already been fined $21m (£11m) for 301 "egregious, wilful violations" of safety rules by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration - the biggest penalty in the body's 35-year history.

In January, an independent panel headed by the former secretary of state James Baker accused BP of suffering a "corporate blindspot" on safety. The company's chief executive, Lord Browne, announced he was bringing forward his retirement and management in the US was reorganised.

According to the chemical safety board, a series of circumstances collided on the day of the explosion - March 23 2005 - when the 52-metre (170ft) tower, known as a blowdown drum, was being refilled with liquid hydrocarbons after a maintenance shutdown.

A night employee, who had worked 12-hour shifts for 33 consecutive days, began filling the tower. But inadequate notes were left for a day operator who took over at 6am on his 29th consecutive day of duty.

Two managers, who were supposed to be overseeing events, had worked 37 and 31 days respectively and a supervisor hurried away from work early for a family medical emergency.

"Evidence suggests that the operators' fatigue degraded their judgment and problem-solving skills, hindering their ability to determine that the tower was overfilling," says the report, which adds that misleading readings from poorly maintained measurement equipment added to the problem.

When the tower was full to bursting, about 7,600 gallons of unstable chemicals shot into the sky over 107 seconds, causing a six-metre geyser. A cloud of flammable vapour formed over the refinery, which was ignited by a spark from a truck idling nearby.

Most of the 15 people killed were in administration trailers placed too close to the tower, which instantly disintegrated. A further 180 people were injured, 70 vehicles were damaged and windows shattered as far away as three-quarters of a mile.

The board lays blame squarely at the feet of Lord Browne and his colleagues in London, saying: "The BP chief executive and the BP board of directors did not exercise effective safety oversight."

After its merger with Amoco in 1999, BP ordered a 25% cut in costs. At Texas City, capital spending had already been reduced by 84% in eight years.

The refinery's training budget was halved over the five years to 2004 from $2.8m to $1.4m and its 28 staff were cut to eight. The company relied heavily on cheaper computer-based training which focused on "memorising facts" and box-ticking rather than troubleshooting.

Because of a lack of attention to the subject, staff were given the impression that safety procedures were "not strict instructions but outdated documents to be used as a guideline".

In 2002, a senior BP executive in Houston warned that ageing infrastructure at Texas City was "in complete decline" and just five months before the disaster, an internal plant safety meeting included a slide warning: "Texas City is not a safe place to work."

Among the board's recommendations are calls for BP to encourage guilt-free reporting of incidents and to appoint a non-executive director with direct experience of process safety.

The board also calls on both the petroleum industry and American unions to develop fatigue prevention guidelines limiting hours and days of work.

During maintenance periods, BP allowed its staff to work up to 84 hours per week and put no limit on consecutive days' duty.

The chemical safety board points out that nuclear workers are limited to 14 days' work, pilots can only work 100 hours per month, merchant sailors are restricted to 70 hours per week and under European law, long-distance hauliers may not drive for more than 60 hours per week.

BP is facing a slew of lawsuits from people injured at Texas City. Lord Browne admitted in January that he felt a "deep and moral responsibility" for the company.

"I always feel that when anything goes wrong, I have let the staff down."

Response: BP rejects findings

BP reacted angrily to the report of the Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), saying last night it "strongly disagreed" with many of its contents and findings. A statement from head office gave no details of what it objected to but the oil group is understood to have communicated those concerns to the CSB.

"Notwithstanding the company's strong disagreement with some of the content of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions, BP will give full and careful consideration to the CSB's recommendations, in conjunction with the many activities already under way to improve process safety management," the statement said.

The company has previously said budget cuts were not a "critical factor" behind the accident and its December 2005 investigation found that instruments had functioned properly

BP said it had accepted complete responsibility for the March 23 2005 explosion and fire at the Texas City refinery and had apologised to those harmed. "While we cannot change the past or repair all the damage this incident caused, we have worked diligently to provide fair compensation, without the need for lengthy court proceedings, to those who were injured and to the families of those who died," it said.

On the CSB's recommendation, BP had created an independent panel, led by former US secretary of state James Baker, to assess process safety management and safety culture at all of its US refineries and was implementing the recommendations in full, it said.

"We have completed and made public the results of our own investigation of the incident and, as CSB chairman [Carolyn] Merritt has publicly recognised, BP cooperated in an unprecedented way with the CSB investigation." Terry Macalister

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Financial Times
March 21, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/d8be9ece-d750-11db-b9d7-000b5df10621.html

Cost-cutting blamed for BP refinery explosion
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
and Ed Crooks in London
Published: March 21 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 21 2007 02:00

Cost-cutting at BP's Texas City refinery left it vulnerable to a catastrophe before the explosion in March 2005 that killed 15 people, a US government agency said yesterday.

The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board blamed "safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP corporation'' for the accident and called on the board to appoint an extra member with expertise in safety.

The CSB said its two-year inquiry revealed an inadequate response to several audits revealing safety lapses, failure thoroughly to investigate and respond to previous accidents, the ignoring of federal regulations and a focus on production rather than safety.

BP said it accepted responsibility for the explosion but disagreed with some of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions.

In spite of its disagreement, BP said it would give full and careful consideration to the CSB's recommendations, alongside the steps it was taking to improve safety.

Carolyn Merritt, CSB chairman, said: "The March 23 2005 accident at BP was avoidable. It was the inevitable result of a series of actions by the company. Among other things, they cut costs that affected maintenance and safety [and] they ignored the implications of previous incidents that were red warning flags. There was a broken safety culture at BP."

The explosion, in which 500 people were also injured, was the worst US industrial accident in 15 years.

The CSB interviewed 370 witnesses, reviewed more than 30,000 documents and tested equipment at the facility before publishing its final report.

The 335-page report called for better incident reporting - without fear of retaliation - and use of new indicators to measure safety performance. The CSB indicated regulators had failed to provide comprehensive scrutiny of the facility.

Ms Merritt said: "The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery.''

The CSB said audits and studies revealing serious safety problems at BP were shared with executives in London and provided to at least one member of the executive board - John Manzoni, chief executive of refining and marketing.

Don Holmstrom, the CSB's supervisory investigator, said "Our findings show that both BP group executives and Texas City managers became aware of serious process safety problems at the refinery beginning in 2002 and continuing through March 2005.'' He said they failed to apply lessons from three incidents at BP's refinery in Grangemouth, Scotland, in 2000.

The US House of Representatives committee on energy and commerce is to review BP's performance and see whether it has implemented lessons learned from the explosion and last year's Prudhoe Bay oil spill.

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/97b6f65a-d751-11db-b9d7-000b5df10621.html

BP report exposes the fatal risks of cost-cutting
By Andrew Hill
Published: March 21 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 21 2007 02:00

So long after the event, it is easy to assume there is nothing new in the US Chemical Safety and Hazards Board's report on the BP refinery accident - 335 pages long, two years in the making. The company's response to the report of the BP-appointed independent panel, led by James Baker; the planned replacement of Lord Browne as chief executive; his successor Tony Hayward's insistence on putting safety and reliability at the centre of the corporate culture: all show how BP is raising its game. Some of the CSB's recommendations - for instance, the appointment of a board member with process safety expertise - seem almost superfluous.

But the CSB, unlike the Baker report, does finally go to the heart of what many suspected was the problem that led to the Texas City disaster: "a combination of cost-cutting, production pressures and failure to invest".

The report deliberately mentions no names but its conclusions, some of which are disputed by BP, read like an indictment of the very attributes for which Lord Browne used to be lauded: his strategic vision - which saw the opportunity for BP to pounce on Amoco, owner of Texas City; his quest for higher production; his ability to wring savings out of the combined group.

All companies wage a constant battle to save money and improve margins. The perils of squeezing costs too hard are rarely as high - in human terms - as those faced by BP and its rivals. But still, the conclusions of the CSB report should resonate for chief executives well beyond the oil sector.

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Wall Street Journal
March 21, 2007

US Rep Dingell: To Review BP's Performance After Mishaps
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 21, 2007 7:30 a.m.
(This article was originally published Tuesday)
By Ian Talley
Of  DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
 
WASHINGTON (Dow Jones)--The chairman of the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on Energy and Commerce said Tuesday he plans to hold more hearings on the lessons learned from major mishaps at BP PLC's (BP) Texas City, Texas, refinery and Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, oil fields.

Rep. John Dingell, D-Mich., said he hoped to review whether the company's performance since the incidents had improved.

The announcement followed a Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, or CSB, report published Tuesday that found the company didn't take sufficient action to ensure plant safety at the ill-fated Texas City refinery, despite repeated warnings about mechanical integrity problems in the years leading to a fatal March 2005 accident.

Fifteen people were killed and 180 workers were injured in the March 23, 2005, explosion at BP Texas City, which is located just south of Houston.

Last year, Congress held numerous oversight hearings on BP's Prudhoe Bay oil leak, which temporarily shut down the U.S.'s largest producing field. Investigations revealed the company had known about the potential for such leaks but hadn't adequately addressed the problem before the leak occurred.

According to the CSB report, cost-cutting by corporate leaders, inadequate corporate oversight, outdated mechanical equipment and a culture that discouraged the reporting of safety problems were central causes of the Texas City explosion. Repeated budget cuts left the Texas City refinery "vulnerable to a catastrophe," the report said.

Dingell said he intends to hold hearings soon to review BP's performance and determine whether the company has implemented lessons learned from both the Texas City explosion and last year's major oil spill at Prudhoe Bay, his office said in a statement.

"The most tragic thing about what happened in Texas City is the fact that this disaster could have been prevented," Dingell said. "We are committed to making sure BP implements the changes necessary to secure their oil refineries and, more importantly, protect American workers."

Dingell's office said that though previous investigations had been conducted by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, CSB found that OSHA failed to identify the likelihood for a catastrophic accident and take necessary enforcement action, despite obvious warning signs and the fact that 10 fatalities have occurred at the BP Texas City refinery over the past two decades.

"In light of the Texas City blast and the Prudhoe Bay spill, BP's management must make safety their top priority," Dingell said. "The millions of dollars in fines that were levied against BP after the explosion have done little more than close the door after the horse had left the stable.

"It's clear that both additional oversight measures and sweeping cultural changes are critical," he said.

On Thursday, the House Education and Labor will hold a hearing called "BP Texas City Disaster and Worker Safety." Witnesses will include Eva Rowe, whose parents were killed in Texas City explosion; Carolyn Merritt, the head of CSB; and Red Caveny, the president of the American Petroleum Institute.

George Miller, chairman of the Education and Labor Committee, said, "The Chemical Safety Board report paints an extremely troubling picture of gross negligence on the part of BP and OSHA." He said the hearing would "examine what we can learn from the missteps that preceded this disaster in order to help prevent future ones."

"We can't bring back the 15 men and women who died in the Texas City explosion, but in their honor, we can and must take steps to prevent future tragedies," Miller added.

 -By Ian Talley, Dow Jones Newswires; (202) 862 9285;
ian.talley@dowjones.com 

(John Biers in Houston contributed to this report.)
 

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Houston Chronicle
March 20, 2007

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/front/4645814.html

Cost-cutting, lax oversight blamed for deadly BP blast
By ANNE BELLI
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

RESOURCES
BP's statement about the final report
http://www.bp.com/genericarticle.do?categoryId=2012968&contentId=7031189

BP-Baker safety review panel report
http://www.bp.com/bakerpanelreport
Read the statements made by CSB
http://images.chron.com/content/news/photos/06/10/31/Statements.pdf
Federal recommendations after investigation
http://images.chron.com/content/news/photos/06/10/31/CSBBlowdownRecs.pdf

While hourly operators working on the unit that exploded made mistakes, the true, root cause of the blast was management's lack of commitment to safety, largely evident through years of drastic cost-cutting at the refinery while turning a blind eye to repeated warning signs that a catastrophic event loomed, investigators with the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board said.

And while they stopped short of laying blame at the feet of the Occupational Safety & Health Administration, investigators noted years of lax oversight at the plant, even after numerous fatalities there, and recommended that regulators significantly step up their enforcement of federal health and safety laws governing the petroleum refining industry.

The 335-page report, the most exhaustive ever conducted by the 9-year-old safety board, comes nearly two years to the day of the blast, which killed 15 people, injured hundreds more and led to troubling discoveries about one of the world's largest oil companies.

"The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery," CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt said, who added that senior BP officials, including outgoing chief executive John Browne, were aware of that deterioration and allowed it to persist.

Investigators are set to present their findings and recommendations at what is expected to be a widely-attended public hearing tonight, when the full chemical safety board will vote on whether to accept them.

Operators were starting up the plant's isomerization unit just after lunch on March 23, 2005 when they accidentally overfilled a raffinate splitter tower with highly flammable hydrocarbons.

The materials then overflowed into a pressure relief system called a blowdown drum, which quickly filled and, and rushed up a stack that vented to the atmosphere. Liquids and vapor clouds formed on the ground, while unsuspecting workers went about their business. An idling truck or some other source ignited the materials, causing a series of blasts heard and felt up to five miles away.

All of those killed were working in or around construction trailers parked near the unit. Most of the fatalities were inside a trailer parked just 121 feet away, investigators have said.

The chemical safety board in October issued widespread preliminary findings that key equipment malfunctioned, workers lacked sufficient training, the trailers were parked too close to the process unit, the blowdown drum was and should have at least been fitted with a flare, and even that BP was in a cost-cutting mode at the time of the accident.

But Tuesday was the first time that investigators went so far as to directly tie those cost cuts to the accident, as well as blame BP management for the blast.

Specifically, the investigators reported nine "key findings" dealing with the accident's root cause. Among them:

• Cost-cutting orders from senior executives in BP's London headquarters impaired safety at the Texas City refinery, the largest in the company's portfolio. Those executives also failed to provide effective safety leadership.

• BP's board of directors failed to provide effective oversight.

• Plant managers focused on reducing the number of on-the-job injuries and illnesses instead of larger "process safety" problems that lead to fires and explosions.

• The plant's general attitude toward maintenance was not to fix equipment until it stopped working.

• Safety procedures were often checked off even when they weren't completed.

• BP workers were discouraged from reporting near-misses, and those that were often went uninvestigated.

• While the company went to the trouble to conduct safety audits, surveys and studies in the years before the blast, their findings were largely ignored.

The federal investigators also will ask the chemical safety board to approve several recommendations to not only BP, but also OSHA, the United Steelworkers, the American Petroleum Institute and the Center for Chemical Process Safety, which is an arm of the American Institute of Chemical Engineers.

BP should appoint a non-executive member to its board to monitor process safety, improve its incident reporting program to encourage workers to speak up when they discover safety lapses, ensure that equipment is properly tested and maintained, improve operator training programs to include the use of simulators and ensure that supervisors are adequately trained and present during hazardous operations, such as start-ups.

Many of those recommendations were included in a January report by an independent panel of experts headed by former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III and charged with examining BP's corporate safety culture.

But what the Baker report didn't include was harsh words for OSHA, which CSB investigators said today fell short of providing adequate oversight of the troubled Texas City refinery.

Although the agency slapped BP with a record $21.4 million fine after finding more than 300 willful violations resulting from the blast, the agency had gone six years before conducting a planned inspection of the plant, investigators said. Regulators also refused to provide some requested information to the CSB, the investigators said.

A Houston Chronicle review of OSHA records showed that regulators hadn't conducted unplanned inspections of the vast majority of the area's refineries in the last five years. And those inspections that were conducted were mostly reactionary, meaning they were performed only after a complaint, accident or referral.

CSB investigators recommend that OSHA significantly strengthen enforcement of refineries by conducting more planned inspections as well as hire more inspectors specifically trained under the agency's process safety management regulations.

It also recommended that OSHA amend those regulations to require companies to review safety policies and management changes following mergers and acquisitions. BP acquired the Texas City plant in 1999 following a merger with Amoco.

Investigators also recommended that the overall industry make changes.

The American Petroleum Institute should work with the United Steelworkers to create specific "performance indicators" to measure process safety at refineries, as well as develop fatigue prevention guidelines.

And finally, the Center for Chemical Process Safety should issue new industry guidelines to address safety issues that arise from mergers and acquisitions as well as personnel and budget changes.

"It is my sincere hope and belief that our report and the recent Baker report will establish a new standard of care for corporate boards of directors and CEO's throughout the world," Merritt said. "Process safety programs to protect the lives of workers and the public deserve the same level of attention, investment and scrutiny as companies now dedicate to maintaining their financial controls."

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Financial Times
March 20, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/1a2dce96-d6ef-11db-98da-000b5df10621.html

Safety deficiencies ‘at all levels’ in BP
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 20 2007 15:04 |
Last updated: March 20 2007 15:04

The US government on Tuesday cited “safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation” for the UK company’s fatal Texas refinery accident and called on the board to appoint an additional member with expertise in process safety.

VIDEO

Ed Crooks on the ’safety deficiencies’ at BP
http://video.ft.com/ukdailyvideo/?clipid=1359_FT0168
The US Chemical Safety and Hazards Board (CSB), the federal agency charged with investigating the blast, said its two-year probe revealed cost-cutting; an inadequate response to multiple audits revealing safety lapses; failure to thoroughly investigate and respond to previous accidents; ignoring federal regulations; and focusing on production over safety left the site “vulnerable to catastrophe”.

The catastrophe that took place, on March 23 2005 killed 15 and injured 500 in the US’s worst industrial accident in 15 years. The CSB interviewed 370 witnesses, reviewed more than 30,000 documents and tested equipment at the facility before publishing its final report yesterday.

The 335-page report, backed up by an inch-thick book of BP documents, called on BP senior executives to establish an improved incident reporting programme  one without fear of retaliation  and use new indicators to measure safety performance, determining the company’s current procedures inadequate.

“The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery,” said Carolyn Merritt, CSB chairwoman. Audits revealing the deterioration at the site were shared with BP executives in London and with at least one member of the executive board, she added.

“Our findings show that both BP Group executives and Texas City managers became aware of serious process safety problems at the refinery beginning in 2002 and continuing through March 2005,’’ said Don Holmstrom, the CSB’s supervisory investigator.

Despite that, he said, they failed to apply lessons learned following three serious incidents at the BP refinery in Grangemouth, Scotland, in 2000, which could have helped prevent the explosion.

The CSB also indicated US regulators had failed to provide comprehensive oversight of the facility to uncover its alarming state of disrepair. It, therefore, called on the US Occupational Safety and Health Administration to increase inspection and enforcement at all US oil refineries and chemical plants, and to require these corporations to evaluate the safety impact of mergers, reorganisations, downsizing and budget cuts.

In addition, the CSB recommended that the American Petroleum Institute, the national trade association representing all aspects of America’s oil and natural gas industry, and the United Steelworkers International Union, the labour union, work together to develop new industry standards, include fatigue prevention guidelines that limit hours and days of work.

The CSB found fatigue, by some who had worked 12-hour days for 29 or more consecutive days, played a role in the explosion.

BP said that despite its “strong disagreement“ with some of the report’s findings and conclusions, it would “give full and careful consideration to CSB’s recommendations, in conjunction with the many activities already underway to improve process safety management. BP and its employees are ready, willing and able to achieve the goal of becoming an industry leader in process safety management.

“In the two years since the accident, BP has taken significant steps to identify and address the causes of the March 23 2005 Texas City explosion in order to reduce risk and improve process safety management and performance at its five US Refineries.  This effort continues. BP is committed to preventing such a tragedy from occurring again.”

Ms Merritt said she hoped the CSB’s investigation would establish a new standard of care for corporate boards of directors and chief executives throughout the world.

“Process safety programmes to protect the lives of workers and the public deserve the same level of attention, investment and scrutiny as companies now dedicate to maintaining their financial controls,” Ms Merritt said.

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Wall Street Journal
March 20, 2007

U.S. Agency Slams BP
On Blast at Texas Plant
By JOHN M. BIERS
March 20, 2007 1:07 p.m.

BP PLC didn't take sufficient action to ensure plant safety at the ill-fated Texas City refinery, despite repeated warnings about mechanical integrity problems in the years leading to a fatal March 2005 accident, according to a report released by a federal safety agency Tuesday.

Compared with its preliminary conclusions, Tuesday's final report by the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board offered up some new findings, such as criticism of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. But the report's central conclusion -- that the calamity stemmed from BP budget cuts and anemic safety management -- was a restatement of prior CSB findings, albeit in a broader form and with more supporting documents.

"The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery," CSB Chairman Carolyn Merritt said in a statement. BP budget cuts "left the Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe," the report said.

In a press release issued in response to the report, BP reiterated its apologies and pointed out that it had worked to ensure that all harmed were provided fair compensation. The company, however, continued to disagree with some of the findings.

"Notwithstanding the company's strong disagreement with some of the content of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions, BP will give full and careful consideration to CSB's recommendations, in conjunction with the many activities already underway to improve process safety management," BP said.

Although BP has overhauled its executive leadership in the wake of the accident at Texas City among other problems, the company continues to face lingering probes related to oil spills in Alaska and a federal crackdown on its trading operations.

The London-based energy giant faces an ongoing U.S. criminal probe into the Texas City accident, an explosion at the Houston-area plant that killed 15 contract workers and injured 170 others at the plant. Federal prosecutors have issued subpoenas on BP, the company disclosed in a recent securities filing. BP has set aside $1.6 billion in reserves to settle ongoing civil litigation related to the refinery accident. The company also paid a $21.4 million fine to OSHA in 2005 to resolve civil violations of safety rules at Texas City.

Texas City Comes to Washington

On Thursday, a U.S. House committee will hear from Ms. Merritt at a congressional hearing on Texas City, an occasion that has generated concerns within the oil industry that the Democratic-led Congress will introduce new legislation. The hearing is a "first step" that may spawn additional hearings on OSHA and other issues related to refinery safety, said Aaron Albright, a spokesman for the House Committee on Education and Labor.

The CSB has previously noted that an across-the-board 25% cut in fixed spending at BP's refineries was a prominent factor in the accident. The agency repeated that charge again Tuesday, pointing to older documents in which company officials link budget cuts to emerging operational problems.

An October 2002 "retrospective analysis" bemoans the "deterioration" in refinery performance, saying the "current integrity and reliability issues at Texas City are clearly linked to the reduction in maintenance spend over the last decade."

The CSB report also references another 2002 document, a "Good Practice Sharing Assessment," that warns of "serious concerns about the potential for a major site incident." The "serious safety problems found in the 2002 study were not adequately corrected, and many played a role in the 2005 disaster," the CSB report said of the assessment, which the CSB said was shared with BP's London executives.

The CSB released the "retrospective analysis" with its report Tuesday. The agency didn't release the "good practice" assessment, but that document was released earlier by Brent Coon & Associates, a law firm that has led much of the Texas City litigation against BP.

While expressing regret for the accident, BP has contested the CSB's criticism of company actions prior to the blast and battled plaintiffs attorneys who have sought to depict the accident as the result of "gross negligence."

Critique of OSHA

Tuesday's report constituted the CSB's most direct criticism of OSHA to date. While the CSB doesn't impose fines or have other enforcement authority, OSHA is the federal government's prime agency for ensuring workplace safety. The CSB said OSHA has "an insufficient number of qualified inspectors" to guarantee refinery safety.

The report calls on OSHA to identify the most vulnerable sites for a catastrophic accident and "conduct comprehensive inspections."

The CSB report also highlighted worker fatigue as a contributing factor to the disaster, noting that many Texas City operators had been working 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days at the time of the incident. The CSB noted that fatigue prevention standards have been developed in aviation and some other sectors, but not in the oil industry.

The American Petroleum Institute should work with labor leaders to develop "new consensus standards for fatigue prevention in the oil and gas industry," the report said.

Write to John M. Biers at
john.biers@dowjones.com 



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RELATED DOCUMENTS

Chemical Safety Board Statement
March 20, 2007 11:16 a.m.
U.S. Chemical Safety Board Investigators Conclude "Organizational and Safety Deficiencies at All Levels of the BP Corporation" Caused March 2005 Texas City Disaster That Killed 15, Injured 180

HOUSTON, March 20, 2007 - In a 335-page final report released today, federal investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) conclude that "organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation" caused the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery, the worst industrial accident in the United States since 1990. The report calls on the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to increase inspection and enforcement at U.S. oil refineries and chemical plants, and to require these corporations to evaluate the safety impact of mergers, reorganizations, downsizing, and budget cuts.

CSB Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt said, "It is my sincere hope and belief that our report and the recent Baker report will establish a new standard of care for corporate boards of directors and CEO's throughout the world. Process safety programs to protect the lives of workers and the public deserve the same level of attention, investment, and scrutiny as companies now dedicate to maintaining their financial controls. The boards of directors of oil and chemical companies should examine every detail of their process safety programs to ensure that no other terrible tragedy like the one at BP occurs."

The CSB report calls on BP to appoint an additional member of the board of directors with expertise in process safety, and calls for BP senior executives to establish an improved incident reporting program and use new indicators to measure safety performance.

The independent Baker panel, formed and funded by BP in response to an urgent CSB safety recommendation, issued its final report in January 2007. It found "material deficiencies" in the safety of BP's five U.S. refineries in Texas, California, Indiana, Ohio, and Washington. The 11-member panel also issued ten safety recommendations, including calling on BP's corporate board to closely monitor safety performance at its facilities. The Baker panel was not charged with determining the root causes of the March 2005 explosion.

CSB Investigation Background

Chairman Merritt said, "Our investigation of BP was the largest and most complex undertaking in the agency's nine-year history. Under the leadership of Supervisory Investigator Don Holmstrom, the team interviewed 370 witnesses, reviewed more than 30,000 documents, and conducted a far-reaching program of equipment, instrumentation, and chemical testing." The final report is scheduled to be presented at a CSB public meeting beginning at 6 p.m. tonight at the Nessler Center, Wings of Heritage Room, located at 2010 5th Avenue North in Texas City. The report and recommendations are subject to approval by the full Board at the public meeting.

BP cooperated with the investigation, furnished documents and interviews on a voluntary basis, and committed to widespread safety improvements and investments following the accident. BP published its own report on the explosion in December 2005, pledged the total elimination of the kind of unsafe disposal equipment that led to the explosion, and developed a new siting policy to remove trailers from hazardous process areas. All 15 fatalities occurred in or near trailers that were sited as close as 121 feet from a blowdown drum that vented flammable liquid and vapor directly to the atmosphere.

Safety Harmed by Cost-Cutting, Production Pressures, and Failure to Invest

BP acquired the Texas City refinery when it merged with Amoco in 1999. The CSB report found that "cost-cutting in the 1990s by Amoco and then BP left the Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe." Shortly after acquiring Amoco, the BP Group Chief Executive ordered an across-the-budget 25% cut in fixed spending at the corporation's refineries. The impact of the cost cuts is detailed in many of the more than 20 key investigative documents the CSB made public today, including internal BP safety audits, reviews, and emails. Among other things, cost considerations discouraged refinery officials from replacing the blowdown drum with a flare system, which the CSB previously determined would have prevented or greatly minimized the severity of the accident.

Chairman Merritt said, "The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures, and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery. Beginning in 2002, BP commissioned a series of audits and studies that revealed serious safety problems at the Texas City refinery, including a lack of necessary preventative maintenance and training. These audits and studies were shared with BP executives in London, and were provided to at least one member of the executive board. BP's response was too little and too late. Some additional investments were made, but they did not address the core problems in Texas City. In 2004, BP executives challenged their refineries to cut yet another 25% from their budgets for the following year."

Blast Modeling Shows Vulnerability of Temporary Trailers

The March 23 accident occurred during the startup of the refinery's octane-boosting isomerization (ISOM) unit, when a distillation tower and attached blowdown drum were overfilled with highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons. Because the blowdown drum vented directly to the atmosphere, there was a geyser-like release of highly flammable liquid and vapor onto the grounds of the refinery. A diesel pickup truck that was idling nearby ignited the vapor, initiating a series of explosions and fires that swept through the unit and the surrounding area. Fatalities and injuries occurred in and around occupied work trailers, which were placed too close to the ISOM unit and which were not evacuated prior to the startup.

CSB Investigator Mark Kaszniak, who led the CSB's vapor and blast modeling effort, stated, "The CSB was able to calculate that approximately 7,600 gallons of flammable liquid hydrocarbons - nearly the equivalent of a full tanker truck of gasoline - were release from the top of the blowdown drum stack in just under two minutes." The ejected liquid rapidly vaporized due to evaporation, wind dispersion, and contact with the surface of nearby equipment. High overpressures from the resulting vapor cloud explosion totally destroyed 13 trailers and damaged 27 others. People inside trailers were injured as far as 479 feet away from the blowdown drum, and trailers nearly 1000 feet away sustained damage.

"Industry trailer siting guidelines did not predict the level of trailer damage that we actually saw," Mr. Kaszniak stated. In October 2005, the CSB issued an urgent recommendation to the American Petroleum Institute to develop new guidance to prevent trailers from being sited near hazardous areas of refineries and chemical plants, where occupants could be injured or killed. "A human being is more likely to be injured or killed inside a trailer - which can shatter during an explosion - than if he is standing in the open air. For that reason, occupied trailers have no place near hazardous process areas of refineries and chemical plants," Mr. Kaszniak said.

Human Factors Analysis: Fatigue, Other Conditions Made Errors More Likely

The tower overfilled because a valve allowing liquid to drain from the bottom of the tower into storage tanks was left closed for over three hours during the startup on the morning of March 23, which was contrary to unit startup procedures. The CSB investigative team examined various conditions and human factors that led to this error.

"BP relied on operators taking correct and timely actions and following procedures to prevent excessive liquid levels in the tower. While procedures are essential to any process safety program, they are the least reliable safeguard to prevent process accidents," Mr. Kaszniak said. "Modern control systems utilize automatic safety controls to shut down liquid flow to a tower and prevent dangerous overfilling."

According to a definition by U.K. safety authorities, human factors are those environmental, organizational, and job-related factors that influence behavior at work and can impact safety performance. CSB Investigator Cheryl MacKenzie, who led the human factors analysis, said, "Although errors and procedural deviations occurred during the startup, it is important to recognize that individuals do not plan to make mistakes. They are doing what makes sense to them at the time, given the work environment, the organization's goals, and other job-related factors. Understanding and correcting these factors will help prevent future accidents at BP and throughout the industry."

In particular, the investigation found that procedural deviations, abnormally high liquid levels and pressures, and dramatic swings in tower liquid level were the norm in almost all previous startups of the unit since 2000. Operators typically started up the unit with a high liquid level inside and left the drain valve in manual - not automatic - mode to prevent possible loss of liquid flow and resulting damage to a furnace that was connected to the tower. These procedural deviations - together with the faulty condition of valves, gauges, and instruments on the tower - made the tower susceptible to overfilling, investigators said.

None of the previous abnormal startups was investigated by BP, nor were operating procedures updated to reduce the likelihood or consequences of flooding the tower. As American Petroleum Institute safety guidance notes, when operating procedures are not updated or correct, "workers will create their own unofficial procedures that may not adequately address safety issues." At the Texas City refinery, "Procedural workarounds were accepted as normal," Investigator MacKenzie said.

On March 23, the control board operator's decision to keep the drain valve closed was influenced by ineffective communication and by false instrument readings from the tower. Alarms and gauges that should have warned of the overfilling equipment failed to operate properly. In addition, the operator believed he had been instructed not to send any liquid from the bottom of the tower to storage tanks, and the CSB determined that these storage tanks were in fact noted as nearly full. "BP had no policy for effective shift communication or requirements for shift turnover," Ms. MacKenzie said. "This important instruction to the operator was given over the phone and was not contained in the log book or the startup procedure."

Although a high tower liquid level alarm did activate in the control room in the early morning hours, a second high-level alarm malfunctioned and the faulty tower level transmitter later indicated that the liquid level was below nine feet and falling. The normal liquid level in the tower was six-and-a-half feet. Unknown to operators, the level was actually rising rapidly, reaching 158 feet by 1 p.m. on March 23, twenty minutes before the explosion. The CSB determined that the level transmitter was miscalibrated, using a setting from outdated data sheets that likely had not been updated since 1975.

The tower lacked basic process indicators, such as a bottom pressure indicator, that could have provided operators with an accurate picture of the high level inside the tower. The control panel also did not display the flows in and out of the tower on the same screen, and did not automatically calculate how much total liquid was in the tower, even though it could have been configured to do so.

The CSB team used an NTSB methodology to conclude that ISOM unit operators were likely fatigued when the startup occurred. By March 23, operators had been working 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days. "Fatigue causes cognitive fixation and impaired judgment and could lead operators to fixate on one operational parameter - such as the apparently declining liquid level - to the exclusion of other indicators," Ms. MacKenzie said. Fatigue has been recognized as a cause of major accidents in the transportation sector. Fatigue prevention regulations have been developed for aviation and other transportation sectors, but there are no fatigue prevention guidelines that are widely used and accepted in the oil and chemical sector.

The report recommends that the American Petroleum Institute, a leading trade organization, and the United Steelworkers International Union (USW), the largest union representing refinery workers, work together to develop a new consensus standard for fatigue prevention in the oil and chemical industry.

The investigative team also pointed to a significant downsizing that occurred in operations and training at the refinery. Following BP's global 25% cut to fixed costs in 1999, the Texas City Refinery halved the number of control board operators in the ISOM area, from two to one. Then in 2003, the sole remaining operator was given a third process unit to control. Each refinery unit is a complex network of equipment, piping, valves, and instruments. The ISOM unit itself, one of the smaller units of the refinery, was the size of a city block and contained four major subunits. A 2003 BP hazard review recommended that a second operator be present during startups, but this recommendation was never implemented. The 25% budget cut from 1999 also resulted in significant training reductions for operators, and cost pressures prevented the refinery from using simulators to train operators for handling abnormal situations and process upsets.

Refinery Had Longstanding Process Safety Deficiencies

Like other refineries and chemical plants that handle highly flammable, toxic, or hazardous substances, the Texas City Refinery is regulated under the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The standard was promulgated in 1992 as a result of provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act, which responded to major chemical accidents in the U.S. and overseas. The PSM standard requires covered facilities to implement 14 specific management elements to prevent catastrophic releases of hazardous substances. These include hazard analysis, operator training, preventative maintenance programs (mechanical integrity), and management of change reviews.

Investigator Mark Kaszniak stated, "If the Process Safety Management standard had been thoroughly implemented at the refinery, as required by federal regulations, this accident likely would not have occurred." Mr. Kaszniak said that numerous requirements of the standard were not being followed in Texas City and cited ineffective incident investigations, lack of effective preventative maintenance, lack of change reviews and pre-startup reviews, and incomplete hazard analyses.

OSHA rules require internal investigations and corrective actions for any serious process incidents or near-misses. But the CSB found that the refinery only investigated three of the eight known previous ISOM blowdown release incidents, where flammable and potentially explosive vapor was released from the same blowdown drum involved in the March 23 accident. In 2004, an internal BP audit graded the refinery's analysis of incident information as "poor."

The CSB also determined that both the blowdown drum and the relief valve disposal piping were undersized, which led to the blowdown drum overflowing with liquid. Under the PSM standard, BP was required to conduct a study of the tower's pressure relief system to ensure its safety. Despite the federal requirement, BP was not able to produce any documents indicating the study had even been done. "By 2005, the required relief valve study was 13 years overdue," Investigator Kaszniak said. "Without the study, there was no assurance that the equipment could handle all the credible relief scenarios, including the one that actually occurred on March 23." The report noted that an internal BP audit from 2004 found that design calculations did not exist for many relief valves at the refinery and that the problem had existed for nearly 10 years.

In October 2006, the CSB issued recommendations to OSHA and API aimed at eliminating similar atmospheric blowdown systems from U.S. refineries and chemical plants in favor of safer alternatives, such as flare systems.

The investigative team also noted a number of problems with the facility's preventative maintenance program that were causally related to the March 23 accident. The report concluded that BP supervisory personnel were aware of the equipment problems with the level transmitter before the March 23 startup but still had signed off on equipment checks as if they had been done, which the report said reflected the prevalence of production pressures at the refinery.

In addition, there was no documented test method for the blowdown drum high-level alarm, which failed to sound on March 23, and the testing method in actual use was contrary to the manufacturer's recommendations. The refinery's computerized maintenance management system allowed maintenance work orders to be closed even if no repair had been done. Many action items from previous hazard analyses and incident investigations - such as a 1994 action item to review the adequacy of the ISOM blowdown system following two serious incidents that year - were never completed.

Dysfunctional Safety Culture Existed at All Levels of BP

For the first time in its nine-year history, the CSB conducted an examination of corporate safety culture. "As the science of major accident investigations has matured, analysis has gone beyond technical and system deficiencies to include an examination of organizational culture," Supervisory Investigator Don Holmstrom said. "Effective organizational practices such as encouraging the reporting of incidents and allocating adequate resources for safe operation, are required to make safety systems work successfully."

Mr. Holmstrom pointed to the unusual history of fatal incidents at the Texas City Refinery. Over a thirty-year period spanning Amoco and BP's ownership, 23 workers died at the facility - not counting the 15 workers killed in March 2005. "Many of the safety issues that led to the March 2005 accident were recurring safety problems that had been previously identified in internal audits, reports, and investigations. Our findings show that both BP Group executives and Texas City managers became aware of serious process safety problems at the refinery beginning in 2002 and continuing through March 2005," Mr. Holmstrom said.

Mr. Holmstrom also cited a series of three serious incidents at the BP refinery in Grangemouth, Scotland, in 2000, which were investigated by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive. BP officials wrote that meeting "cost targets" played a role in the Grangemouth incidents and stated that "there was too much emphasis on short term cost reduction - HSE [health, safety, and environment] was unofficially sacrificed to cost reductions, and cost pressures inhibited the staff from asking the right questions." The lessons from the Grangemouth investigation were not effectively implemented at the Texas City Refinery, however.

Mr. Holmstrom stated that in each year from 2002 to 2005, BP made its own significant findings about the culture and safety of the Texas City site. In 2002, the new refinery manager found the infrastructure and equipment to be "in complete decline." A follow-up study by BP found "serious concerns about the potential for a major site accident" due to mechanical integrity problems. Later in 2002, another internal report explicitly connected the safety problems to earlier cost-cutting, stating, "the current integrity and reliability issues at TCR [Texas City Refinery] are clearly linked to the reduction in maintenance spending over the last decade." The prevailing culture at the Texas City refinery was to accept cost reductions without challenge and not to raise concerns when operational integrity was compromised."

Similar findings were made in 2003, when a study of maintenance found that "cost cutting measures have intervened with the group's work to get things right - usually reliability improvements are cut." An external BP safety audit found inadequate training, a large number of overdue action items, and a concern about "insufficient resources to achieve all commitments." The report stated that "the condition of the infrastructure and assets is poor."

The year 2004 was marked by three major accidents at the refinery, including a $30 million process fire and two other accidents that caused three deaths. Meanwhile, an analysis conducted by BP's internal audit group in London found common safety deficiencies among 35 BP business units around the world, including widespread tolerance of non-compliance with basic health, safety, and environment rules and poor implementation of safety management systems.

"In 2004, BP documents do show that maintenance spending increased, but we found that the increases were largely due to complying with environmental requirements and responding to major accidents and outages. There was still not an adequate focus on preventative maintenance before accidents occurred," Mr. Holmstrom said. The investigation found that BP's executives relied unduly on injury statistics in assessing the safety of their facilities.

Mr. Holmstrom said. "BP managers and executives attempted to make improvements from 2002 to 2005 but they were largely focused on personal safety - such as slips, trips, falls, and vehicle accidents - rather than on improving process safety performance, which continued to deteriorate." The report calls on API and the USW to develop a new consensus standard defining performance indicators for process safety. The consensus process should draw on representatives from industry, labor, government, public interest, and environmental organizations.

Later in 2004, a safety culture survey of the refinery was conducted and endorsed by the site leadership. The study, known as the Telos report, pointed to "an exceptional degree of fear of catastrophic incidents" among other conclusions, and it stated respondents' belief that "production and budget compliance gets ... rewarded before anything else." Finally, a safety business plan for 2005 cited as a "key risk" the possibility that "Texas City kills someone in the next 12-18 months."

"The investigation found that BP executives made spending cuts without assessing the safety impact of those decisions," Mr. Holmstrom said. The report recommends that OSHA amend its Process Safety Management standard to require companies to perform a management-of-change safety review on organizational changes - including mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations, personnel changes, policy changes, and budget reductions. The CSB report cited previous good-practice guidance from the American Chemistry Council, then known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, calling for such safety reviews. The report also included a new recommendation to the Center for Chemical Process Safety to develop guidelines for how to conduct the organizational management-of-change reviews envisioned in the recommendation to OSHA.

OSHA Should Increase Petrochemical Inspections, Enforcement

As part of its investigation, the CSB looked at the role of OSHA in inspecting and enforcing safety regulations at refineries and chemical plants. Although the refinery had experienced numerous fatal incidents from 1985 to 2005, the investigation found that OSHA conducted only one planned PSM inspection at the Texas City Refinery, in 1998. Other, unplanned OSHA inspections of the Texas City Refinery occurred in response to accidents, complaints, or referrals; the report said that unplanned inspections are typically narrower in scope and shorter than planned inspections. Proposed OSHA fines during the twenty years preceding the March 2005 disaster - a period when ten fatalities occurred at the refinery - totaled $270,255; net fines collected after negotiations totaled $77,860. Following the March 2005 explosion, OSHA issued the largest penalty in its history to BP, over $21 million for more than 300 egregious and willful violations.

"OSHA's national focus on inspecting facilities with high injury rates, while important, has resulted in reduced attention to preventing less frequent, but catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City," the report reads. The report found that when the PSM standard was created, OSHA had envisioned a highly technical, complex, and lengthy inspection process for regulated facilities, called a Program Quality Verification or PQV inspection. The inspections would take weeks or months at each facility and would be conducted by a select, well-trained, and experienced team.

The CSB investigation found that few PQV inspections were done between 1995 and 2005. Federal OSHA conducted only nine such inspections in the targeted industries over that ten-year period, and none in the refining sector. State agencies in the 26 states that operate their own workplace safety programs conducted a total of 48 PQV inspections, including six at refineries. However, a number of states - including Texas, Louisiana, and New Jersey, where much of the U.S. oil and chemical industry is concentrated - rely upon federal OSHA to enforce workplace safety rules.

"On average from 1995 to 2005, only 0.2% of the approximately 2,816 facilities in targeted, high-hazard industries received a planned OSHA process safety inspection each year. That's about one planned inspection per 500 facilities," Mr. Holmstrom said. The total number of U.S. facilities covered under the PSM standard is not known, since covered facilities are not required to identify themselves to the government; however, a similar regulatory program administered by the Environmental Protection Agency covers an estimated 15,000 sites.

The report noted that California's Contra Costa County, which has its own industrial safety ordinance, inspects each covered facility every three years. A county staff of five engineers performs an average of 16 inspections per year. The U.K. Health and Safety Executive, which oversees a much smaller oil and chemical industry than do U.S. authorities, has 105 inspectors for high-hazard facilities; each covered facility in the U.K. is inspected every five years. Although OSHA did not provide requested information to the CSB investigation, available evidence indicates that OSHA has an insufficient number of qualified inspectors to enforce the PSM standard at oil and chemical facilities.

The report calls on OSHA to "identify those facilities at the greatest risk of a catastrophic accident" and then to "conduct comprehensive inspections" at those facilities. The report also recommends that OSHA hire or develop new, specialized inspectors and expand the PSM training curriculum at its National Training Institute.

"Rules already on the books would likely have prevented the tragedy in Texas City," Chairman Merritt said. "But if a company is not following those rules, year-in and year-out, it is ultimately the responsibility of the federal government to enforce good safety practices before more lives are lost. OSHA should obtain and dedicate whatever resources are necessary for inspecting and enforcing safety rules at oil and chemical plants. These facilities simply have too many potentially catastrophic hazards to be overlooked."

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA

Source: Chemical Safety Board


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BP Response to Final CSB Report
On Deadly Fire at Texas City Plant
March 20, 2007 12:53 p.m.
Following is the full text of a release from BP PLC in response to the final government report about a 2005 explosion at a BP plant in Texas City, Texas, that left 15 workers dead.

BP Products North America Inc. Statement on CSB Final Report

Release date: 20 March 2007

BP accepted responsibility for the March 23, 2005 explosion and fire at the Texas City refinery. We have apologized to those harmed. While we cannot change the past or repair all the damage this incident caused, we have worked diligently to provide fair compensation, without the need for lengthy court proceedings, to those who were injured and to the families of those who died. On the recommendation of the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board (CSB), we created an independent panel, led by Former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker, III to assess process safety management and safety culture at our US refineries. The independent panel undertook extensive investigations, and issued their report in January of this year. BP is implementing the recommendations in full.

We have completed and made public the results of our own investigation of the incident and, as CSB Chairman Merritt has publicly recognized, BP cooperated in an unprecedented way with the CSB investigation. BP voluntarily produced to CSB over 6,300,000 pages of documents, made over 300 witnesses available for CSB interviews, including some of its most senior executives and, importantly, agreed to form the independent panel.

Notwithstanding the company's strong disagreement with some of the content of the CSB report, particularly many of the findings and conclusions, BP will give full and careful consideration to CSB's recommendations, in conjunction with the many activities already underway to improve process safety management. BP and its employees are ready, willing and able to achieve the goal of becoming an industry leader in process safety management.

In the two years since the accident, BP has taken significant steps to identify and address the causes of the March 23, 2005 Texas City explosion in order to reduce risk and improve process safety management and performance at its five US Refineries. This effort continues. BP is committed to preventing such a tragedy from occurring again.

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Timeline: BP's Woes
March 20, 2007 12:39 p.m.

BP is struggling to put behind it a series of problems in the U.S., including a refinery explosion in Texas that killed 15 people in March 2005 and an oil spill in Alaska discovered earlier this year. Below is a timeline of the energy giant's woes.

2002

June:
BP agrees to a $45.8 million settlement with the state of California, resolving allegations that dozens of service stations it now owns in the state didn't make required safety upgrades.

2005

March:
A deadly explosion at BP's Texas City, Texas, refinery kills 15 workers, all of them employees of contractors doing work at the plant. It was the third fatal accident at the petrochemical and refining facility in the past year and the deadliest U.S. petro-chemical accident in 15 years.

April: The U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration puts BP on a safety watch list.

May : BP backtracks on an earlier statement that blamed managers and other workers for the March blast at its Texas refinery.

July: BP's Gulf of Mexico Thunder Horse facility, the largest oil and gas producing platform in the world, is left listing after the passage of hurricane Dennis. Company sets aside $700 million in compensation for the families of Texas City victims.

August: The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board calls on BP to set up an independent panel to review safety across its U.S. refining operations. Former Secretary of State James Baker is eventually tapped to lead the report.

September : BP agreed to pay workplace-safety regulators $21.4 million in fines for scores of "egregious" safety violations tied to the March 23 explosion. The fine is the largest industrial-accident settlement of its kind.

December: BP says it will spend $1 billion over the next five years to improve the refinery in Texas City, including replacing equipment and beefing up maintenance programs found lacking at the facility.

2006

March
: Several thousand barrels of crude spill from a ruptured pipeline at Alaska's Prudhoe Bay field.

April: U.S. environmental regulators conduct a criminal investigation into BP's management of pipelines in Alaska's North Slope. BP said it has found another pipeline break caused by corrosion at a BP-operated facility on the Alaskan North Slope. OSHA fines BP $2.4 million for alleged safety violations in its Ohio refinery. In May, the agency later opened an investigation after a contract worker suffered severe burning.

June: Robert Malone succeeds Ross Pillari as head of BP's U.S. unit. Federal investigators charge BP traders with illegally manipulating the U.S. propane market in February 2004. Simultaneous probes investigate potential manipulation cases in crude-oil and unleaded-gasoline markets.

August: BP shuts down its Prudhoe Bay oil field in Alaska following the discovery of a corroded pipeline and small leak there. Federal investigators probe changes made to a report commissioned by Alaska state officials on BP's operations there after the oil giant complained the report was overly negative.

September: BP says it had spilled about 1,000 barrels of a refined petroleum product into the port of Long Beach, Calif., the latest in a series of environmental, safety and compliance lapses in the U.S. A House committee grills BP executives on problems at Prudhoe Bay, the first of a series of harsh congressional sessions on the matter. BP will further postpone the start-up of its long-delayed Thunder Horse oil field in the Gulf of Mexico.

October: The Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, a federal agency, says cost cutting by senior executives led to the Texas refinery explosion. BP announces it is replacing Steve Marshall, the head of its Alaska division.

November: BP makes a last-minute settlement in a civil lawsuit stemming from the Texas explosion, including donating $32 million to institutions to aid health care, worker training and safety and education in Texas, Louisiana and Tennessee. The plaintiff received an undisclosed financial settlement. Indiana workplace-safety regulators propose fining BP about $384,000 for a series of violations at the company's Whiting, Ind., refinery.

December: The Commodity Futures Trading Commission informs BP it intends to bring a civil enforcement action against the company over its trading in unleaded-gasoline futures in October 2002.

2007

Jan. 12:
BP names Tony Hayward CEO to succeed John Browne, who will retire at the end of July. On Jan. 16, BP is expected to release the results of an independent review of its U.S. refinery operations.

Jan. 16: An independent panel set up to review BP's refinery operations in the U.S. said company goals, such as cost-cutting, often overrode safety concerns at its plants.

March 20: The CSB issues its final report on the Texas City incident, affirming its belief that BP failed to heed safety warnings. Notable in this report is criticism of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, which the CSB says has "an insufficient number of qualified inspectors" to guarantee safety at refineries.

Source: WSJ.com research

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Chemical Safety Board
March 20, 2007

CBS News Release
http://www.chemsafety.gov/index.cfm?folder=news_releases&page=news&NEWS_ID=355

U.S. Chemical Safety Board Investigators Conclude "Organizational and Safety Deficiencies at All Levels of the BP Corporation" Caused March 2005 Texas City Disaster That Killed 15, Injured 180
For more information, go to: BP Investigation Information Page

Full Board to Weigh Recommendations to OSHA, Oil Industry, BP, and Union to Improve U.S. Refinery Safety at Public Meeting Tonight

Houston, Texas, March 20, 2007 - In a 335-page final report released today, federal investigators from the U.S. Chemical Safety Board (CSB) conclude that "organizational and safety deficiencies at all levels of the BP Corporation" caused the March 23, 2005, explosion at the BP Texas City refinery, the worst industrial accident in the United States since 1990. The report calls on the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to increase inspection and enforcement at U.S. oil refineries and chemical plants, and to require these corporations to evaluate the safety impact of mergers, reorganizations, downsizing, and budget cuts.

CSB Chairman Carolyn W. Merritt said, "It is my sincere hope and belief that our report and the recent Baker report will establish a new standard of care for corporate boards of directors and CEO's throughout the world. Process safety programs to protect the lives of workers and the public deserve the same level of attention, investment, and scrutiny as companies now dedicate to maintaining their financial controls. The boards of directors of oil and chemical companies should examine every detail of their process safety programs to ensure that no other terrible tragedy like the one at BP occurs."

The CSB report calls on BP to appoint an additional member of the board of directors with expertise in process safety, and calls for BP senior executives to establish an improved incident reporting program and use new indicators to measure safety performance.

The independent Baker panel, formed and funded by BP in response to an urgent CSB safety recommendation, issued its final report in January 2007. It found "material deficiencies" in the safety of BP's five U.S. refineries in Texas, California, Indiana, Ohio, and Washington. The 11-member panel also issued ten safety recommendations, including calling on BP's corporate board to closely monitor safety performance at its facilities. The Baker panel was not charged with determining the root causes of the March 2005 explosion.

CSB Investigation Background

Chairman Merritt said, "Our investigation of BP was the largest and most complex undertaking in the agency's nine-year history. Under the leadership of Supervisory Investigator Don Holmstrom, the team interviewed 370 witnesses, reviewed more than 30,000 documents, and conducted a far-reaching program of equipment, instrumentation, and chemical testing." The final report is scheduled to be presented at a CSB public meeting beginning at 6 p.m. tonight at the Nessler Center, Wings of Heritage Room, located at 2010 5th Avenue North in Texas City. The report and recommendations are subject to approval by the full Board at the public meeting.

BP cooperated with the investigation, furnished documents and interviews on a voluntary basis, and committed to widespread safety improvements and investments following the accident. BP published its own report on the explosion in December 2005, pledged the total elimination of the kind of unsafe disposal equipment that led to the explosion, and developed a new siting policy to remove trailers from hazardous process areas. All 15 fatalities occurred in or near trailers that were sited as close as 121 feet from a blowdown drum that vented flammable liquid and vapor directly to the atmosphere.

Safety Harmed by Cost-Cutting, Production Pressures, and Failure to Invest

BP acquired the Texas City refinery when it merged with Amoco in 1999. The CSB report found that "cost-cutting in the 1990s by Amoco and then BP left the Texas City refinery vulnerable to a catastrophe." Shortly after acquiring Amoco, the BP Group Chief Executive ordered an across-the-budget 25% cut in fixed spending at the corporation's refineries. The impact of the cost cuts is detailed in many of the more than 20 key investigative documents the CSB made public today, including internal BP safety audits, reviews, and emails. Among other things, cost considerations discouraged refinery officials from replacing the blowdown drum with a flare system, which the CSB previously determined would have prevented or greatly minimized the severity of the accident.

Chairman Merritt said, "The combination of cost-cutting, production pressures, and failure to invest caused a progressive deterioration of safety at the refinery. Beginning in 2002, BP commissioned a series of audits and studies that revealed serious safety problems at the Texas City refinery, including a lack of necessary preventative maintenance and training. These audits and studies were shared with BP executives in London, and were provided to at least one member of the executive board. BP's response was too little and too late. Some additional investments were made, but they did not address the core problems in Texas City. In 2004, BP executives challenged their refineries to cut yet another 25% from their budgets for the following year."

Blast Modeling Shows Vulnerability of Temporary Trailers

The March 23 accident occurred during the startup of the refinery's octane-boosting isomerization (ISOM) unit, when a distillation tower and attached blowdown drum were overfilled with highly flammable liquid hydrocarbons. Because the blowdown drum vented directly to the atmosphere, there was a geyser-like release of highly flammable liquid and vapor onto the grounds of the refinery. A diesel pickup truck that was idling nearby ignited the vapor, initiating a series of explosions and fires that swept through the unit and the surrounding area. Fatalities and injuries occurred in and around occupied work trailers, which were placed too close to the ISOM unit and which were not evacuated prior to the startup.

CSB Investigator Mark Kaszniak, who led the CSB's vapor and blast modeling effort, stated, "The CSB was able to calculate that approximately 7,600 gallons of flammable liquid hydrocarbons - nearly the equivalent of a full tanker truck of gasoline - were release from the top of the blowdown drum stack in just under two minutes." The ejected liquid rapidly vaporized due to evaporation, wind dispersion, and contact with the surface of nearby equipment. High overpressures from the resulting vapor cloud explosion totally destroyed 13 trailers and damaged 27 others. People inside trailers were injured as far as 479 feet away from the blowdown drum, and trailers nearly 1000 feet away sustained damage.

"Industry trailer siting guidelines did not predict the level of trailer damage that we actually saw," Mr. Kaszniak stated. In October 2005, the CSB issued an urgent recommendation to the American Petroleum Institute to develop new guidance to prevent trailers from being sited near hazardous areas of refineries and chemical plants, where occupants could be injured or killed. "A human being is more likely to be injured or killed inside a trailer - which can shatter during an explosion - than if he is standing in the open air. For that reason, occupied trailers have no place near hazardous process areas of refineries and chemical plants," Mr. Kaszniak said.

Human Factors Analysis: Fatigue, Other Conditions Made Errors More Likely

The tower overfilled because a valve allowing liquid to drain from the bottom of the tower into storage tanks was left closed for over three hours during the startup on the morning of March 23, which was contrary to unit startup procedures. The CSB investigative team examined various conditions and human factors that led to this error.

"BP relied on operators taking correct and timely actions and following procedures to prevent excessive liquid levels in the tower. While procedures are essential to any process safety program, they are the least reliable safeguard to prevent process accidents," Mr. Kaszniak said. "Modern control systems utilize automatic safety controls to shut down liquid flow to a tower and prevent dangerous overfilling."

According to a definition by U.K. safety authorities, human factors are those environmental, organizational, and job-related factors that influence behavior at work and can impact safety performance. CSB Investigator Cheryl MacKenzie, who led the human factors analysis, said, "Although errors and procedural deviations occurred during the startup, it is important to recognize that individuals do not plan to make mistakes. They are doing what makes sense to them at the time, given the work environment, the organization's goals, and other job-related factors. Understanding and correcting these factors will help prevent future accidents at BP and throughout the industry."

In particular, the investigation found that procedural deviations, abnormally high liquid levels and pressures, and dramatic swings in tower liquid level were the norm in almost all previous startups of the unit since 2000. Operators typically started up the unit with a high liquid level inside and left the drain valve in manual - not automatic - mode to prevent possible loss of liquid flow and resulting damage to a furnace that was connected to the tower. These procedural deviations - together with the faulty condition of valves, gauges, and instruments on the tower - made the tower susceptible to overfilling, investigators said.

None of the previous abnormal startups was investigated by BP, nor were operating procedures updated to reduce the likelihood or consequences of flooding the tower. As American Petroleum Institute safety guidance notes, when operating procedures are not updated or correct, "workers will create their own unofficial procedures that may not adequately address safety issues." At the Texas City refinery, "Procedural workarounds were accepted as normal," Investigator MacKenzie said.

On March 23, the control board operator's decision to keep the drain valve closed was influenced by ineffective communication and by false instrument readings from the tower. Alarms and gauges that should have warned of the overfilling equipment failed to operate properly. In addition, the operator believed he had been instructed not to send any liquid from the bottom of the tower to storage tanks, and the CSB determined that these storage tanks were in fact noted as nearly full. "BP had no policy for effective shift communication or requirements for shift turnover," Ms. MacKenzie said. "This important instruction to the operator was given over the phone and was not contained in the log book or the startup procedure."

Although a high tower liquid level alarm did activate in the control room in the early morning hours, a second high-level alarm malfunctioned and the faulty tower level transmitter later indicated that the liquid level was below nine feet and falling. The normal liquid level in the tower was six-and-a-half feet. Unknown to operators, the level was actually rising rapidly, reaching 158 feet by 1 p.m. on March 23, twenty minutes before the explosion. The CSB determined that the level transmitter was miscalibrated, using a setting from outdated data sheets that likely had not been updated since 1975.

The tower lacked basic process indicators, such as a bottom pressure indicator, that could have provided operators with an accurate picture of the high level inside the tower. The control panel also did not display the flows in and out of the tower on the same screen, and did not automatically calculate how much total liquid was in the tower, even though it could have been configured to do so.

The CSB team used an NTSB methodology to conclude that ISOM unit operators were likely fatigued when the startup occurred. By March 23, operators had been working 12-hour shifts for 29 or more consecutive days. "Fatigue causes cognitive fixation and impaired judgment and could lead operators to fixate on one operational parameter - such as the apparently declining liquid level - to the exclusion of other indicators," Ms. MacKenzie said. Fatigue has been recognized as a cause of major accidents in the transportation sector. Fatigue prevention regulations have been developed for aviation and other transportation sectors, but there are no fatigue prevention guidelines that are widely used and accepted in the oil and chemical sector.

The report recommends that the American Petroleum Institute, a leading trade organization, and the United Steelworkers International Union (USW), the largest union representing refinery workers, work together to develop a new consensus standard for fatigue prevention in the oil and chemical industry.

The investigative team also pointed to a significant downsizing that occurred in operations and training at the refinery. Following BP's global 25% cut to fixed costs in 1999, the Texas City Refinery halved the number of control board operators in the ISOM area, from two to one. Then in 2003, the sole remaining operator was given a third process unit to control. Each refinery unit is a complex network of equipment, piping, valves, and instruments. The ISOM unit itself, one of the smaller units of the refinery, was the size of a city block and contained four major subunits. A 2003 BP hazard review recommended that a second operator be present during startups, but this recommendation was never implemented. The 25% budget cut from 1999 also resulted in significant training reductions for operators, and cost pressures prevented the refinery from using simulators to train operators for handling abnormal situations and process upsets.

Refinery Had Longstanding Process Safety Deficiencies

Like other refineries and chemical plants that handle highly flammable, toxic, or hazardous substances, the Texas City Refinery is regulated under the Process Safety Management (PSM) standard of the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA). The standard was promulgated in 1992 as a result of provisions in the 1990 Clean Air Act, which responded to major chemical accidents in the U.S. and overseas. The PSM standard requires covered facilities to implement 14 specific management elements to prevent catastrophic releases of hazardous substances. These include hazard analysis, operator training, preventative maintenance programs (mechanical integrity), and management of change reviews.

Investigator Mark Kaszniak stated, "If the Process Safety Management standard had been thoroughly implemented at the refinery, as required by federal regulations, this accident likely would not have occurred." Mr. Kaszniak said that numerous requirements of the standard were not being followed in Texas City and cited ineffective incident investigations, lack of effective preventative maintenance, lack of change reviews and pre-startup reviews, and incomplete hazard analyses.

OSHA rules require internal investigations and corrective actions for any serious process incidents or near-misses. But the CSB found that the refinery only investigated three of the eight known previous ISOM blowdown release incidents, where flammable and potentially explosive vapor was released from the same blowdown drum involved in the March 23 accident. In 2004, an internal BP audit graded the refinery's analysis of incident information as "poor."

The CSB also determined that both the blowdown drum and the relief valve disposal piping were undersized, which led to the blowdown drum overflowing with liquid. Under the PSM standard, BP was required to conduct a study of the tower's pressure relief system to ensure its safety. Despite the federal requirement, BP was not able to produce any documents indicating the study had even been done. "By 2005, the required relief valve study was 13 years overdue," Investigator Kaszniak said. "Without the study, there was no assurance that the equipment could handle all the credible relief scenarios, including the one that actually occurred on March 23." The report noted that an internal BP audit from 2004 found that design calculations did not exist for many relief valves at the refinery and that the problem had existed for nearly 10 years.

In October 2006, the CSB issued recommendations to OSHA and API aimed at eliminating similar atmospheric blowdown systems from U.S. refineries and chemical plants in favor of safer alternatives, such as flare systems.

The investigative team also noted a number of problems with the facility's preventative maintenance program that were causally related to the March 23 accident. The report concluded that BP supervisory personnel were aware of the equipment problems with the level transmitter before the March 23 startup but still had signed off on equipment checks as if they had been done, which the report said reflected the prevalence of production pressures at the refinery.

In addition, there was no documented test method for the blowdown drum high-level alarm, which failed to sound on March 23, and the testing method in actual use was contrary to the manufacturer's recommendations. The refinery's computerized maintenance management system allowed maintenance work orders to be closed even if no repair had been done. Many action items from previous hazard analyses and incident investigations - such as a 1994 action item to review the adequacy of the ISOM blowdown system following two serious incidents that year - were never completed.

Dysfunctional Safety Culture Existed at All Levels of BP

For the first time in its nine-year history, the CSB conducted an examination of corporate safety culture. "As the science of major accident investigations has matured, analysis has gone beyond technical and system deficiencies to include an examination of organizational culture," Supervisory Investigator Don Holmstrom said. "Effective organizational practices such as encouraging the reporting of incidents and allocating adequate resources for safe operation, are required to make safety systems work successfully."

Mr. Holmstrom pointed to the unusual history of fatal incidents at the Texas City Refinery. Over a thirty-year period spanning Amoco and BP's ownership, 23 workers died at the facility - not counting the 15 workers killed in March 2005. "Many of the safety issues that led to the March 2005 accident were recurring safety problems that had been previously identified in internal audits, reports, and investigations. Our findings show that both BP Group executives and Texas City managers became aware of serious process safety problems at the refinery beginning in 2002 and continuing through March 2005," Mr. Holmstrom said.

Mr. Holmstrom also cited a series of three serious incidents at the BP refinery in Grangemouth, Scotland, in 2000, which were investigated by the U.K. Health and Safety Executive. BP officials wrote that meeting "cost targets" played a role in the Grangemouth incidents and stated that "there was too much emphasis on short term cost reduction - HSE [health, safety, and environment] was unofficially sacrificed to cost reductions, and cost pressures inhibited the staff from asking the right questions." The lessons from the Grangemouth investigation were not effectively implemented at the Texas City Refinery, however.

Mr. Holmstrom stated that in each year from 2002 to 2005, BP made its own significant findings about the culture and safety of the Texas City site. In 2002, the new refinery manager found the infrastructure and equipment to be "in complete decline." A follow-up study by BP found "serious concerns about the potential for a major site accident" due to mechanical integrity problems. Later in 2002, another internal report explicitly connected the safety problems to earlier cost-cutting, stating, "the current integrity and reliability issues at TCR [Texas City Refinery] are clearly linked to the reduction in maintenance spending over the last decade." The prevailing culture at the Texas City refinery was to accept cost reductions without challenge and not to raise concerns when operational integrity was compromised."

Similar findings were made in 2003, when a study of maintenance found that "cost cutting measures have intervened with the group's work to get things right - usually reliability improvements are cut." An external BP safety audit found inadequate training, a large number of overdue action items, and a concern about "insufficient resources to achieve all commitments." The report stated that "the condition of the infrastructure and assets is poor."

The year 2004 was marked by three major accidents at the refinery, including a $30 million process fire and two other accidents that caused three deaths. Meanwhile, an analysis conducted by BP's internal audit group in London found common safety deficiencies among 35 BP business units around the world, including widespread tolerance of non-compliance with basic health, safety, and environment rules and poor implementation of safety management systems.

"In 2004, BP documents do show that maintenance spending increased, but we found that the increases were largely due to complying with environmental requirements and responding to major accidents and outages. There was still not an adequate focus on preventative maintenance before accidents occurred," Mr. Holmstrom said. The investigation found that BP's executives relied unduly on injury statistics in assessing the safety of their facilities.

Mr. Holmstrom said. "BP managers and executives attempted to make improvements from 2002 to 2005 but they were largely focused on personal safety - such as slips, trips, falls, and vehicle accidents - rather than on improving process safety performance, which continued to deteriorate." The report calls on API and the USW to develop a new consensus standard defining performance indicators for process safety. The consensus process should draw on representatives from industry, labor, government, public interest, and environmental organizations.

Later in 2004, a safety culture survey of the refinery was conducted and endorsed by the site leadership. The study, known as the Telos report, pointed to "an exceptional degree of fear of catastrophic incidents" among other conclusions, and it stated respondents' belief that "production and budget compliance gets ... rewarded before anything else." Finally, a safety business plan for 2005 cited as a "key risk" the possibility that "Texas City kills someone in the next 12-18 months."

"The investigation found that BP executives made spending cuts without assessing the safety impact of those decisions," Mr. Holmstrom said. The report recommends that OSHA amend its Process Safety Management standard to require companies to perform a management-of-change safety review on organizational changes - including mergers, acquisitions, reorganizations, personnel changes, policy changes, and budget reductions. The CSB report cited previous good-practice guidance from the American Chemistry Council, then known as the Chemical Manufacturers Association, calling for such safety reviews. The report also included a new recommendation to the Center for Chemical Process Safety to develop guidelines for how to conduct the organizational management-of-change reviews envisioned in the recommendation to OSHA.

OSHA Should Increase Petrochemical Inspections, Enforcement

As part of its investigation, the CSB looked at the role of OSHA in inspecting and enforcing safety regulations at refineries and chemical plants. Although the refinery had experienced numerous fatal incidents from 1985 to 2005, the investigation found that OSHA conducted only one planned PSM inspection at the Texas City Refinery, in 1998. Other, unplanned OSHA inspections of the Texas City Refinery occurred in response to accidents, complaints, or referrals; the report said that unplanned inspections are typically narrower in scope and shorter than planned inspections. Proposed OSHA fines during the twenty years preceding the March 2005 disaster - a period when ten fatalities occurred at the refinery - totaled $270,255; net fines collected after negotiations totaled $77,860. Following the March 2005 explosion, OSHA issued the largest penalty in its history to BP, over $21 million for more than 300 egregious and willful violations.

"OSHA's national focus on inspecting facilities with high injury rates, while important, has resulted in reduced attention to preventing less frequent, but catastrophic, process safety incidents such as the one at Texas City," the report reads. The report found that when the PSM standard was created, OSHA had envisioned a highly technical, complex, and lengthy inspection process for regulated facilities, called a Program Quality Verification or PQV inspection. The inspections would take weeks or months at each facility and would be conducted by a select, well-trained, and experienced team.

The CSB investigation found that few PQV inspections were done between 1995 and 2005. Federal OSHA conducted only nine such inspections in the targeted industries over that ten-year period, and none in the refining sector. State agencies in the 26 states that operate their own workplace safety programs conducted a total of 48 PQV inspections, including six at refineries. However, a number of states - including Texas, Louisiana, and New Jersey, where much of the U.S. oil and chemical industry is concentrated - rely upon federal OSHA to enforce workplace safety rules.

"On average from 1995 to 2005, only 0.2% of the approximately 2,816 facilities in targeted, high-hazard industries received a planned OSHA process safety inspection each year. That's about one planned inspection per 500 facilities," Mr. Holmstrom said. The total number of U.S. facilities covered under the PSM standard is not known, since covered facilities are not required to identify themselves to the government; however, a similar regulatory program administered by the Environmental Protection Agency covers an estimated 15,000 sites.

The report noted that California's Contra Costa County, which has its own industrial safety ordinance, inspects each covered facility every three years. A county staff of five engineers performs an average of 16 inspections per year. The U.K. Health and Safety Executive, which oversees a much smaller oil and chemical industry than do U.S. authorities, has 105 inspectors for high-hazard facilities; each covered facility in the U.K. is inspected every five years. Although OSHA did not provide requested information to the CSB investigation, available evidence indicates that OSHA has an insufficient number of qualified inspectors to enforce the PSM standard at oil and chemical facilities.

The report calls on OSHA to "identify those facilities at the greatest risk of a catastrophic accident" and then to "conduct comprehensive inspections" at those facilities. The report also recommends that OSHA hire or develop new, specialized inspectors and expand the PSM training curriculum at its National Training Institute.

"Rules already on the books would likely have prevented the tragedy in Texas City," Chairman Merritt said. "But if a company is not following those rules, year-in and year-out, it is ultimately the responsibility of the federal government to enforce good safety practices before more lives are lost. OSHA should obtain and dedicate whatever resources are necessary for inspecting and enforcing safety rules at oil and chemical plants. These facilities simply have too many potentially catastrophic hazards to be overlooked."

The CSB is an independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial chemical accidents. The agency's board members are appointed by the president and confirmed by the Senate. CSB investigations look into all aspects of chemical accidents, including physical causes such as equipment failure as well as inadequacies in regulations, industry standards, and safety management systems.

The Board does not issue citations or fines but does make safety recommendations to plants, industry organizations, labor groups, and regulatory agencies such as OSHA and EPA. Please visit our website, www.csb.gov.

For more information, please contact a member of the CSB public affairs office:

(1) Daniel Horowitz, (202) 441-6074 cell (2) Sandy Gilmour (202) 251-5496 cell (3) Jennifer Jones (202) 577-8448 cell (4) Hillary Cohen (202) 446-8094 cell (5) Kate Baumann (202) 725-2204 cell

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A Chronology of the CSB Investigation

March 24, 2005 - CSB investigators arrive at the BP Texas City refinery

March 26, 2005 - The CSB team points out the hazard of placing trailers so close to operating refinery units

April 1, 2005 - CSB investigators make initial entry into the damaged ISOM unit and identify the atmospheric blowdown drum as the likely source of the release

April 28, 2005 - CSB investigators say diminished outflow from an ISOM unit distillation tower resulted in overpressurization and flooding and led to the flammable release during startup

June 28, 2005 - CSB Lead Investigator Don Holmstrom announces that a review of computer records shows that two alarms and a level transmitter, which could have warned operators of the flooded condition of ISOM unit equipment, failed to operate properly in the hours leading to the explosion

July 28, 2005 - The Texas City refinery experiences a serious hydrogen fire in the Resid Hydrotreater Unit that causes $30 million in property damage and forces residents to take shelter

August 10, 2005 - Another incident related to mechanical integrity in the refinery's Gas Oil Hydrotreater forces another community shelter-in-place alert

August 17, 2005 - The Chemical Safety Board issues its first-ever urgent safety recommendation, calling on BP to convene an independent panel to assess safety culture and oversight at all five of its North American refineries

October 24, 2005 - BP announces formation of the 11-member panel of experts, chaired by former U.S. Secretary of State James A. Baker III

October 25, 2005 - The Chemical Safety Board issues new urgent safety recommendations calling on the American Petroleum Institute to develop new safety guidance for the placement of trailers away from hazardous process areas

October 27, 2005 - In preliminary findings released at a public meeting in Texas City, CSB investigators describe a history of abnormal startups in the ISOM unit, previous vapor releases, and mechanical failures; they refer to the unit's blowdown system as "outdated and unsafe"

November 10, 2005 - CSB Chairman Merritt testifies before the newly established Baker panel, notes the role of worker fatigue and operator downsizing in the accident

December 22, 2005 -The CSB releases a narrated computer animation of the events leading to the accident; the video is viewed in refineries and chemical plants worldwide

June 30, 2006 - The CSB releases blast damage information for 44 trailers located near the ISOM unit; notes serious damage to a distance of almost 600 feet from the center of the explosions

October 15, 2006 - The CSB issues a safety bulletin based on the July 28, 2005, hydrogen fire, calling for expanded use of positive material verification to prevent accidental releases

October 30, 2006 - CSB Chairman Merritt releases new preliminary findings from the investigation, pointing to the role of organizational factors and cost-cutting in setting the stage for the accident

October 31, 2006 - The CSB issues new safety recommendations, calling on the U.S. oil industry to eliminate the use of unsafe blowdown drums similar to the one involved in the Texas City accident and calling on OSHA to establish a refinery special emphasis program to promote the replacement of the drums with safer alternatives

January 16, 2007 - The independent refinery safety panel chaired by Secretary Baker issues its final report at a news conference in Houston, revealing systemic safety problems in BP's North American refineries

March 20, 2007 - At a public meeting in Texas City, the CSB releases its final investigation report and recommendations, three days prior to the second anniversary of the explosion

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Chemical Safety Board
March 20,2007

http://www.chemsafety.gov/index.cfm?folder=current_investigations&page=info&INV_ID=52

BP America Refinery Explosion
Texas City, TX, March 23, 2005


Incident Description
At approximately 1:20 p.m. on Wednesday, March 23, a series of explosions occurred at the BP Texas City refinery during the restarting of a hydrocarbon isomerization unit. Fifteen workers were killed and about 170 others were injured. Many of the victims were in or around work trailers located near an atmospheric vent stack. CSB investigators have reported that the explosions occurred when a distillation tower flooded with hydrocarbons and was overpressurized, causing a geyser-like release from the vent stack.


Investigation Status
The Board will convene a public meeting at 6 p.m. central time, Tuesday, March 20, 2007, at the Nessler Center, Wings of Heritage Room, 2010 5th Avenue North, Texas City, TX 77590, to release and consider the CSB's final investigative report on the accident.
 

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Houston Chronicle
March 20, 2007

  http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/4645084.html

Federal investigator recites causes of BP blast
Safety official blames years of cost-cutting, lack of strong oversight
By BRETT CLANTON
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

SAN ANTONIO  Years of cost-cutting, operator mistakes and a corporate culture that didn't make safety a top priority contributed to the deadly March 2005 accident at BP's Texas City refinery, a top federal investigator said Monday.

The "ineffective or nonexistent" oversight of safety by the British oil company's board of directors also played a direct role, said Carolyn Merritt, chairwoman and CEO of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board.

"Somebody has to be asking the question: 'What is happening, and is this being done?' " Merritt told the National Petrochemical & Refiners Association's annual meeting in San Antonio. Yet those questions were rarely asked, she said.

Merritt told the industry crowd that she wanted refiners and petrochemical companies to learn from the Texas City case, suggesting they could be facing more government oversight if they do not do more to prevent accidents.

"Performance is what's going to prevent over-regulation," she said.

The speech offered a preview of the report the Chemical Safety Board plans to release today in Houston. This study addresses problems that contributed to BP's Texas City refinery explosion, which killed 15 and injured scores more.

Among its findings: BP failed to investigate repeated warnings of trouble at the facility, slashed costs without taking into account the impact on safety and did not adequately train workers or communicate safety expectations and procedures, Merritt said.

The themes in the report, which is the product of nearly two years of work, closely hew to those found in a January report by an independent panel headed by former Secretary of State James A. Baker III. That panel was assembled at the Chemical Safety Board's urging.

Alvaro Baltran, who works for Grace Davison, an industry supplier, said it's good to hear the ideas again.

"It's very important to hear speeches like this to remind us of the risks in this business," he said after Merritt's remarks.

When asked about the Chemical Saftey Board report, BP spokesman Neil Chapman said the company would not comment until it is made public.

BP conducted its own study of the Texas City accident, and is now implementing recommendations made by the Baker panel. It is spending more than $1 billion to upgrade the refinery, which has been running at half its capacity since being shut down for Hurricane Rita in September 2005.

The speech comes at a time when the petroleum industry is trying to fend off attempts by lawmakers in Washington to increase regulation or roll back favorable provisions in the 2005 Energy Act.

A new Democratic majority in Congress is proposing a range of legislation the industry views as threatening, including cutting incentives that encourage refinery expansions. In addition, the Bush administration has a goal to vastly increase production of alternative fuels such as ethanol, a measure that could add costs for refiners.

The fear that such proposals could become law was on the minds of refining industry leaders, who had a call to action of their own.

"We simply have too much at stake to sit on the sidelines and let others dictate the future of our industry and of our nation," Jim Mahoney, chairman of the National Petrochemical and Refiners Association, said.

"We believe, in our heart, we have to act now or we're going to get regulated," John Rice, vice chairman of General Electric, said in referring to legislation he sees as all but inevitable to reduce carbon emissions by U.S. corporations.

Merritt said her agency is not trying to burden the industry. She said it just wants to reduce the number of deaths and injuries in the refining and petrochemical industries, and believes the cooperation shown by BP in preparing the agency's Texas City report can help.

brett.clanton@chron.com

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Financial Times
March 20, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7760ee62-d687-11db-99b7-000b5df10621.html

BP safety culture under attack
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 20 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 20 2007 02:00

The head of the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board said yesterday she was "absolutely terrified" that a weak safety culture could have existed at BP.

The comments from the CSB, the main government body investigating the accident, come ahead of today's release of what is expected to be a strongly critical report on the Texas refinery explosion. The final report from its investigation has been two years in the making.

Interim updates provided by the CSB, the federal agency tasked with investigating the blast, have indicated that it will condemn BP's safety culture.

Speaking at a conference in Texas, Carolyn Merritt, the CSB's chairman, said: "As the investigation unfolded, we were absolutely terrified that such a culture could exist at BP."

The CSB was so alarmed by signs of a failing safety culture at BP that, upon launching its investigation, the agency called on BP to appoint an independent panel to investigate all five of the company's US refineries.

That panel, led by James Baker the former US secretary of state, confirmed the CSB's suspicions in January, with a detailed report on safety failings at all five sites.

Mr Baker's team concluded: "BP has not provided effective process safety leadership and has not adequately established process safety as a core value across all its five US refineries.''

The report added: "The panel found instances of a lack of operating discipline, toleration for serious deviations from safe operating practices and apparent complacency toward serious process safety risks at each refinery.'' The CSB's report is focused on the Texas City refinery, where 15 people were killed and 500 injured in and around the site on March 23 2005, in the worst US industrial accident in a decade.

Its mandate has been to get at the root cause of the disaster, which will have involved a detailed inside look at what is BP's biggest refinery.

In addition to its concerns about BP's safety culture, the CSB said in its interim assessment of the explosion that cost-cutting at the refinery had "drastic effects", adding: "Maintenance and infrastructure deteriorated over time, setting the stage for the disaster."

BP said it had long accepted that there had been a problem with the safety culture at Texas City. Its internal report into the disaster was concluded in December 2005. It said: "We have accepted responsibility for what occurred there, and we have been in action since March 24 2005 [the day after the accident] to find out what went wrong. We have worked very hard to learn from this and to share the lessons with other companies."

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/32d534d8-d5bf-11db-a5c6-000b5df10621.html

BP paints grim picture of Texas refinery before blast
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 19 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 19 2007 02:00

BP management paints a grim picture of the poor state of the Texas refinery that exploded in 2005, according to the conclusions of a wide-ranging internal report conducted into the fatal blast.

Copies of BP's interview summaries, seen by the FT, quote various levels of management saying the Texas City refinery had a high acceptance of risk; employees worked weeks, if not months, of 12-hour days without a day off; maintenance was deferred; and training had been scaled back before the explosion, which killed 15 and injured 500 in and around the facility.

These disclosures come just days before the CSB, the federal agency charged with investigating the blast, releases its final report, to be published tomorrow.

BP's own investigation, conducted by a team led by Wilhelm Bonse-Geuking, group vice-president of BP, took place from April until October 2006 to determine whom to hold accountable.

In it, Colin Maclean, the refinery manager, said his impression on arrival "was that it was a big old, rundown and dirty refinery and people were desperate for hope . . . they did the best they could''.

The interviews indicate that, privately, some members of BP management, including very senior executives, agreed with earlier assessments made by US government investigators of the poor state of the Texas City refinery.

Ross Pillari, then president of BP America, explained to BP's internal investigators: "The directive was to keep expenditures low because of 10 years of lousy refinery margins. London did not say reduce maintenance, it said reduce capital, and capital choices favoured commercial. It was a sad environment."

Mike Broadribb, BP's director of process safety, listed the "roots for the disaster" as "incompetence, high tolerance of non-compliance, inadequate maintenance and investments".

Paul Maslin, a BP technology vice-president, told interviewers: "Texas City's problems were significantly aggravated by the 25 per cent cost reduction" imposed on acquiring the site in 1999.

Ronnie Chappell, BP spokesman, said: "The interview notes are not, and do not contain, findings of fact. They contain hearsay and report the sometimes conflicting opinions of those who were interviewed. In the nearly two years since the accident, BP has taken, and continues to take, significant steps to reduce risk and improve process safety management and performance at its five US refineries."

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Scotsman
March 19, 2007

http://business.scotsman.com/utilities.cfm?id=423662007

BP stays silent over leaked Texas City memo
MARTIN FLANAGAN CITY EDITOR
(
mflanagan@scotsman.com)

OIL giant BP yesterday stonewalled suggestions of a leaked memo that allegedly shows the company's board was aware of the link between spending cuts and poor maintenance at the Texas City refinery two years before the fatal explosion.

It comes a day ahead of the report tomorrow by the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, which for two years has been investigating the cause of the accident which killed 15 workers in March 2005.

A weekend report said an internal BP document showed that a presentation was made to John Manzoni, chief executive for refining and marketing, in November 2003 which linked the "history of reduced investment" at the Texas City refinery with "poor maintenance practices".

A BP spokesman said he had no comment on any such document, but referred to BP chief executive Lord Browne's comments in January.

"At the time of the Baker report in January it was made clear there was no link between spending cuts and impact on safety. He said safety-related spending there [at Texas City] had never been turned down," the spokesman said.

In January an inquiry into BP's refineries, chaired by former US secretary of state James Baker in the aftermath of the accident, said the company emphasised personal safety "but BP did not emphasise process safety".

Baker found there was "a lack of operating discipline, toleration of serious deviations from safe operating practices and apparent complacency toward serious process safety risks" and called for an overhaul of the way BP operates.

One source said yesterday that the latest alleged document leak looked like "someone trying to warm things up ahead of the report of the US Chemical Safety Board".

The reported presentation to Manzoni said fixed costs peaked at $727 million (£364.3m) in the early 1990s before falling to $347m in 1999.

The document, obtained by lawyers representing victims of the accident, reportedly says the refinery "remained in the lowest percentile grouping for operational availability".

Manzoni lost out in the BP succession race to replace the outgoing Browne this summer to boardroom colleague, Tony Hayward, who runs the exploration and energy business.

Tomorrow, the Chemical Safety and Hazards Board investigators are due to publish their final report into the explosion. It is expected to focus on problems with the "mechanical integrity" of the plant.

Alongside the Texas City investigation, the discovery of pipeline corrosion forced BP into the partial closure of Prudhoe Bay, the largest field in the United States, last August.

Despite the problems the company still made profits of $22.25 billion during 2006.

This article:
http://business.scotsman.com/utilities.cfm?id=423662007

Last updated: 19-Mar-07 00:36 GMT

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Financial Times
March 19, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/32d534d8-d5bf-11db-a5c6-000b5df10621.html

BP paints grim picture of Texas refinery before blast
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 19 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 19 2007 02:00

BP management paints a grim picture of the poor state of the Texas refinery that exploded in 2005, according to the conclusions of a wide-ranging internal report conducted into the fatal blast.

Copies of BP's interview summaries, seen by the FT, quote various levels of management saying the Texas City refinery had a high acceptance of risk; employees worked weeks, if not months, of 12-hour days without a day off; maintenance was deferred; and training had been scaled back before the explosion, which killed 15 and injured 500 in and around the facility.

These disclosures come just days before the CSB, the federal agency charged with investigating the blast, releases its final report, to be published tomorrow.

BP's own investigation, conducted by a team led by Wilhelm Bonse-Geuking, group vice-president of BP, took place from April until October 2006 to determine whom to hold accountable.

In it, Colin Maclean, the refinery manager, said his impression on arrival "was that it was a big old, rundown and dirty refinery and people were desperate for hope . . . they did the best they could''.

The interviews indicate that, privately, some members of BP management, including very senior executives, agreed with earlier assessments made by US government investigators of the poor state of the Texas City refinery.

Ross Pillari, then president of BP America, explained to BP's internal investigators: "The directive was to keep expenditures low because of 10 years of lousy refinery margins. London did not say reduce maintenance, it said reduce capital, and capital choices favoured commercial. It was a sad environment."

Mike Broadribb, BP's director of process safety, listed the "roots for the disaster" as "incompetence, high tolerance of non-compliance, inadequate maintenance and investments".

Paul Maslin, a BP technology vice-president, told interviewers: "Texas City's problems were significantly aggravated by the 25 per cent cost reduction" imposed on acquiring the site in 1999.

Ronnie Chappell, BP spokesman, said: "The interview notes are not, and do not contain, findings of fact. They contain hearsay and report the sometimes conflicting opinions of those who were interviewed. In the nearly two years since the accident, BP has taken, and continues to take, significant steps to reduce risk and improve process safety management and performance at its five US refineries."

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Houston Chronicle
March 19, 2007

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/energy/4641880.html

OSHA scarce at area plants
By ANNE BELLI
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

Federal regulators responsible for ensuring worker safety have not conducted planned inspections of the vast majority of area petroleum refineries over the last five years  including the BP Texas City plant where 15 people were killed two years ago, a Houston Chronicle review of federal records shows.

Instead, inspections by the U.S. Occupational Safety & Health Administration of local refineries have been conducted only sporadically  sometimes after years of no visits by inspectors at all. And the few inspections that have been conducted all came after a complaint, referral or accident, records show.

When federal investigators this week release their final report on the causes of the BP explosion, OSHA may be sharing the hot seat with the oil giant.

At issue is whether the 37-year-old agency has provided adequate oversight of the refining industry.

While the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board's findings won't be made public until Tuesday, many industry observers are concerned that OSHA fails to proactively enforce its own standards, leaving plant operators to largely police themselves. They say the BP accident shows what can happen as a result.

"OSHA's oversight role has been a major focus of our investigation for more than a year and we will be presenting significant findings (Tuesday) in our final report," CSB Chairwoman Carolyn Merritt told the Chronicle.

OSHA defends its enforcement record, saying it ensures safe workplaces through vigorous inspections and voluntary compliance programs.

Merritt said that approach may not be effective.

"Voluntary programs and partnerships have a useful role, but they should never be used as a substitute for strong regulations, inspections and enforcement," Merritt said.

Directing resources

Richard Fairfax, director of OSHA enforcement, said "bristle is a good word" when asked his reaction to criticism of the agency.
"I think we have enough oversight of the industry," he said. "We cover 7 million workplaces in this country. We have gone to great effort to direct our resources to where we think we need to be."

The agency also touts its enforcement history, saying it conducts more than 38,000 inspections a year.

But few of them happen in the refineries around Houston.

A Chronicle analysis of OSHA inspection dates shows:

•Among Texas refineries, OSHA conducted nine inspections in 2002; 10 in 2003; 13 in 2004; 20 in 2005 and 34 in 2006. (Eleven of the 2006 inspections were at BP as follow-up reviews following the blast the year before.)

•In Harris and Galveston counties, seven were conducted in 2002; three in 2003; four in 2004; 14 in 2005 and 26 in 2006.

•Some of the area's largest refineries, such as those operated by BP in Texas City, Shell in Deer Park, Lyondell-Citgo in Houston and Valero in Texas City had no "programmed," or planned inspections in the last five years and sometimes went up to two years in a row with no inspections at all.

"There is an acute lack of OSHA oversight in an industry that needs to have a high level of oversight because of the nature of the dangers inherent in cooking gasoline," said Brent Coon, a Beaumont lawyer who has represented injured workers in the March 23, 2005, BP blast.

CSB investigators have said in their preliminary report that while operators made mistakes that day, key alarms and equipment failed to work properly, and that refinery managers generally had a lax attitude toward safety at the plant. BP acknowledged similar findings in its own probe.

After a six-month investigation, OSHA slapped BP with more than 300 health and safety violations and a $21.4 million fine, a record for the agency.

The safety board also has said in the last several months that it has been examining OSHA's oversight of the plant.

Victim of budget cuts

Gary Beevers, District 6 Coordinator for the United Steelworkers, said OSHA wasn't always viewed as being lax. Shortly after it was established by Congress in 1970, he said, the agency was known for its unannounced inspections of petroleum refineries and heavy fines.

But throughout the 1980s, the agency fell victim to budget cuts, Beevers said. It also began focusing more on personal safety issues  such as making sure workers are wearing protective goggles and reducing slips and falls  and took its eye off the larger process safety issues that can lead to explosions. Process safety deals with the operation of equipment and the handling of hazardous materials.

Then in the late '80s, several large accidents  including the 1989 explosion at the Phillips Petroleum plant in Pasadena that killed 23 people  caused OSHA to sit up and take notice, said Ray Skinner, retired director of OSHA's Houston South Area office.

Now a consultant, Skinner said he and others in the agency drafted OSHA's exhaustive set of regulations that today govern virtually every aspect of chemical process safety and require plant operators to keep records of inspections, safety procedures and maintenance.

As industry operators became more familiar with the new standards, accidents began to decline.

"When I first came here there was hardly a week when we didn't have a fire or explosion in this area," said Skinner, who retired in 2004. "Then after a massive outreach, we saw the industry turning around." As the result of the new regulations, he said, the industry is much safer today and experiencing far fewer fires, explosions and chemical releases.

The American Petroleum Institute, an industry trade group, said API members don't feel that OSHA doesn't provide enough oversight. "I have not really heard from our members that this is a problem," said Ron Chittim, senior refinery associate for API.

Chittim noted that OSHA has announced a "National Emphasis Program" for the refinery industry, which will include planned inspections of all facilities in the country over a two- to three-year period, beginning within the next year.

"We are always looking at inspection data and accident data and that was something we thought we needed to do," Fairfax said.

OSHA officials in the Region 6 office in Dallas, which covers the Houston and Galveston areas, could not provide statistics for fires, explosions and chemical releases over the years, saying that they do not keep them. Instead, they point to a gradual decline in "recordables," on-the-job injuries and illnesses.

Fairfax provided a chart showing that OSHA's inspections for fatalities and catastrophes in those industries governed by the process safety management standard have declined from 29 in 1994 to just five in 2004.

Specific stats needed

But some say more specific statistics on fires, explosions and chemical releases should be kept by the agency.

"We need to be able to track these catastrophic incidents. Illness and injury reports do not in any way reflect process safety performance," said M. Sam Mannan, director of the Mary Kay O'Connor Process Safety Center at Texas A&M University.

Mannan agreed that the agency falls short when it comes to inspections and doesn't employ enough qualified people to review process safety at plants.

"I don't see many people shaking in their boots when they hear OSHA is coming," Mannan said.

anne.belli@chron.com 

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Greg Pallast.com
March 18, 2007

http://www.gregpalast.com/its-still-the-oilsecret-condi-meeting-on-oil-before-invasion/

It’s STILL The Oil:
Secret Condi Meeting on Oil Before Invasion
Published March 18th, 2007 in Articles
by Greg Palast

Four years ago this week, the tanks rolled for what President Bush originally called, “Operation Iraqi Liberation”  O.I.L.

I kid you not.

And it was four years ago that, from the White House, George Bush, declaring war, said, “I want to talk to the Iraqi people.” That Dick Cheney didn’t tell Bush that Iraqis speak Arabic … well, never mind. I expected the President to say something like, “Our troops are coming to liberate you, so don’t shoot them.” Instead, Mr. Bush told, the Iraqis,
“Do not destroy oil wells.“

Nevertheless, the Bush Administration said the war had nothing to do with Iraq’s oil. Indeed, in 2002, the State Department stated, and its official newsletter, the Washington Post, repeated, that State’s Iraq study group, “does not have oil on its list of issues.”

But now, we’ve learned that, despite protestations to the contrary, Condoleezza Rice held a secret meeting with the former Secretary-General of OPEC, Fadhil Chalabi, an Iraqi, and offered Chalabi the job of Oil Minister for Iraq. (It is well established that the President of the United States may appoint the cabinet ministers of another nation if that appointment is confirmed by the 101st Airborne.)

In all the chest-beating about how the war did badly, no one seems to remember how the war did very, very well  for Big Oil.

The war has kept Iraq’s oil production to 2.1 million barrels a day from pre-war, pre-embargo production of over 4 million barrels. In the oil game, that’s a lot to lose. In fact, the loss of Iraq’s 2 million barrels a day is equal to the entire planet’s reserve production capacity.

In other words, the war has caused a hell of a supply squeeze  and Big Oil just loves it. Oil today is $57 a barrel versus the $18 a barrel price under Bill “Love-Not-War” Clinton.

Since the launch of Operation Iraqi Liberation, Halliburton stock has tripled to $64 a share  not, as some believe, because of those Iraq reconstruction contracts  peanuts for Halliburton. Cheney’s former company’s main business is “oil services.” And, as one oilman complained to me, Cheney’s former company has captured a big hunk of the rise in oil prices by jacking up the charges for Halliburton drilling and piping equipment.
But before we shed tears for Big Oil’s having to hand Halliburton its slice, let me note that the value of the reserves of the five biggest oil companies more than doubled during the war to $2.36 trillion.

And that was the plan: putting a new floor under the price of oil. I have that in writing. In 2005, after a two-year battle with the State and Defense Departments, they released to my team at BBC Newsnight the “Options for a Sustainable Iraqi Oil Industry.” Now, you might think our government shouldn’t be writing a plan for another nation’s oil. Well, our government didn’t write it, despite the State Department seal on the cover. In fact, we discovered that the 323-page plan was drafted in Houston by oil industry executives and consultants.

The suspicion is that Bush went to war to get Iraq’s oil. That’s not true. The document, and secret recordings of those in on the scheme, made it clear that the Administration wanted to make certain America did not get the oil. In other words, keep the lid on Iraq’s oil production  and thereby keep the price of oil high.

Of course, the language was far more subtle than, “Let’s cut Iraq’s oil production and jack up prices.” Rather, the report uses industry jargon and euphemisms which require Iraq to remain an obedient member of the OPEC cartel and stick to the oil-production limits  “quotas”  which keep up oil prices.

The Houston plan, enforced by an army of occupation, would, “enhance [Iraq’s] relationship with OPEC,” the oil cartel.

And that’s undoubtedly why Condoleezza Rice asked Fadhil Chalabi to take charge of Iraq’s Oil Ministry. As former chief operating officer of OPEC, the oil cartel, Fadhil was a Big Oil favorite, certain to ensure that Iraq would never again allow the world to slip back to the Clinton era of low prices and low profits. (In investigating for BBC, I was told by the former chief of the CIA’s oil unit that he’d met with Fadhil regarding oil at Bush’s request. Fadhil recently complained to the BBC. He denied the meeting with the Bush emissary in London because, he noted, he was secretly meeting that week in Washington with Condi!)

Fadhil, by the way, turned down Condi’s offer to run Iraq’s Oil Ministry. Ultimately, Iraq’s Oil Ministry was given to Fadhil’s fellow tribesman, Ahmad Chalabi, a convicted bank swindler and neo-con idol. But whichever Chalabi is nominal head of Iraq’s oil industry in Baghdad, the orders come from Houston. Indeed, the oil law adopted by Iraq’s shaky government this month is virtually a photocopy of the “Options” plan first conceived in Texas long before Iraq was “liberated.”

In other words, the war has gone exactly to plan  the Houston plan. So forget the naïve cloth-rending about a conflict gone haywire. Exxon-Mobil reported a record $10 billion profit last quarter, the largest of any corporation in history. Mission Accomplished.

**********
Greg Palast is the author of the New York Times bestseller, Armed Madhouse: From Baghdad to New Orleans  Sordid Secrets and Strange Tales of a White House Gone Wild. A new edition, updated and expanded, will be released April 24.
 

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Anchorage Daily News
March 18, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/story/8719256p-8621309c.html

Conoco included in pipeline probe
CORROSION: Largest producer subpoenaed
for 11 years of records.
By ELIZABETH BLUEMINK
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 18, 2007
Last Modified: March 18, 2007 at 06:09 AM

A federal grand jury in Alaska investigating pipeline corrosion at North Slope oil fields has subpoenaed up to 11 years' worth of records from Conoco Phillips concerning how well the fields have been run.

The huge oil company, the largest oil producer in Alaska, confirmed Friday that its legal department recently instructed employees to preserve years worth of records relating to North Slope oil transport pipelines, including records relating to the lines' maintenance, corrosion, inspection, integrity and operations.

"Conoco Phillips is cooperating fully with the DOJ's request," said Natalie Knox, spokeswoman for Conoco's Alaska subsidiary, about the subpoena that came out of the U.S. Department of Justice.

She said the company was asked to provide the information to the grand jury to support its ongoing investigation of last year's Prudhoe Bay pipeline leaks.

The grand jury opened its criminal investigation and subpoenaed BP after the company's 201,000-gallon crude oil spill last winter at Prudhoe Bay, the nation's biggest oil field. It was the largest North Slope oil spill ever.

A report in August of severe corrosion in Prudhoe transit pipelines, followed a few days later by another oil spill, prompted BP to temporarily shut down part of the field, disrupting the U.S. oil supply and spawning several ongoing state and federal investigations.

With the new Conoco subpoenas, the Alaska grand jury investigation appears to be expanding.

BP runs Prudhoe on behalf of itself, Conoco, Exxon Mobil, Chevron and Forest Oil. But BP doesn't get the largest share of Prudhoe production -- Exxon and Conoco do. Conoco also has interests in most of the other two dozen North Slope fields, and it runs the second and third largest fields.

Conoco's legal department sent out a legal hold order dated Feb. 28 asking its employees to maintain and not destroy certain documents related to North Slope pipeline maintenance.

The hold order, obtained by the Daily News, stated that the Justice Department's Alaska office served the grand jury subpoena.

The order covers the following documents:

• A current version of the Prudhoe operating agreement between Conoco, BP and other companies holding leases there.

• All records related to Prudhoe Bay working group meetings on pipeline integrity, including maintenance, corrosion and inspections at Prudhoe Bay, dating from January 2000 to the present.

• All records related to budget requests, approvals, disapprovals and final budgets regarding Prudhoe Bay transit pipelines.

• All records related to corrosion management strategy for transit lines operated by Conoco from January 1996 to the present.

In the order, the legal department told employees to contact the department if they have such documents. The legal department would decide if the records were relevant to the investigation, the order stated.

It's not the first time Conoco has been drawn into the BP pipeline spill controversy.

Last August, state lawyers subpoenaed BP, Conoco and their three Prudhoe partners for records pertaining to last year's oil spills and pipeline maintenance. Unlike the federal grand jury's investigation, those subpoenas were civil, not criminal in nature.

Prudhoe's transit pipelines are major trunk lines that transport oil out of the vast field and feed it into the larger trans-Alaska pipeline, which carries the crude 800 miles south to the tanker port at Valdez.

Daily News reporter Elizabeth Bluemink can be reached at
ebluemink@adn.com  or 257-4317.
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Anchorage Daily News
March 17, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/story/8715342p-8617341c.html

Pipeline owners, state war over tariff
ALASKA PIPELINE: Analyst says the state loses $404 a minute.
By WESLEY LOY
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 17, 2007
Last Modified: March 17, 2007 at 03:11 AM

Long-standing complaints that the owners of the trans-Alaska pipeline are overcharging to ship oil -- costing private companies and the state hundreds of millions of dollars -- recently got a potential boost from federal lawyers.

Staff attorneys for the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, which oversees pipelines, said the companies that own the 800-mile Alaska pipe have done a poor job of justifying their high rates, known as tariffs.

The Feb. 16 legal brief comes amid a massive, multiyear legal fight involving the pipeline owners, other companies that ship oil through the pipe, and the state.

The five pipeline owners -- BP, Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, Koch Industries and Chevron -- currently charge an average of more than $5 per barrel to carry oil from the North Slope to the tanker port in Valdez.

Lawyers for the state as well as two energy companies that ship crude on the line -- Anadarko and refiner Tesoro -- argue that the oil companies are grossly overcharging. They say the tariff ought to be what state energy regulators in 2002 ruled it should be -- less than $2 per barrel.

At stake is a possible refund to the state of more than $800 million, should the commission order the $2 rate, state tax director Jon Iversen told state lawmakers this month.

Why? Because higher pipeline transportation costs mean lower tax and royalty collections for oil produced from state land. These costs are deducted from the price refineries pay for crude, and the greater the deductions, the lower the taxable value of the oil.

The pipeline owners are vigorously defending their rates as fair, and they are fighting on two fronts to maintain them -- at the federal commission in Washington, D.C., and in the Alaska Supreme Court, where the oil companies are trying to kill the 2002 state order.

The Feb. 16 legal brief from the commission's staff attorneys was big, said Robin Brena, a lawyer for Anadarko and Tesoro. Brena said the pipeline owners, over the 30-year life of the pipeline, have booked billions of dollars in undeserved profits by cheating the state and gouging companies such as Anadarko and Tesoro.

Because the state has only one pipeline off the North Slope -- what Brena calls a "monopoly pipeline" -- higher transportation costs hurt chances that smaller oil fields will be developed, and that refiners such as Tesoro can afford to make fuel products within the state, he said.

"There's a huge amount at stake for Alaska's future in this," Brena said.

Lawyers for the pipeline owners, however, insist their rates have been and remain fair.

Steven Brose, an attorney for the owners, told state lawmakers during a March 5 hearing on the pipeline tariff fight that the five-member federal regulatory commission often doesn't agree with the opinions of the agency's staff lawyers.

The commission's lawyers, in the Feb. 16 brief, said the pipeline owners had made arguments that are "contrary to some of the most basic notions of calculating just and reasonable rates" and conflict with prior commission orders. They recommend that the pipeline tariffs be cut.

Richard Fineberg, an Ester analyst and longtime oil industry critic, recently completed a study in which he calculated that the state is losing $404 a minute due to excessive charges on the oil pipeline, amounting to billions of dollars over the life of the pipeline.

He said a 1985 legal settlement between the state and the pipeline owners establishing a method for setting pipeline tariffs -- a deal that's now at the center of the legal fight -- was a big mistake for the state.

The state has a long legacy of battling with oil companies over pipeline tariffs, royalties and taxes, and this latest struggle isn't likely to end soon.

The case before the federal commission is densely complicated. Filings routinely exceed 100 pages, and at least a dozen law firms are involved from Anchorage to Houston to Washington.

An administrative law judge is expected to rule in the commission case by May 18. After that, the commission itself is expected to consider the matter, possibly ruling by the end of the year, a commission spokesman told state lawmakers.

After that, the parties can carry the battle into the federal courts, and are likely to, Brose said.

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.
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Houston Chronicle
March 17, 2007

http://www.chron.com/disp/story.mpl/business/4639070.html

Industry awaits report on BP blast
By KRISTEN HAYS
Copyright 2007 Houston Chronicle

Nearly two years after an explosion at BP's Texas City refinery killed 15 people and injured scores more, the oil industry's trade organization has no specific recommendations to Congress on whether regulations governing refinery safety should change, officials from the group said Friday.

Bob Greco, a director for the Washington, D.C.-based American Petroleum Institute, told reporters on a conference call that it was "premature" for the group to propose regulatory changes before digesting the U.S. Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board's final report on the root causes of the blast.

The board, which issues recommendations but has no enforcement authority, is slated to unveil it Tuesday.

"Give us a chance to read the report," Greco said.

Senior institute refinery associate Ron Chittum said that whether the board's report turns into a regulation-change guide for the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration "is certainly not clear."

But if it becomes a road map for change, the institute will seek to work with OSHA to develop "the best set of regulations we can," Chittum said.

Dan Horowitz, spokesman with the safety board, said the lengthy report includes new safety recommendations, "quite a few national and international in scope."

Investigators will hear public comment on the blast and then present the report to the agency's board for an approval vote at a meeting Tuesday night in Texas City.

The blast will be in the spotlight again on Thursday  one day before its two-year anniversary  at a hearing before the U.S. House Education and Labor Committee in Washington.

Carolyn Merritt, the safety board's chairwoman, and Eva Rowe, whose parents were killed in the explosion, are slated to testify.

Greco said Red Cavaney, the institute's president, plans to testify as well.

While institute officials noted Friday that they don't yet know what the safety board's report will say, the independent federal agency charged with investigating industrial accidents already has pushed for safety improvements in light of the Texas City explosion.

On the day of the blast, a blowdown drum and attached vent stack filled with flammable hydrocarbons, which spilled and formed vapor clouds. The cloud ignited and exploded.

Most of those who died were working in a trailer 121 feet from the unit that exploded. The safety board's investigation showed trailers parked as far as 600 feet away were damaged.

kristen.hays@chron.com

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Wall Street Journal
March 17, 2007

US Oil Grp Warns Of 'Arbitrary' Refinery Safety Rules
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 16, 2007 12:40 p.m.

 HOUSTON (Dow Jones)--Asserting that the 2005 BP PLC (BP) Texas City refinery disaster was an anomaly, the American Petroleum Institute Friday warned of rash moves by the U.S. Congress to step up safety regulations on oil refineries.

"We're concerned about Congress taking action that doesn't look at the best available data," said Bob Greco, API's director for the refining and marketing industry, said on a conference call with reporters. "Congress may take some arbitrary and unilateral action that isn't supported by the science and the data."

API convened the conference call ahead of next week's release of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board's final report into the March 2005 BP accident that killed 15 workers. Also next week, a House congressional committee will convene a hearing on Texas City.

The trade group, which represents large oil companies, reiterated its view that, while the industry is committed to continually improving refinery safety, it regards the Texas City tragedy as an exception to an otherwise solid industrywide safety record. The oil industry frequently points to statistical evidence of progress in improving safety and reducing accidents.

However, some critics question the validity of some commonly used benchmarks for monitoring refinery safety. For example, at least nine workers who died at refineries in 2002 and 2003 weren't counted as refinery fatalities by the Bureau of Labor Statistics because they were contract workers and not refinery employees, according to a May 2005 report in the Houston Chronicle.

API officials Friday pointed to a preliminary guideline related to the siting of temporary trailers. The proximity of the trailers to the Texas City explosion was a key factor in the deaths. Greco said it was "premature" for API to have a more detailed response to Texas City, given that the final report won't be released until this week.

"Give us a chance to read the report and to decide how we'll proceed," Greco said.

 -By John M. Biers, Dow Jones Newswires; 713-547-9214;
john.biers@dowjones.com 
 

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Anchorage Daily News
March 16, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/story/8712389p-8614571c.html

Alyeska shifting oil line, tanker port control to Anchorage
RECONFIGURATION: A backup facility is also being constructed in Palmer.
By WESLEY LOY
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 16, 2007
Last Modified: March 16, 2007 at 02:44 AM

The company that runs the trans-Alaska oil pipeline is building two new control centers, the main one in Anchorage and a backup in Palmer, to operate the line and the Valdez tanker port by remote control.

The new centers will replace the existing control center in Valdez, the end point of the 800-mile pipe.

Mike Heatwole, spokesman for Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., said a main goal of the relocation project is to bring the control center closer to company headquarters in Anchorage.

Technological advances such as high-speed Internet and fiber optics allow for remote control of pipelines, and stationing controllers closer to corporate headquarters has become a trend in the nation's energy industry, Heatwole said.

Around 15 Alyeska employees will transfer to Anchorage from Valdez or Fairbanks, or will commute here to work in the new control center, which should be ready by late this year, he said.

Alyeska is remodeling space in two buildings to house the control centers. In Anchorage, the main center will go in the AT&T building on Government Hill. AT&T is Alyeska's telecom contractor, Heatwole said.

The Palmer center will be a backup in case something goes wrong in Anchorage, he said. He declined to name the building involved, citing security concerns.

The remodeling is a $2 million project, Heatwole said.

The Anchorage control center will be a 24-hour operation to keep the oil moving. Workers there will control everything from flow rates and valves along the main pipeline to tanker loading at the port in Valdez, he said.

The high-tech control centers won't really save Alyeska money, Heatwole said. But they will make operations more efficient by bringing employees closer together and reducing cumbersome telephone conferences, he said.

The control center relocation is part of a broader modernization campaign on the pipeline, which has been moving oil since 1977.

Since early 2004, Alyeska has been working to overhaul and automate four main pump stations along the line, converting them to unmanned outposts. The goal is to reduce staff and costs as oil production declines from Prudhoe Bay and other North Slope fields. Oil flow down the pipeline exceeded 2 million barrels per day in 1988, but has since dwindled to around 800,000 barrels.

The original plan was for the two-year, $250 million reconfiguration project to be done by now.

But the project, which Alyeska calls "strategic reconfiguration," has overshot both the schedule and the budget.

The plan now is to overhaul the pump stations one at a time, not all at once, Heatwole said. Upgrades have been completed only at Pump Station 9, just south of Delta Junction. That work finished in February, and lessons learned there will be applied to future pump station overhauls, he said.

"The current plan is to do one station a year for the next three years," he said.

The projected budget for pipeline upgrades is now more than $400 million, Heatwole said.

Alyeska is a consortium of companies that own the pipeline. BP holds the biggest share at 47 percent. The other owners are Exxon Mobil, Conoco Phillips, Koch Industries and Chevron.

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.
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Financial Times
March 12, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/618260ee-cd9f-11db-839d-000b5df10621.html

BP
By Ed Crooks

Published: March 11 2007 19:05 |
Last updated: March 11 2007 19:05

BP’s reputation has plunged in the past two years as a result of a string of problems in the US. These have included investigations of its oil and gas trading activities, oil leaks in Alaska caused by pipeline corrosion, long delays in Thunder Horse, one of its most ambitious projects, and the explosion at its Texas City refinery in 2005 that killed 15 people.

The investigations and law suits that followed those deaths, in what was the worst industrial accident in the US for a decade, hang over the company, and will continue to do so for a long time to come.

They have contributed to the decision by Lord Browne, BP’s charismatic chief executive, to step down at the end of July, almost 18 months sooner than he had previously planned. It is a sad end to what has been one of the most admired performances by any British business leader.

Lord Browne built the company into a global business with a series of well-timed acquisitions about the turn of the decade. He also set it up well in the first years of the 21st century with the best deal any international oil company has been able to secure in Russia, forming the 50 per cent-owned joint venture TNK-BP.

But in the wake of the Texas City explosion, concerns have emerged that BP management culture was insufficiently focused on safety, and that poor practices that BP inherited when it made its US acquisitions had not been addressed fast enough. Investments in equipment that could have prevented the explosion were not made.

When it released its results for 2006 in February, BP also indicated that it expected very slow growth in production out to the end of the decade, raising questions about its strategy.

The steady flow of bad news has taken its toll on the shares, cutting BP’s market value to below that of its UK-listed peer and rival, Royal Dutch Shell, and behind PetroChina, the listed arm of the China National Petroleum Corporation.

Tony Hayward, the former head of exploration and production who is taking over as chief executive, has a fight on his hands to persuade investors that he can put right BP’s operational weaknesses, while delivering the growth in earnings that they will want to see.

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Fairbanks News Miner
March 10, 2007

http://newsminer.com/2007/03/10/5824/

State oil tax estimates on the money
By Stefan Milkowski
Staff Writer
Published March 10, 2007

JUNEAU  The first tax payments under the new oil production tax were due last week, and the state got pretty much what it expected.

The Department of Revenue’s tax division predicted the state would bring in $121 million from the payments, which were oil companies’ first estimated monthly installments on their 2007 taxes.

The state took in about $125 million, according to the division’s director, Jonathan Iversen. That’s 85 to 90 percent more than the state would have received under the old tax, he said Thursday.

Iversen cautioned that the payments were only estimated installments on the yearly taxannual filings aren’t due till March of the following yearand are subject to refund. Oil companies can make refund claims for two years, and the state can audit the returns for three years, he said.

Each company’s tax payment, and information on that payment, is confidential, according to Iversen.

As for the total dollar figure, lawmakers can take what they will from it, he said.

Local lawmakers offered different responses.

Rep. Mike Kelly, R-Fairbanks, said he was “very pleased” with the news as someone who worked to shape the tax and get it passed.

Rep. Jay Ramras, R-Fairbanks, called it “outstanding.”

But Rep. David Guttenberg, D-Fairbanks, said the success of the new tax shouldn’t be based on a comparison with the old tax, which used an “economic limit factor,” or ELF.

“ELF wasn’t fair to begin with,” he said. “ELF was broken.”

Guttenberg said he still supported switching to a tax based on gross production rather than net profits, as the new tax is, and said the new petroleum profits tax, or PPT, wasn’t “fair” because of the tax deductions it allowed companies.

Guttenberg and Ramras have both signed on as co-sponsors to a bill that would empower the state to exclude deductions on costs associated with “improper maintenance” of pipelines and other infrastructure.

“PPT probably needs a lot of massaging,” Ramras said, “but it’s great initial legislation.”

The tax law mandates a thorough review of the PPT in 2011, but Sen. Gary Wilken, R-Fairbanks, has asked for an earlier review.

Contact staff writer Stefan Milkowski at 388-6141 or
smilkowski@newsminer.com.
 

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Alaska Report
March 9, 2007

http://www.alaskareport.com/kim-elton19013.htm

Exxon: Exxorbitant, Exxtortionists
a VIP policy letter from Alaska
Senator Kim Elton
    
Note to self: The oil industry is not our friend. Especially Exxon.

This note to self is inspired by a series of unfortunate events that are Exxon-centric.

     First: "The State of Alaska does not have a good track record on fiscal stability. Not trying to single them out or be critical, but they've changed fiscal terms on us 13 times over the last couple of decades." (Rex Tillerson, ExxonMobile chairman and president speaking to Wall Street analysts Wednesday.)

     This is inflammatory on so many levels but let's leave his statement by noting it is an untruth so bold it twists the innards.

     Second: I'm a bit fried that the Exxon honcho who reportedly made about $13,700 an hour last year can so blithely spout such nonsense to Wall Street analysts. If the Exxon board is going to pay someone that much they should at least demand he tell the truth. If he can distort reality as much as he did Wednesday when speaking to financial analysts, how can his board be sure he's being transparently truthful with them?

     Third: Exxon, not trying to single them out or be critical (to borrow Mr. Tillerson's predicate before speaking this week about Alaska), for well over a decade has been stiffing Alaska's fishermen by not paying billions of dollars of court-ordered restitution--restitution ordered, remember, when their drunk skipper fouled our shores in 1989.

     Fourth: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) staff recently opined that Exxon and other owners of the Trans Alaska Pipeline have been stiffing the state with unfair oil pipeline tariffs. The state could have lost as much as $800 million in just four years. That FERC staff report is in line with a 2002 finding by the Regulatory Commission of Alaska (RCA).

     If FERC agrees with their professional staff and the RCA, litigation on this latest corporado tactic by Exxon and others could drag on for years as we try to recoup money they diverted to their bottom line by artifice.

     Fifth: How do we know that Exxon won't do what's right on oil pipeline tariffs if FERC accepts their professional staff analysis? Well, we don't know for sure. Remember though, they fought the state for well over a decade on royalty oil disputes before they and others paid us back hundreds of millions they took from us. Remember too, the years and years of litigation to avoid paying Alaska fishermen. The tiger in their tank doesn't change its stripes.

     Sixth: Exxon is the company that's been sitting on the resources at Pt. Thompson for three decades. They were warehousing resources that terms of their lease with Alaska compelled them to develop. The state finally cancelled the lease. Predictably, instead of sending drillers to the slope, Exxon is sending lawyers to court to try and defend their 30-year violation of lease terms.

     Seven: Exxon's profits were nearly $40 billion last year. That broke the previous record for U.S. corporate profits set, by the way, in 2005 by Exxon. The 2005 record set by Exxon broke the previous record for U.S. corporate profits set in 2004 by Exxon. Exxon's been gushing money. The obvious question, given their Alaska history, is how much of their record setting profits really belong to Alaskans.

     So, there's my first seven rebuttal points to Mr. Tillerson's Wednesday comments. Given this history, I guess we can conclude the least egregious behavior by Exxon over the past several decades of operating in Alaska is the blatant disregard for the truth Mr. Tillerson demonstrated this week. Not being truthful, I guess, isn't the worst of their offenses: they don't pay our fishermen for their bad; they don't pay us fairly for our royalty oil until compelled by courts; they are charged with overcharging us and others for shipping oil through TAPS; they sit on our resources at Pt. Thompson, and their definition of profit sharing with the owners of the resource is akin to the definition espoused by robber barons.

     Finally, this column has focused on Exxon's egregious behavior. Alaska has had its disputes with other multi-national oil companies. But there is an opportunity the others now have--they can set the record straight in the wake of Mr. Tillerson's distortions or they can allow his distortions to stand. Their choice.

     Note to self: The oil industry is not our friend. They can be our partner if we are vigilant, but they are not our friends.

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Anchorage Daily News
March 9, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/pipeline/story/8696642p-8595919c.html

Exxon and Palin butt heads over taxes in pipeline deal
GAS: CEO says Alaska has changed fiscal terms 13 times, but governor claims only twice.
By WESLEY LOY
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 9, 2007
Last Modified: March 9, 2007 at 05:19 AM

Alaska has a bad habit of changing its tax policy, and that poses a big problem for Gov. Sarah Palin in trying to get Exxon Mobil or other energy companies to commit to a multibillion-dollar natural gas pipeline, the company's chief executive told Wall Street analysts this week.

"The state of Alaska does not have a good track record on fiscal stability," Rex Tillerson said. "I'm not trying to be, single them out or be critical. But they've changed fiscal terms on us up there 13 times over the last couple of decades."

The Palin administration Thursday rebutted that, claiming Alaska had changed its oil tax structure only twice.

Tillerson's comments are the latest in what seems to be a budding war of words between giant Exxon and Palin, who's been in office just over three months and is the latest in a long string of Alaska governors who have tried to entice, cajole or force energy companies to build a pipeline to tap the vast North Slope gas reserves. Such a project would inject billions of new dollars into the Alaska economy.

On Valentine's Day, Palin took offense at some remarks Tillerson made at an industry conference in Houston, in which he questioned the state's latest approach. She said in a press release it was "painfully obvious" that Exxon didn't favor her "competitive, open and transparent process" to designate a pipeline builder.

Tillerson, in addressing Wall Street analysts for more than three hours Wednesday about the company's profits and global energy projects, spent about four minutes answering a question about Alaska's gas line.

He said a draft contract Palin's predecessor, Frank Murkowski, presented last year between the state and Exxon, BP and Conoco Phillips -- the three companies holding most of the Slope gas -- would have set long-term oil and gas tax rates if the trio built a pipeline across Alaska and Canada. That's key for any company gambling on a $25 billion-plus megaproject, Tillerson said.

Murkowski's contract was never signed and died in a hail of criticism from state lawmakers and others who didn't like the proposed tax freeze and other elements.

Palin has restarted the process by introducing legislation offering certain incentives to would-be pipeline builders and users, including an offer to freeze the tax rate on gas for 10 years, a much shorter term than Murkowski proposed.

The main concern for Exxon, Tillerson said, is the risk that the state might jack up petroleum taxes before a pipeline begins to pay off.

"As we do with all of our other big investments -- and we say this to decision makers everywhere -- we're willing to take geologic risk, we're willing to take cost risk, and we're even willing to take price risk. But we can't take fiscal-terms-changing-on-us risk," he said.

"You just can't undertake something of this size and not have durability around the terms," Tillerson added. "And I think that's probably going to be the most significant challenge for this new administration to deal with -- understanding that and securing that and providing it."

Tillerson said Exxon would look at the Palin plan, which he described as "a little short on details," to "see if there's something there that would make sense and might work."

Palin's revenue commissioner, Pat Galvin, issued a statement Thursday questioning Tillerson's facts.

"There have only been two changes in the state's oil tax structure in the last 26 years, and prior to last year's change, the tax structure had been in place unchanged for over 17 years," Galvin said.

Lawmakers last year overhauled the state's petroleum tax code to increase tax revenue when prices are high, as they are now. That could mean Exxon and other oil companies will pay billions extra in taxes in coming years.

"Alaska is a stable government, where companies don't have to worry about terrorism or have their employees live in compounds," Galvin continued. "Alaska's attractiveness to global energy companies is demonstrated by the large investments of companies such as Shell Oil who see tremendous opportunities in Alaska, in contrast to the instability seen elsewhere in the world.

"We are confident that Exxon will continue to recognize the opportunities Alaska offers."

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at
wloy@adn.com   or 257-4590.

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OPINION
http://www.adn.com/opinion/view/story/8696654p-8595949c.html

Exxon can't add
Company wrong on its tax facts
Published: March 9, 2007
Last Modified: March 9, 2007 at 04:18 AM

Alaskans dislike Exxon Mobil enough without the company's chairman throwing crude oil on the fire.

Chief executive officer Rex Tillerson told reporters and oil industry analysts this week, "The state of Alaska does not have a good track record on fiscal stability." The mega-company is still mega-grumpy over the Legislature's rewrite last year of Alaska's oil and gas production tax. The change just about doubled the company's tax bill this year, likely the main reason for Mr. Tillerson's Texas boot-heel dig into Alaska tax politics.

But rather than just leaving it at that, Exxon's top boss added another kick: "I'm not trying to ... single them (Alaska) out or be critical. But they've changed fiscal terms on us up there 13 times over the last couple of decades."

Sorry, Mr. Tillerson, but you've got your tax facts wrong.

Going back two decades, we see that Alaska has imposed only a few major changes in taxes that dug into Exxon's pockets.

In 1989, the Legislature significantly raised the production tax rate at Prudhoe Bay in exchange for cutting the rate on smaller fields. Also, in the aftermath of the 1989 Exxon Valdez oil spill, the Legislature adopted a nickel a barrel in new taxes for spill prevention and response.

The Department of Revenue in January 2005 significantly raised the production tax rate at Prudhoe Bay and its satellites in an administrative decision changing how the rate is calculated.

And last year lawmakers scrapped everything for an entirely new production tax system.

Other changes in the past two decades were relatively small when measured against the billions of dollars of production taxes during that time.

Mr. Tillerson probably believes what he said, and he's not the first oil industry official to recite the claim of multiple fiscal changes. Alaska may have threatened over the years, but the reputation of fiscal instability is undeserved. Truth is, nothing much changed of any significance between 1989 and 2005. Sure, the oil tax rewrite of 2006 was a doozy, but that doesn't excuse Exxon's overstatement of the facts.

When asked, the company did not respond with a list of the 13 changes claimed by Mr. Tillerson.

Our advice to Exxon, if they're listening, is: Disagree with Alaska if you want, but don't insult us.

BOTTOM LINE:
The only thing more constant than state oil tax policy in the past two decades has been Exxon's refusal to settle damage claims from its 1989 tanker spill.

Good work

Oil tax revenues right on target

Put aside for a moment the lingering debate over last year's rewrite of oil and gas production taxes. Whether you like the change, whether you wanted a tax with fewer deductions, a higher tax rate or more investment credits, at least know that the first taxpayer checks are almost exactly where state economists estimated they would be.

The state has received its first full checks under the new production tax formula. The payments for January's oil totaled $125 million, just a bit above Department of Revenue estimates of $121 million. That's impressive forecasting.

More important, the tax receipts were almost 90 percent higher than they would have been under the old formula scrapped by legislators. Yes, this is the tax change introduced by Gov. Frank Murkowski, who deserves a note of thanks -- even from critics who wanted a higher tax rate.

The first checks would have been even more lucrative for the state had production been stronger -- maintenance shutdowns kept the flow of North Slope oil below 800,000 barrels a day on average for January. And the average price for the month was $51.52 a barrel, the lowest since May 2005.

State economists can't do anything about world oil prices or declining North Slope production, but their accuracy in estimating revenues under the new oil tax should give legislators confidence as they plan next year's budget.

BOTTOM LINE:
State profits from new oil tax.

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Fairbanks News Miner
March 6, 2007

http://newsminer.com/2007/03/06/5735/

State showcases new gas line plan
By Eric Lidji
Staff Writer
Published March 6, 2007

Tom Irwin, the commissioner of the Alaska Department of Natural Resources, unveiled details of Gov. Sarah Palin’s plan for getting North Slope natural gas to market on Monday night, presenting the plan as the state’s way of moving into an active role to bring about a natural gas pipeline.

“The state is moving forward,” Irwin said. “We’re not waiting.”

The Alaska Gas Inducement Act, or AGIA, Irwin said, issues a list of the state’s demands for a pipeline, paired against incentives, or “inducements,” for the agency ultimately chosen to build the project.

More than 35 people gathered in the Lathrop High School library to hear Irwin and a panel of representatives from the state Division of Oil and Gas discuss the plan.

The Palin administration held a simultaneous town hall meeting in Anchorage on Monday night.

While the crowd seemed enthusiastic about the proposal, many also expressed concern that AGIA did not adequately guarantee Alaskan employment on a pipeline project.

Irwin acknowledged the concerns, but said that weighing the proposal down with too many specifics now could jeopardize the entire plan, and that the details of any labor agreement could be settled after legislative approval of AGIA.

Employment for Alaskans is one of six goals Palin had for the plan, according to Bruce Anders, a leasing manager with the Division of Oil and Gas.

Other goals include creating a competitive marketplace for project proposals, ensuring long-term development and expansion of North Slope facilities, setting reasonable tariffs on gas moving through the pipeline and guaranteeing a natural gas supply for Alaskans.

One of the inducements would match initial state or federal permitting costs up to $500 million. Another would offer certain tax exemptions to producers for natural gas committed to a pipeline.

Irwin set out a rough timeline for the plan leading to preparations for construction as early as the summer of 2008.

The timeline begins with legislative approval this session.

AGIA entered the legislative process Monday when senators and representatives referred mirroring versions of Palin’s proposal to six different committees for review.

According to Irwin, the state would take two months after legislative approval to finalize the act and issue a call for application from groups interesting in building the pipeline.

Those groups would have three months, or somewhere around Oct. 1, to return the application.

After a 15-day review by the state, the public would have two months to review and comment on all the applications.

The state would then make a recommendation to the Legislature next January, and the process would be finalized by the end of next year’s session.

Alaska’s North Slope has 35 trillion cubic feet of proven natural gas reserves.

Contact staff writer Eric Lidji at 459-7504 or
elidji@newsminer.com

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Anchorage Daily News
March 6, 2007

http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/pipeline/story/8687906p-8585083c.html

Palin's plan for gas line takes first public licks
NEW ENERGY: About 30 people air views on governor's legislation.
By RICHARD RICHTMYER
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 6, 2007
Last Modified: March 6, 2007 at 02:17 AM

A week before state lawmakers are scheduled to take their first crack at Gov. Sarah Palin's natural gas pipeline legislation, members of her pipeline project team took the proposal directly to the people.

Revenue Commissioner Pat Galvin, Resources deputy commissioner Marty Rutherford and other Palin administration officials gave an overview of the governor's bill during a town hall-style meeting in Anchorage on Monday night. They also took questions from the group of about 30 people who showed up for the event.

Many who turned out voiced comments or aired concerns instead of asking questions.

For example, one man said he was pleased that the legislation included provisions aimed at ensuring Alaskans get to work on the project but was disappointed that it didn't require a project-labor agreement. Another voiced concerns about how the state, since it would be soliciting proposals from a wide range of potential builders, would be able to fairly weigh drastically different pipeline plans against one another.

This was the first of several public meetings Palin officials said they plan to hold throughout the state in the coming weeks. The governor wants to get the bill passed before the Legislature adjourns in mid-May.

She unveiled her pipeline plan, called the Alaska Gasline Inducement Act, on Friday. The 21-page bill would provide cash and other incentives to potential builders of a pipeline that would carry the North Slope's vast reserves of natural gas to Lower 48 markets.

Legislative committee work on the bill isn't scheduled to begin until next week. In the meantime, members of Palin's pipeline team got a head start addressing some of the questions that are expected to emerge in the Legislature.

One of the biggest inducements in Palin's bill is a state gift of up to $500 million, to be matched by a pipeline builder, to help offset early upfront costs.

That was the first issue that came up during Monday's question-and-answer session.

"Why should the state of Alaska subsidize Exxon, Conoco Phillips and BP to get natural gas to market to the tune of $500 million?" an audience member asked.

Galvin defended the plan, asserting that in return for that money the state would be "buying" project terms that are valuable to Alaska.

"It's not a subsidy. It's actually a purchase," Galvin said.

Among the givebacks are a pipeline that can be expanded to allow a wide range of gas explorers to tap it; commitments by a pipeline builder to provide at least five places where the gas could be drawn off for in-state use at rates below those charged to Lower 48 buyers; and project timelines and benchmarks, the governor's people said.

Some of the questions narrowly focused on specific points in the legislation. For instance, why does Palin's proposal call for five in-state taps instead of four, as proposed in former Gov. Frank Murkowski's plan?

The answer, Rutherford said, is that the number of taps isn't as important as ensuring a good supply of gas for Alaska. Other components of the legislation, such as requiring the builder to set rates for in-state gas that only charge for transportation from the North Slope and not all the way to the end of the line, are more important.

Murkowski last year presented a deal with Exxon, Conoco and BP setting tax and other terms for a possible pipeline. That deal died after most state lawmakers criticized it as giving too much to the oil companies.

The former governor's critics cast doubt on his plan, arguing that it was impossible to know if the deal he struck with the producers was the best deal for Alaskans because there hadn't been adequate public scrutiny of other proposals.

Palin's plan allows for anyone interested in building a pipeline to submit a project plan and for all the proposals that meet the state's guidelines be released for public review before state officials select the winner.

That might achieve the transparency that the new governor has promised in the process, but some participants in Monday's meeting said that might ultimately weaken the state's bargaining position.

Galvin acknowledged the quandary.

"It's all going to be laid out there, and within that framework is one of the problems that we just inherently have to recognize," he said. "We're a democracy, and we have to make a public decision. That by its nature puts us at a disadvantage."

Reporter Richard Richtmyer can be reached at rrichtmyer or 257-4344.

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http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/pipeline/story/8687906p-8585082c.html

Pipeline tariff fight key to gas line plan
SHIPPING: If cost is too high, exploration efforts may suffer.
By SABRA AYRES
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 6, 2007
Last Modified: March 6, 2007 at 02:17 AM

JUNEAU -- A dispute about how the owners of the trans-Alaska pipeline set shipping fees could influence future debates on who should build the natural gas pipeline, lawmakers said Monday.

Smaller oil companies that ship oil through the existing pipeline say the rates charged by the consortium of BP, Conoco Phillips and Exxon Mobil are arbitrary and too high.

Anadarko and Tesoro, two of the oil companies using the pipeline, in December 2004 challenged the interstate rates charged by the pipeline owners with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.

In a separate complaint filed by Tesoro and Williams, the Regulatory Commission of Alaska ruled that in-state rates set by the producers also should be lowered.

A judge is expected to make a ruling on the FERC challenge in May. After that, a series of appeals could keep the rate challenge in the courts for some time, lawyers for the oil companies said.

The Department of Revenue gave estimates to lawmakers Tuesday suggesting that if the challenge is upheld, the state could receive as much as $818 million in reimbursements because the high fees lowered the value of Alaska's oil.

The reimbursement estimates were based on fees collected between 2005 and 2007.

Lawmakers said the current debate on shipping fees is particularly relevant as the legislature begins debating Gov. Sarah Palin's proposed gas line legislation.

If it passes, pipeline builders would get money and tax incentives in return for a commitment to build the gas line.

"When it comes to the gas line, bar none, the three most important factors will be the tariff, the tariff and the tariff," said Rep. Carl Gatto, R-Palmer, who is the co-chairman of the House Resources Committee.

"If we have no control over how the tariffs are calculated, then I'm fearful about getting the independent explorers to get out and look for the gas, which is absolutely what we need to find in order to make the gas line an economic reality."

Daily News reporter Sabra Ayres can be reached at
sayres@adn.com or 907-586-1531.
 

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Wall Street Journal
March 6, 2007

Pay For BP's Browne Falls To GBP2.53M In 06 Vs GBP3.29M In 05
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 6, 2007 4:44 a.m.
 
LONDON (Dow Jones)--BP PLC's (BP) departing chief executive, John Browne, had an annual pay of GBP2.53 million in 2006 compared with GBP3.29 million in 2005, the company's annual report showed.

The amount included his salary, bonus and non-cash benefits.
 
The bonus awarded to Browne, who is to leave the company in July, was nearly halved to GBP900,000 in 2006, from a previous GBP1.75 million.

BP's annual performance bonuses are based on financial targets but also operational goals, including safety.

BP has been heavily criticized in past months over safety and alleged lapses in corporate governance.

In August a leak and heavy corrosion led to a partial shutdown of a key Prudhoe Bay oil field and BP was later criticized in the U.S. congress in relation to the incident.

In January this year the Baker report into a deadly blast at a BP refinery in Texas harshly criticized the British oil giant over safety deficiencies.

BP's energy-trading practices are also being investigated, with federal officials alleging BP traders manipulated propane markets in 2004.

 
Browne's salary and bonus have declined for the second-straight year, given his 2005 pay fell after the Texas refinery blast.

The bonus cut was applied to each of BP's top executives, including Tony Hayward, who is set to replace Browne in August and who received GBP431,000, down from GBP463,000 in 2005.

BP said in its report that seven of its staff died at work during 2006. In 2005 there were 27 deaths, including 15 in the Texas explosion.

It said the 2006 level of fatalities was the lowest level in nearly 20 years of reporting this data.

-By Benoit Faucon, Dow Jones Newswires; +44-20-7842-9266;
benoit.faucon@dowjones.com

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Alaska Lawmakers Worry About Producer-Owner
Nat Gas Pipeline
DOW JONES NEWSWIRES
March 5, 2007 11:10 p.m.

JUNEAU, Alaska (AP)--Federal regulators are questioning how oil flowing through the trans-Alaska pipeline is charged, prompting some Alaska lawmakers to say this could serve as a warning for a producer-owned natural gas pipeline.

The company that manages the oil pipeline is owned largely by a consortium of BP PLC (BP) ConocoPhillips Co. (COP) and Exxon Mobil Corp. (XOM), but other oil companies say they are being charged too much to send their oil down the 800-mile pipeline.

State lawmakers are paying close attention to a dispute over rates - or a tariff - between the consortium, Alyeska Pipeline Service Co., Tesoro Corp. (TSO) and Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (APC).

Tariffs cover transportation rates, terms and conditions for the service. Higher tariffs mean lower royalties for the state and higher costs for companies paying to use the pipeline.

The issue comes as state lawmakers begin reviewing Gov. Sarah Palin's plan called the Alaska Gasline Inducements Act, or AGIA, and tariff structure will be a critical component of the proposed natural gas pipeline.

"The three most important things - bar none - are the tariff, the tariff, and the tariff," said state Rep. Carl Gatto, R-Palmer, who co-chairs the House Resources Committee.

"Both pipelines, the one that exists and the one that is coming, and AGIA, are all the same issue: develop resources so we can run the state."

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission is in the middle of reviewing the oil pipeline dispute that may ultimately be resolved by the courts, state officials and lawmakers said.

Tesoro, a refiner, and Anadarko, a producer, want the federal rates to be closer to the state rate, which would drop their fees by about $3 a barrel, the companies said. The companies haven't quantified the difference yet, because the lower tariff would be offset in part by a higher royalty to the state, but could result in millions of dollars in savings for them.

On Monday, the House Resources Committee discussed but took no action on the FERC report. The report from the agency's legal department has sided with Tesoro and Anadarko in the dispute.

Tariff adjustments are submitted to FERC, which can approve, deny or conditionally approve pending appeals, which means the higher rates go into effect.

The battle has lawmakers concerned over potential fallouts from having producers own any natural gas pipeline.

Producers Exxon Mobil, ConocoPhillips and BP have told House and Senate committees they have every fiscal motivation to keep the costs down if they are chosen to build the natural gas pipeline. The producers also argued that they have the financial stability and a proven track record to undertake such a project.

What they don't have any longer is an exclusive deal to build the project, like they had last year with the former governor. When Palin took office, she totally rewrote the process to build a pipeline, proposing a competitive bidding process that has attracted more interest than just from the big three oil companies.

While lawmakers have expressed concern about a producer-owned pipeline, Palin's plan calls for an openly competitive process. She introduced her bill on Friday, and lawmakers could start holding hearings on it as early as next week.

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Financial Times
March 5, 2007

http://www.ft.com/cms/s/7e6fd90e-cabe-11db-820b-000b5df10621.html
FRONT PAGE

BP fought off Texas safety controls
By Sheila McNulty in Houston
Published: March 5 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 5 2007 02:00

BP successfully lobbied against tighter environmental controls by regulators in Texas, saving $150m (£77m) in monitoring and equipment upgrades prior to the fatal Texas City refinery explosion in 2005, internal documents show.

The proposed controls would have forced BP to invest in upgrading the exhaust system on the unit at the refinery that exploded, to include a flare.

The US Chemical Safety Board said the upgrade would have prevented - or at least mitigated - the blast that killed 15 and injured 500.

John Mogford, BP's group vice-president for exploration and production, who led the company's internal investigation into the blast, said in his May 2005 report that a "conversion to a flare system would have reduced the severity of the incident".

A flare would have contained and safely burned off most, if not all, emissions, preventing them from catching a spark on March 23 2005, according to the CSB.

Until the accident, BP was considered the "greenest'' of the big oil companies and was able to convince regulators not to impose such tough controls.

Susan Moore, BP regulatory affairs manager, was nominated for a $1,000 bonus for her efforts.

"On behalf of BP, Susan Moore lobbied for and gained agency support to exempt Brazoria and Galveston Counties from new highly reactive volatile organic compound [HRVOC] short-term and long-term emission caps,'' wrote her superior, Watson Dupont, in a nominating e-mail.

The Texas City refinery is in Galveston county.

In the December 20 2004 e-mail, he noted: "We also delayed and maybe avoided $150m in additional costs by lobbying against the expansion of the definition of HRVOC. An expansion of there gulated chemical list would have doubled and, in some cases, tripled, monitoring costs."

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http://www.ft.com/cms/s/bc3eb314-cabd-11db-820b-000b5df10621.html

Civil litigation focus on BP manager laptop
By Sheila McNulty
Published: March 5 2007 02:00 |
Last updated: March 5 2007 02:00

Susan Moore, BP's regulatory affairs manager, finds herself at the centre of BP civil litigation arising from the Texas City refinery blast

On January 26 2007, she admitted in a sworn deposition to deleting documents after plaintiffs' lawyers subpoenaed her laptop on an anonymous tip that she had information useful in the lawsuits from those injured and killed in the refinery explosion. The lawyers are seeking all deleted documents from BP.

Internal documents from when the regulatory issue was first raised, seen by the Financial Times, include a June 27 2002 e-mail by Matthew Brewer, a process engineer, to staff saying that the new rules would probably require the installation of a flare, meter and other equipment: "This would be a huge expense, as well as a large design effort. Probably not achievable by December 2003."

In a June 9 2002 e-mail, David Harlan, a BP engineer, told staff the proposed rule required that "after December 2003, any atmospheric relief valve in VOC [volatile organic compound] service must be routed to the flare upon any second venting occurrence".
BP had had a number of instances whereby VOCs had "vented'', or been released, from the blowdown drum in the Isom unit - the part of the refinery that exploded - according to John Mogford, BP's group vice-president for exploration and production, who led the internal investigation into the blast.

The Chemical Safety Board documented six previous releases from the "antiquated" blowdown drum since 1994, any of which could have led to a disaster. After what was to have been the December 2003 deadline, BP had three such releases, on March 26 2004, November 29 2004 and February 25 2005.

Ronnie Chappell, BP spokesman, said: "Even if the environmental regulations had required the Isom unit to have a flare, the time between what was the effective date of the regulations (December 23 2004) and the tragedy - three months - would have made it almost, if not, impossible to engineer, permit, obtain materials for and install a flare at the Isom unit prior to the incident.''

Rerouting would have been required within one year of the second venting.

In the end, BP did not undertake that rerouting process until after the unit exploded.

Mr Mogford said in his investigation report that BP had not seized opportunities to upgrade to a flare in spite of admitting: "Blowdown stacks have been recognised as potentially hazardous for this service, with the industry moving more towards closed relief systems to flare.''

Mr Chappell said at the time that the new regulations were being discussed, the "blowdown system remained in use because process hazard reviews did not recognise the possibility that multiple, prolonged procedural failures could result in such a massive flow of fluids and vapours to the blowdown system. Operated properly, we believed this unit was safe.''

So, on July 12 2004, a BP PowerPoint sent to John Manzoni, BP's chief executive of refining and marketing, ahead of his visit to the site, boasted of how - by fighting off tighter regulations and successfully influencing the "drivers" of regulation to reduce capital expenditures by more than $100m (£51.5m) on the highly reactive volatile organic compound emissions - BP had "eliminated expensive, burdensome monitoring requirements, which only reduced emissions minimally".

Other oil and gas companies had joined BP's lobbying effort against the tighter regulations but only BP suffered the consequences.
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Anchorage Daily News
March 1, 2007

http://www.adn.com/news/alaska/story/8677428p-8572195c.html

BP warns against more tax
LEGISLATURE: An amendment would ban certain deductions.
By SABRA AYRES
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 1, 2007
Last Modified: March 1, 2007 at 02:43 AM

JUNEAU -- A BP representative told lawmakers Wednesday that adopting proposed changes to the state oil and gas tax to disallow energy companies from deducting expenses incurred from improper facility maintenance would result in fewer investment dollars for Alaska's energy industry.

The state's Petroleum Production Tax, which lawmakers passed last year, already taxes energy companies at a rate that is too high, said Tom Williams, a senior tax consultant for BP. The proposed amendment on repair costs as a result of improper maintenance is unclear and could hurt the state's future energy industry, he said.

"The PPT is suboptimal for the state because the rate is too high," Williams told the Senate Resources committee. He added that the PPT as written already addresses repair costs. Passing the amendment would mean the state would be "double-dipping" into existing provisions, he said.

The bill was introduced by Sen. Tom Wagoner, R-Kenai, and signed on by 17 other sponsors from both sides of the aisle. A similar House bill has an equally high number of bipartisan sponsors.

The measure was sparked by pipeline leaks last year that resulted in the largest oil spill ever on the North Slope and a decrease in production as Prudhoe Bay pipelines were shut down for repair.

BP, which runs Prudhoe on behalf of itself and other major owners, including Exxon Mobil and BP, is under investigation by federal authorities and has been criticized by members of Congress and federal pipeline regulators for lax pipeline maintenance.

Last month, BP told the Legislature it planned to deduct the cost of the repairs, a move that would save the oil producer as much as $11 million on its tax bill.

Lawmakers argue that the pipeline corrosion that caused the oil spill was a result of years of neglect and the state shouldn't have to pay for the repair costs. Sponsors of the bill said they had hoped to protect the state from the high costs of improper maintenance practices.

But despite the bipartisan popularity of the bill, it has run into several roadblocks, and now more questions are being raised about how to get a passable version of the bill written.

Energy producer groups argue that the bill's terminology is problematic, particularly in how to define "improper maintenance."

While gross negligence is clearly defined, no such standard exists in the bill for what constitutes improper maintenance, said Jason Brune, executive director of the Resource Development Council for Alaska, a nonprofit organization representing energy producers and resource businesses.

"The predictability just isn't there with this bill," Brune said.

Representatives from the Department of Natural Resources' Division of Oil and Gas said they supported the idea behind the bill but also had concerns with the difficulties in defining improper maintenance.

The state should look to Outside certification agencies, like the American Petroleum Institute, for ways to create standards when defining what is gross and improper maintenance, said the chairman of the Alaska Oil and Gas Conservation Commission, John Norman.

Sen. Lesil McGuire, R-Anchorage, a sponsor of the bill and a member of the committee, agreed. McGuire said the legislation wouldn't do the job "unless we put out what our rules and standards are."

The bill also calls into question whether and how far back the proposed legislation could retroactively apply. While many sponsors have said they hoped passing the bill would block BP from deducting repair costs incurred after last year's oil spill, some feared the legislation could tie the state up in future legal battles.

In a letter to Wagoner, the legislative counsel said the bill's language would allow the legislation to work retroactively to April 1, 2006, the date the PPT took effect.

But according to testimony from Robert Mintz, a consultant for the Department of Revenue, cases involving retroactive changes to existing state tax laws "have seen an uphill battle" in the courtroom.

"The Legislature should be cautious when changing laws targeted at a particular entity or event," Mintz said.

Both House and Senate versions of the bill failed to move out of committee, but were rescheduled.

Wagoner, the main sponsor of the legislation, expressed frustration Wednesday at the bill's lack of progress.

"It seems that we are being dragged back into the PPT debate, which never had any discussion on the maintenance issue," he said.

Daily News reporter Sabra Ayres can be reached at sayres@adn.com or 907-586-1531.

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http://www.adn.com/money/industries/oil/prudhoe/story/8677754p-8572162c.html

Conoco's profits hit $2.3 billion
2006: Prudhoe Bay leaks and other factors cut output by 31,000 barrels a day.
By WESLEY LOY
Anchorage Daily News
Published: March 1, 2007
Last Modified: March 1, 2007 at 02:29 AM

Conoco Phillips made a monster $2.3 billion profit on its Alaska oil production last year, despite a partial shutdown of the giant Prudhoe Bay field due to leaks from corroded pipes.

PROFITS GRAPHIC
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Powered by continued high oil prices, the company's profit was only slightly lower than its record 2005 tally of $2.6 billion.

The profit figures are contained in an annual report the Houston-based oil company filed Friday with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.

Conoco is Alaska's top producer of crude oil and natural gas, and the firm's financial disclosures contain more Alaska-specific detail than those filed by the state's other two major oil producers, Exxon Mobil and BP. Those firms are larger than Conoco and they don't break down Alaska financial information to the same degree.

Conoco owns a 36 percent share of BP-run Prudhoe Bay, the nation's largest oil field. Conoco also owns majority stakes in the state's next two largest oil fields, Kuparuk and Alpine, as well as a 28 percent share of the trans-Alaska oil pipeline. The company also owns the most prolific Cook Inlet natural gas field.

The company's average daily crude production slipped by 31,000 barrels last year to 263,000 barrels. Conoco attributed about a third of the decline to the partial shutdown of the Prudhoe Bay field from early August to October.

Among other disclosures in Conoco's annual report:

• The company said it drilled seven exploration wells in 2006, two of which turned out to be dry holes with the other five striking "commercial quantities of oil." Three of the finds were in the West Sak field, believed to hold billions of barrels of thick and sticky crude known as heavy oil, with the others in the vicinity of Prudhoe Bay and Alpine.

Dawn Patience, a Conoco spokeswoman in Anchorage, said Wednesday the company is drilling five exploration wells this winter -- three in the Kuparuk field and two in the National Petroleum Reserve-Alaska.

• The company plans capital spending of $783 million this year in Alaska, down slightly from the $820 million in 2006. Some of the money will go toward exploiting the West Sak oil and developing small "satellite" fields that will feed oil by pipeline to Alpine for processing.

Two such satellites, called Nanuq and Fiord, started up last year. Conoco said it plans to drill dozens more wells to boost output at the satellites. And it plans to develop a third satellite on the Qannik discovery announced last year. Production from that satellite is expected to begin by late 2008, the company said.

• Federal investigations into possible environmental violations aboard two of the company's new double-hull tankers remain unresolved, Conoco said. The company reported receiving subpoenas from the U.S. Attorney's Office in Anchorage in 2004 and 2005.

• On a per-barrel basis, oil production in Alaska became considerably more expensive last year, averaging $6.38 per barrel compared with $3.91 the prior year, Conoco said.

Elsewhere, the company reported averages last year of $4.85 per barrel in the Lower 48, $9.05 in Canada and $4.51 in the Middle East and Africa.

A decline in overall oil production can mean higher per-barrel costs, but Patience wasn't able to fully account for the steep rise in Alaska production costs.

Alaska long has been a cornerstone of Conoco's business, dating back to 1968 when the company, then known as Atlantic Richfield or Arco, confirmed its wildcat well had made a big strike at Prudhoe Bay, a find that would catapult both the company and Alaska's economy.

Daily News reporter Wesley Loy can be reached at wloy@adn.com or 257-4590.